oficina / slides Public

slice-2-editor

No handoff yet. An agent working here writes one with amadan branch handoff, so that whoever picks the branch up next — a person, or another agent on another machine — can start without reading the whole history.

Recently

Human

<task-notification> <task-id>aa44a1b73602950fe</task-id> <tool-use-id>toolu_01G4vk8PE6z6BoeyymVJz8ef</tool-use-id> <output-file>/home/paulca/.cache/tmp/claude-1001/-home-paulca-amadan-net-oficina/2420c44b-a27a-4e0d-bbe7-8b3ca0464c21/tasks/aa44a1b73602950fe.output</output-file> <status>completed</status> <summary>Agent "Re-review slice 2 fix wave" finished</summary> <note>A task-notification fires each time this agent stops with no live background children of its own. The user can send it another message and resume it, so the same task-id may notify more than once.</note> <result>All findings verified against both static evidence and live test runs. Final report below. ### Findings 1. CRITICAL poison update: ADDRESSED — `internal/slides/live.go:271-431` (`previewUpdate` gates on a fresh handle outside the transaction via `h.Apply`+`h.JSON`+`deck.Parse`, refusing 422 before storage; `mirrorMeta` at line 421 takes the pre-parsed `*deck.Deck` instead of re-reading); `core/src/view.rs:83-213` (typed-leaf helpers `box_value`/`background_value`/`fonts_value`/`phone_value`/`asset_value`, omit/default malformed shapes); `fixtures/view.mjs:19-104` mirrors the same rules key-for-key. Tests: Rust `core/src/view.rs` `mod tests` (4/4 pass), JS `fixtures/view.test.mjs` (6/6 pass, includes a determinism check across both), Go `TestPoisonUpdateDoesNotBrickTheDeck` in `internal/slidestest/live_test.go:596-696` (9/9 subtests pass, verified live). Named risks (a) and (b) both hold up under inspection: same `update` bytes used for gate and storage, fresh handle per retry attempt (`internal/slides/live.go:283-317`), and wasm call count did not grow (Apply+JSON now happen once in `previewUpdate`, `mirrorMeta` no longer calls the module). 2. `deleteDeck` cascades `deck_snapshots` (and `deck_assets`): ADDRESSED — `internal/slides/decks.go:1036-1046`; `TestDeleteDeckTakesItsDerivedRowsToo` in `internal/slidestest/decks_test.go:227-266`, verified passing live. 3. `failed` save state: ADDRESSED — `fixtures/status.mjs` (`queueStatusState`, `statusState`), `fixtures/editor-entry.js:96,158-160,393-400,562-564`, `internal/slides/locales/en.toml:203`, `internal/slides/editor.go:83,222`, `internal/slides/templates/editor.html:44,97`. Named risk (f) confirmed: `fixtures/save-queue.mjs:85-89` reports `'failed'` only for `4xx`, `'retrying'` for exceptions/`5xx`; `editor-entry.js` maps them distinctly via `queueStatusState`. `TestEditorPageLinksTheCommittedBundle` verified passing live. 4. `deck_assets` gate: ADDRESSED — `internal/slides/models.go:154-181` (`DeckAsset`, unique `(deck_id, ref)`), `internal/slides/migrations/0007_create_deck_assets.sql` (additive, matches `schema.sql`), `internal/slides/assets.go:358-372` (`registerAsset` writes the row with `ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`, failure fails the request), `internal/slides/assets.go:500-524` (`serveAsset` requires the row via indexed COUNT before `openDeck`). Named risk (c) confirmed: `deckAsset`, `sharedAsset`, `presentAsset` (lines 448-483) all funnel through the same `serveAsset`. `TestUnverifiedRefIsNotServed` in `internal/slidestest/assets_test.go:463-524` exercises both the session route and the share-link route; verified passing live. 5. `strip.mjs` focus-preserving reorder: ADDRESSED — `fixtures/strip.mjs:96-119` (`sync` moves only out-of-place nodes via `insertBefore`, restores `document.activeElement`), `fixtures/dom-stub.mjs:64-93` adds blur-on-remove/`focus()`. `strip.test.mjs` new test verified passing live (`moved === ['c']`, focus preserved, no-op sync moves nothing). 6. Gate/docs fixes: ADDRESSED — `.amadan/ci.d/10-gate:29-56` (`git clean` removed, tracked files restored via `git checkout --`, status list with legend printed on failure — named risk (e): tracked/M restored, untracked/?? left and named, message accurate); `.amadan/README.md`, `docs/api.md:461-475` (`unsupported_type` dropped from the registration refusal list, `not_an_image` clarified, verified-asset requirement documented), `AGENTS.md:190-198` (300-line claim qualified for `canvas.mjs`), `README.md:74-83` ("commit it for you" wording + https/secure-context note). 7. Spec §3.2 badge deviation: ADDRESSED — `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-09-07-slides-design.md:258-262`. ### New Breakage in Fix Diff (Critical/Important only) None found. Full verification run: `go build ./...` and `go vet ./...` clean; `go test ./...` all packages `ok` (internal/slidestest 31.3s); `cargo test --manifest-path core/Cargo.toml` 22 lib + 1 + 9 integration, all pass; `cd fixtures &amp;&amp; node --test *.test.mjs` → 137/137 pass — all matching the fix report's claimed counts exactly. No signature-change fallout found for `mirrorMeta`/`commitUpdate`/`previewUpdate` (only call site is `appendUpdate`; the in-package `live_test.go` unit test targets the untouched `metaRowChanges` helper, not `mirrorMeta` directly). ### Out-of-Scope Observations None beyond what the fix report already discloses as residual risk (magnitude poisons reaching the log by a road other than `appendUpdate`; pre-existing decks whose assets predate the `deck_assets` migration will need re-registration) — both already called out honestly in the report's "Concerns and residuals" section and don't constitute new breakage from this diff. ### Verdict All findings addressed (7/7). No new breakage detected.</result> <usage><subagent_tokens>109096</subagent_tokens><tool_uses>38</tool_uses><duration_ms>202248</duration_ms></usage> </task-notification>

Human

<task-notification> <task-id>a3d3b98d84ac2ceb0</task-id> <tool-use-id>toolu_01WczL3FpFmHqEwfcWyirwvm</tool-use-id> <output-file>/home/paulca/.cache/tmp/claude-1001/-home-paulca-amadan-net-oficina/2420c44b-a27a-4e0d-bbe7-8b3ca0464c21/tasks/a3d3b98d84ac2ceb0.output</output-file> <status>completed</status> <summary>Agent "Slice 2 final fix wave" finished</summary> <note>A task-notification fires each time this agent stops with no live background children of its own. The user can send it another message and resume it, so the same task-id may notify more than once.</note> <result>**Status:** Done. All 7 items fixed test-first; worktree clean at the commit; not pushed. **Commit:** `0af8aaf` — `fix: final review — parse gate on updates, tolerant view, snapshot cascade, failed save state, verified assets` (both trailers present). **Tests:** Rust 22 lib + 10 integration pass (4 new view tests); JS 137/137 (16 new: `view.test.mjs`, `status.test.mjs`, strip focus test); Go `go test ./...` all `ok` incl. `TestPoisonUpdateDoesNotBrickTheDeck` (9/9 subtests), `TestDeleteDeckTakesItsDerivedRowsToo`, `TestUnverifiedRefIsNotServed`; `make ci` green; wasm rebuilt + `cmp` identical; vectors regenerated with no drift; bundle `editor.8282c2af4a08f493.js` reproducible; full gate on a clean `git archive HEAD` export → `gate: ok` (exit 0). Report: `.superpowers/sdd/2026-09-07-slice-2-editor/final-fix-report.md`. **Concerns:** 1. Brief said "each poison POST is 422" — impossible once the tolerant view (layer b) exists: the four shapes are now accepted (204) and render; the 422 gate (layer a) is proved instead with a fifth shape, `magnitude` (`phone.order = 1e300`, passes the view, fails Go's `*int`). Both layers independently tested; the bypass-the-gate subtests prove (b). 2. Residual: magnitude poison that reaches the log by any road other than `appendUpdate` still bricks — fix is `deck.PhoneOverride.Order`/`Asset.Width/Height` decoding like `Block.Z`; small, slice 3. 3. Assets registered before this commit have no `deck_assets` row and will 404 until re-registered — no store is bound in production today, so nothing real is affected; note it in the merge discussion. 4. The gate's new `require_committed` failure branch wasn't entered in the green run; verified by `bash -n` and inspection only.</result> <usage><subagent_tokens>260279</subagent_tokens><tool_uses>149</tool_uses><duration_ms>1161443</duration_ms></usage> </task-notification>

Human

<task-notification> <task-id>a25e9c1897f6441be</task-id> <tool-use-id>toolu_01WL8GWWZfFVMKqhQZwPqJw8</tool-use-id> <output-file>/home/paulca/.cache/tmp/claude-1001/-home-paulca-amadan-net-oficina/2420c44b-a27a-4e0d-bbe7-8b3ca0464c21/tasks/a25e9c1897f6441be.output</output-file> <status>completed</status> <summary>Agent "Slice 2 final whole-branch review" finished</summary> <note>A task-notification fires each time this agent stops with no live background children of its own. The user can send it another message and resume it, so the same task-id may notify more than once.</note> <result>I worked in four passes (server transport and integrity; core tolerance and CSRF; a poison-update experiment in a scratch copy plus a11y/docs/tests; canary probes), no subagents. Worktree untouched; the experiment ran in `/home/paulca/.cache/tmp/claude-1001/slides-scratch` and `/poison`. ### Summary Slice 2 lands the whole plan: the live-sync wire, hub, snapshots, the editor, inspector, canvas, switcher, presence, assets and the JS-aware gate, with real HTTP tests and a canary that answers the right unauthenticated shapes (`/api/version` → `526061d`; signed-out GETs 303 to `/signin`; POST/PUT without a session 403). One Critical stands: a member can POST a well-formed Yjs update whose values have the wrong *type* (a `box` with a string `x`, a `background.kind` number, a non-object `assets` entry, a non-string `fonts` field), the core accepts it, `commitUpdate` stores it, and from then on `openDeck` fails at `deck.Parse` for every surface and every write path — the deck is bricked with no path back short of DB surgery. Two Importants (snapshots are not cascaded on delete; a dropped 4xx batch is shown as "Offline, retrying") and a handful of small items round it out. ### Plan alignment All seven tasks are present and match the plan's Global Constraints: framing and `Slides-Seq` derived from the body (`live.go:113`), `Slides-Snapshot` at `since=0` only, SSE with `update`/`presence`/ping and the presentation stream's timings, snapshots at 200 by the crossing request after commit, presence in the hub only, 503 without a store, one bundle, Docs' three modules copied verbatim. Op vocabulary: `core/src/ops.rs` has 15 variants; `fixtures/ops-parse.mjs` has the same 15 cases; nothing on one side only. The browser builds no slide structure itself (`innerHTML` only receives server HTML in `stage.mjs:234` and `strip.mjs:125`; the rest is chrome — handles, avatars, list rows). Deviations, all rulinged or reported: `verify-rust.mjs` became `core/vectors_test.go` (equivalent, and the gate regenerates vectors); href map shape (row 12); fonts as CSS strings; the phone-override badge is in the inspector, not on the stage block (spec §3.2, Task 5 report); the "failed" status state the ledger deferred to Task 7 was not added. ### Findings **Critical** 1. **A poison update bricks a deck for everyone.** `commitUpdate` (`live.go:314-317`) only asks the core whether the bytes *apply*; it never asks whether the resulting view still parses. The Rust view is tolerant at the top level (`schema::maps_of`, `get_string` return defaults for wrong shapes) but passes `box`, `background`, `fonts`, `phone` and every `assets` entry through as whatever object is there (`view.rs:105,126,147,155`), and `deck.Parse` (`deck.go:173`) unmarshals into typed structs. Reproduced in the scratch copy with updates minted by the fixtures' own `yjs`: of 15 shapes, four brick — `box.x = "a"`, `background.kind = 5`, `fonts.body = []`, `assets.x = "str"` — each with `deck: parse view: json: cannot unmarshal …`. `openDeck` (`decks.go:192-221`) sits under the viewer, the editor, `deckSlide`, `serveAsset`, the API's `editDeck` **and** `appendUpdate` itself, so after the row commits nothing can render and nothing can write. Fix, two layers: (a) in `appendUpdate`, move `h.Apply` out of the transaction and follow it with `h.JSON` + `deck.Parse` *before* the insert, answering 422 (`errUpdateRefused`) on a parse failure — this costs no extra wasm call, because `mirrorMeta` (`live.go:389`) already does that read after commit; hand it the parsed view instead. (b) In `view.rs`, emit `box`/`background`/`fonts`/`phone` only when every field has the right type and skip `assets` entries that are not maps with a string `ref`, mirror that in `fixtures/view.mjs`, add a vector. Add `TestPoisonUpdateDoesNotBrickTheDeck` in `slidestest/live_test.go` posting the four shapes and asserting `GET /d/{sqid}` still 200s. The existing `TestRefusedUpdateIs422` only posts non-Yjs bytes. **Important** 2. **`deleteDeck` does not delete `deck_snapshots`** (`decks.go:1031-1047` deletes presentations, updates, grants, share links, the row). `decks.id` is `AUTOINCREMENT` (`0002_create_decks.sql`), so the orphan cannot be replayed into a reused id, but each orphan is a whole copy of a deleted deck kept forever. One more `tx.Where("deck_id = ?", d.ID).Delete(&amp;DeckSnapshot{})` and an assertion in `decks_test.go`. 3. **A dropped batch is reported as "Offline, retrying."** `save-queue.mjs` correctly drops a 4xx batch and emits `failed`; `editor-entry.js:390-395` maps every non-ok state to `offline` and marks `sessionFailed`, so the person sees `slides.editor.status.offline` ("Offline, retrying") while their edits have been discarded and the resync has rebuilt the doc without them. Add a `failed` state with its own catalog line ("Some changes could not be saved; reload to continue") — the ledger deferred this to Task 7 and Task 7 did not do it. 4. **The SVG gate can be bypassed by writing the ref straight into the document.** `registerAsset` sanitises and stores clean bytes under a new hash, but the doc is written by the client's `register_asset` op, and any member can POST an update naming the *unsanitised* hash they PUT via the presigned URL. `serveAsset` (`assets.go:475-487`) then finds the ref in `view.Assets` and, with an S3 store, 302s to the raw object — served from the bucket's origin (so not an XSS on this app; the Dir path is protected by the CSP sandbox). Not a merge blocker while no store is bound; before one is, either record verified refs server-side (a small `deck_assets(deck_id, ref)` table written by `registerAsset` and required by `serveAsset`) or sniff-and-sanitise on the Dir path and only presign refs that table holds. **Minor** 5. `strip.mjs:105` re-appends every `&lt;li&gt;` on a remote reorder, which drops focus from a focused strip item (WCAG 2.2, ledger's own deferred line). Only move nodes whose position differs, and restore `document.activeElement` afterwards. 6. Presence `client` is client-chosen (`live.go:616`): a member can overwrite a colleague's cursor by reusing their client id. Cosmetic within a team; keying the map by `(user, client)` closes it. 7. `/s/{token}/assets/{ref}` and `serveAsset` generally instantiate a wasm module and replay the log per image, and the share route is unauthenticated. The per-(deck, seq) view cache the ledger deferred would cover both; until then a share-link holder can make each image cost a replay. 8. A member in a loop can open unbounded streams; each is one goroutine for up to 5 minutes. Same as Docs; a per-user cap on `Subscribe` is a later change. 9. Undo scoping is right (`trackedOrigins = {ySyncPluginKey, LOCAL}`, remote bytes tagged `REMOTE`), the CSS `[slides-editor] [hidden]` rule is right, the presence live region speaks only on join/leave — credit, no action. ### Deferred/parked triage Fix before merge: #3 (failed state), #5 (strip focus), and the ledger's "delete cascades" gap surfaces as #2. Later: 409/ping/TTL tests, `ids.mjs` test, `raw=1`, thumb scale, `data-seq`, nudge coalescing, the stage phone-override badge (record the spec §3.2 deviation in the spec), the `(deck, seq)` cache (#7), the real-bucket PUT test and the https requirement for `crypto.subtle` (say it in README), the snapshot ABI column (snapshot bytes are Yjs v1, not ABI-bound; fine to wait), the `nohash` message. Accepted: `mirrorMeta` lag window. ### Docs consistency Ten claims checked against code and all hold: 503 without a store; snapshot cadence 200; the wire's framing, headers and `since=0` snapshot; presence whole-set with name/colour from the users row; both write paths publish and snapshot; `build-bundles.mjs` deletes stale hashes; 20 MiB and four types; three capability-keyed asset routes; undo scoped to the person; the gate's step list. One wording nit: README's "CI does not build it for you" sits beside "the gate rebuilds and diffs" — say "CI does not commit it for you". ### Tests Real HTTP throughout `slidestest`; the stream test is event-driven with no sleeps; the only `time.After` is a poll in the browser drive. Seven browser drives plus the upload drive match what the reports claim. `make ci` is the Go half of the one gate, and the gate's `require_committed` restores the tree on failure — well done. ### Verdict: Needs fixes Blocking: **#1** (pre-commit parse gate in `appendUpdate` plus the tolerant view and its test), **#2** (snapshot cascade), **#3** (failed status state). Recommended in the same round because they are small: **#5**. **#4** must land before `carlos store create` is run.</result> <usage><subagent_tokens>176682</subagent_tokens><tool_uses>56</tool_uses><duration_ms>469170</duration_ms></usage> </task-notification>

Human

<task-notification> <task-id>a2bf2ef366d00a320</task-id> <tool-use-id>toolu_01JdrQzCmKKyrqkaqE1r3C3X</tool-use-id> <output-file>/home/paulca/.cache/tmp/claude-1001/-home-paulca-amadan-net-oficina/2420c44b-a27a-4e0d-bbe7-8b3ca0464c21/tasks/a2bf2ef366d00a320.output</output-file> <status>completed</status> <summary>Agent "Review slice 2 Task 7" finished</summary> <note>A task-notification fires each time this agent stops with no live background children of its own. The user can send it another message and resume it, so the same task-id may notify more than once.</note> <result>### Spec Compliance Task 7's first two bullets are implemented and match the brief. - **Gate** (`.amadan/ci.d/10-gate`): adds `node`/`npm` to the tool-check loop, `npm ci --cache "${NPM_CACHE:-$HOME/.npm}"` from `fixtures/`, `node --test *.test.mjs` (deliberately not `node --test fixtures/`, which Node 24 silently no-ops on), `node generate.mjs` + a freshness check on `fixtures/vectors`, `node build-bundles.mjs` + a freshness check on `internal/slides/static`, then `make ci` (which still runs the Go `vectors_test`). Order, `set -euo pipefail`, and the wasm `cmp` step are all unchanged and intact — verified by reading the full current script (`.amadan/ci.d/10-gate` lines 1–166). - **Docs**: `AGENTS.md`, `README.md`, `PRODUCT.md`, `docs/api.md` all rewritten to describe the editor, the live-sync wire, the fixtures rule, the bundle, the `href` ruling, the seams (`render.SlideWith`/`serveAsset`), what's not built, and the 503-without-a-store behavior. `.amadan/README.md` updated with the JS toolchain section and the `npm ci`-needs-registry trade-off. - Task 7's third bullet (`make release`, `carlos deploy`, canary walk, push, branch discussion) is explicitly and correctly left to the controller — the report says so plainly, and nothing in the diff claims it happened. ### Strengths - `require_committed()` is a clean, well-justified abstraction: it correctly explains *why* both `git diff --exit-code --name-status` and `git status --porcelain` are needed (a moved content hash produces a deletion **and** an untracked file — `git diff` alone misses half of it), and the report backs this with a concrete RED-run reproduction (renaming the committed bundle file) that shows exactly the failure mode the second check catches. - The report is unusually self-aware: it flags its own weak points (vector-check redundancy with `ops.test.mjs`, `npm ci` needing the registry, the gate never having run on the real runner, and the `git clean -fdq`) rather than hiding them. - Spot-checking a dozen factual claims against code found the documentation largely accurate: routes in `app.go`, `Slides-Seq`/`Slides-Snapshot` headers and 4-byte framing in `live.go`, 1 MiB update cap, SSE timings (15s ping / 5min TTL from `presentation.go`), presence heartbeat (20s, `fixtures/presence.mjs`) and two-missed-beats sweep (`live/hub.go`), `assets.go`'s 20 MiB cap and four allowed types, the editor's three panes and three-section inspector in `editor.html`, the `href` one-key-map shape in `core/src/schema.rs`, the 318-key catalog count (`grep -cE '^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+ *=' internal/slides/locales/en.toml` reproduces exactly), and the "five vectors" claim (5 files in `fixtures/data/` and `fixtures/vectors/`) all check out. - No doc claims the editor was walked by hand in this task; the only "walks" references are to the automated `browser_test.go`, consistent with the report's honest disclosure that this task's docs came from reading code and prior reports, not from using the editor. ### Issues **Important** 1. **`require_committed`'s `git clean -fdq` is not clearly a data-loss warning, though it is narrowly scoped and largely justified.** It only runs on the failure branch, and only against the two directories being checked (`fixtures/vectors`, `internal/slides/static`), both of which are pure generated-and-committed output by design — nothing legitimate is meant to be hand-authored there. So in practice what gets deleted is either regenerable build output (the intended case) or a forbidden hand-edit to a vector (arguably correct to discard). The real gotcha: if a developer adds a new `fixtures/data/*.json` and runs the gate for the first time, `node generate.mjs` correctly produces the new vector files, the check sees them as untracked ("stale"), prints `gate: vectors are stale: run node fixtures/generate.mjs and commit` to stderr, and then **immediately deletes the very file the message told them to commit** before they can `git add` it. Re-running `generate.mjs` recovers it, but the sequence is confusing and worth a one-line fix (either mention explicitly that the check restores the directory, or reorder the message to say so). Not a blocker given the narrow scope, but it's the one named risk here that isn't fully resolved, only noted by the report's own concern #4. **Minor** 2. **`docs/api.md`'s refusal list for `POST /d/{sqid}/assets` is slightly wrong.** It lists `unsupported_type` as one of that endpoint's possible refusals (docs/api.md, "Refusals are..." under `### POST /d/{sqid}/assets`), but `registerAsset` (`internal/slides/assets.go` lines 268–360) never emits `unsupported_type` — that code belongs only to `signUpload` (line 165). A bad content type reaching `registerAsset` comes back as `not_an_image` (from `sniffImage`, line 328) instead. One word in an enumerated list; trivial fix. 3. **AGENTS.md's line-count claim is off by 19 lines.** "How the editor is put together" states "every other module under `fixtures/` is one concern and stays under 300 lines," but `fixtures/canvas.mjs` is 319 lines (`wc -l fixtures/canvas.mjs`). Either the claim needs qualifying (e.g., "close to 300") or the file needs trimming; as written it's factually false. ### Assessment **Needs fixes** — but the fixes are small and mechanical, not structural. The gate implementation itself is sound: step order, `set -euo pipefail`, the wasm `cmp`, and `NPM_CACHE` handling are all intact and correct, and the `require_committed` design is well-reasoned and proven against real failure scenarios. The documentation is substantially accurate on spot-check (10 of 12 checked claims verified exactly against code), but two concrete factual errors were found (the `unsupported_type` refusal misattribution and the false "under 300 lines" claim), and the one named safety risk the controller asked about — the failure-branch `git clean -fdq` — is acceptable in principle but not clearly communicated as a discard-on-failure behavior to a developer reading the printed message in the moment. None of these require redesign; they're a few lines each to correct before merge.</result> <usage><subagent_tokens>132208</subagent_tokens><tool_uses>36</tool_uses><duration_ms>266151</duration_ms></usage> </task-notification>

Human

<task-notification> <task-id>a791d599856ae38ae</task-id> <tool-use-id>toolu_01BYcXDQ4Y5TryEvbHangcfz</tool-use-id> <output-file>/home/paulca/.cache/tmp/claude-1001/-home-paulca-amadan-net-oficina/2420c44b-a27a-4e0d-bbe7-8b3ca0464c21/tasks/a791d599856ae38ae.output</output-file> <status>completed</status> <summary>Agent "S2 Task 7: gate and docs" finished</summary> <note>A task-notification fires each time this agent stops with no live background children of its own. The user can send it another message and resume it, so the same task-id may notify more than once.</note> <result>Status: DONE. Task 7's deploy bullet (`make release`, `carlos deploy`, canary walk, push, branch discussion) is untouched — that is the controller's. Commit: `526061d` — docs: slice 2 in AGENTS, README, PRODUCT, api.md; gate runs the JS toolchain (7 files, +671/−108, both trailers present, nothing pushed). Gate: green end to end on a clean `git archive HEAD` export (fresh `git init` so status/diff are meaningful) — `128 pass, 0 fail` node tests, 5 vectors regenerated clean, bundle rebuilt to the same `editor.d193d83bc4c2adaa.js`, `make ci` green, `gate: ok`, exit 0, export tree clean afterwards. Both new checks proven able to fail: a tampered vector (exit 1) and a renamed committed bundle (`D` + `??`, the stale-bundle message, exit 1, tree restored). Concerns: the vector-freshness step is largely redundant with `ops.test.mjs`, which fires first (the untracked half still earns it); `npm ci` now needs the npm registry at run time and whether the amadan runner reaches it is unverified; the gate has never run on the runner with these steps; `require_committed` uses a path-scoped `git clean -fdq` on its failure branch; and every claim in the docs comes from reading code and the six task reports, not from opening the editor. Report: `/home/paulca/amadan.net/oficina/slides/.claude/worktrees/slice-1/.superpowers/sdd/2026-09-07-slice-2-editor/task-7-report.md`</result> <usage><subagent_tokens>238266</subagent_tokens><tool_uses>147</tool_uses><duration_ms>913681</duration_ms></usage> </task-notification>

Human

<task-notification> <task-id>a5190df1c0b6496d2</task-id> <tool-use-id>toolu_01UcYRfYJ99nFbQbUaFo43K3</tool-use-id> <output-file>/home/paulca/.cache/tmp/claude-1001/-home-paulca-amadan-net-oficina/2420c44b-a27a-4e0d-bbe7-8b3ca0464c21/tasks/a5190df1c0b6496d2.output</output-file> <status>completed</status> <summary>Agent "Review slice 2 Task 6" finished</summary> <note>A task-notification fires each time this agent stops with no live background children of its own. The user can send it another message and resume it, so the same task-id may notify more than once.</note> <result>This matches what I've reviewed. I have sufficient evidence to write the review. --- ## Output ### Spec Compliance Matches §2.7 and §2.4 fully, and follows the plan's "Assets" global constraint and controller decisions precisely: - `POST /d/{sqid}/uploads` signs a presigned PUT or answers `503 {"error":"no_store"}`; enforces 20 MiB and the four types (png/jpeg/webp/svg). - `POST /d/{sqid}/assets` verifies the object exists and is an image by sniffing bytes (not trusting the client's declared content-type), sanitises SVG, mints a fresh id, and answers the validated record — it does **not** write the Y.Doc. The client applies `register_asset` + `set_block` as one batch (`inspector-ops.mjs:registerAssetOps`), confirmed by `fixtures/uploads.test.mjs` ("one finished upload is register_asset plus the block that uses it, in one batch"). - Asset serving is deck-keyed on all three surfaces (`/d/{sqid}/assets/{ref}`, `/s/{token}/assets/{ref}`, `/p/{session}/assets/{ref}`), one `serveAsset` body, 302 to presigned GET or the file in dev, unknown/unregistered → 404. `render.Options.AssetBase` threaded through all render call sites; asset id never leaks into a URL; unregistered asset → `data-missing-asset`, never a broken `&lt;img&gt;`. - Inspector: labelled file input, required alt unless decorative (enforced both client — `uploads.mjs`'s `altfirst` — and server — `alt_required`), fit/radius carried over from task 4, progress/errors as `role="status"` text, store-missing state server-rendered (`HasStore`/`AcceptTypes`). - "Unused assets" list with Remove, reconciled by id like the Blocks list (focus-preserving). - `uploads.mjs` state machine `choose → sign → put → register → op`, fully seamed/fakeable; all listed tests present (`TestUploadWithoutStoreIs503`, `TestUploadAndRegisterWithDirStore`, `TestSvgIsSanitised`, `TestAssetServeRedirects`, `uploads.test.mjs`). - Dev-only same-origin PUT and CORS operator note both present in `docs/api.md`. - Exactly one bundle file committed (`editor.d193d83bc4c2adaa.js`); the stale `editor.626eebe67341d5d8.js` is deleted in the same diff. ### Strengths - **SVG sanitiser is a real, two-pass implementation**, not regex soup: pass 1 is a genuine `encoding/xml` parse that refuses any `DOCTYPE`/`ENTITY` directive or non-`xml` processing instruction outright (`checkSVGWellFormed`), which forecloses XXE and billion-laughs — Go's `xml.Decoder` has no entity map configured, so an undeclared entity is already an error, and a document that needs one declared is refused before that even matters. `svg_test.go` explicitly covers the `&lt;!DOCTYPE svg [&lt;!ENTITY x "boom"&gt;]&gt;` case. Pass 2 drops `&lt;script&gt;`/`&lt;foreignObject&gt;` subtrees whole, strips `on*` attributes and `javascript:`/`vbscript:`/`data:text/html` schemes (including the entity-obfuscated `java&amp;#115;cript:` case, tested), and *refuses the whole document* (not silently drops) on any external `href`/`xlink:href`/`src`, `&lt;use&gt;` reference, `@import`, or `url()` reaching outside the document. A final self-containment pass re-checks `&lt;style&gt;` CSS after rewriting. This is stricter than "drop the bad bit" — a document that can't be made fully safe is refused, never half-cleaned. - **Sanitised bytes are what's stored**, confirmed end-to-end by `TestSvgUploadIsSanitisedBeforeItIsServed`: dirty SVG registers at a new address, the served bytes have no `script`/`onload`/`onclick`, and the original dirty address is verified unreachable (404) because `serveAsset` only answers for refs the deck's own `assets` map holds. - **Cross-deck asset isolation is directly tested**: `TestAssetIsKeyedByTheDeckThatHoldsIt` proves a ref registered on deck A 404s on deck B via both the session route and a share link scoped to deck B, plus an unknown share token 404s too. Revocation itself reuses `deckForShareLink`, which already treats a revoked link the same as a missing one (404, not 410) — shared by the viewer page and the asset route by design, so there's one lookup rather than two that could disagree. - **Content-type on serve is derived from sniffed bytes**, never the client's claim (`sniffImage(raw)` in `serveAsset`), with `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, `Content-Disposition: inline`, and `Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox` on every served asset — belt-and-braces given SVGs are served from the app's own origin. - **Dev-only PUT is capability-gated, not env-gated, but the two are behaviorally equivalent here**: `cmd/slides/main.go:newBlobs` only ever binds `*blobs.S3` (production) or `blobs.Dir` (only when `env == development`) or `nil`; `putUpload` refuses 404 whenever the bound store implements `presigner` (i.e., is S3). So production never reaches the app-process PUT path even though the guard isn't a literal `Env ==` check. - **20 MiB is enforced in all three places it needs to be**: the sign endpoint refuses an oversize claim, `putUpload` wraps the body in `http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxAssetBytes)`, and `registerAsset`'s `readAsset` re-checks the object actually read back is within bound (since a presigned PUT bypasses the app entirely) — `TestUploadLimits` covers both directions. - No English literals in JS: `uploads.mjs` and `inspector-image.mjs` carry only internal state/error codes; every user-facing string comes from `labels`/catalog data attributes, verified against `en.toml`'s `slides.assets.*` and `slides.editor.block.image.*` keys — all present, complete, and consistent with the codes the Go and JS sides emit. - Width/height are explicitly *not* verified against the decoded object server-side (only bounded to a sane range) — this matches the spec's own text ("verifies the object exists and is an image"; no mention of dimension verification), and is documented as advisory in the code comment. - The one bug the report says the browser drive found — nothing observed `doc.getMap('assets')`, so registering/removing an image left the Unused list and slide stale — is genuinely fixed: `watchDoc` now observes the assets map and triggers `refreshAfterSave`/`refreshStages`/`fillSoon()` exactly like the `meta` map, and the map is also added to `Y.UndoManager`'s tracked roots so an asset op undoes with everything else. - Go tests, node tests, `go vet`, and `gofmt -l` all pass clean when re-run independently in this review (`internal/slides/...`, `internal/slidestest/...` asset/upload/svg subset, `fixtures/uploads.test.mjs` + `assets.test.mjs`). ### Issues #### Critical None found. #### Important None found. #### Minor - `serveAsset` performs a full `openDeck` (wasm replay) per asset request on an unauthenticated surface (`/s/{token}/assets/{ref}`, `/p/{session}/assets/{ref}`); a slide with several images is several replays per page load, and nothing bounds a share-link holder hitting this in a loop. The report already flags this and defers a `(deck id, seq)` cache to a later task — reasonable given no rate limiting exists anywhere else in this app either, but worth carrying forward explicitly rather than only in a prior report. - A presigned PUT is untested against a real bucket (acknowledged in the report); the CORS note in `docs/api.md` is the only mitigation until a real deployment exercises it. - `crypto.subtle` requires a secure context; a non-https, non-localhost deployment fails uploads at the hash step with a generic `nohash` message rather than something more specific. Low risk since real deployments are https, per the report. - `.amadan/ci.d/10-gate` still doesn't run `npm ci`/`node --test`/the bundle-hash check (carried over, not this task's regression); node tests and bundle reproducibility were verified by hand rather than by CI here, same as prior tasks in this slice. ### Assessment **Task quality:** Approved **Reasoning:** Every controller decision in the brief is implemented and independently verified against the diff and a live re-run of the relevant tests (Go: `TestUploadWithoutStoreIs503`, `TestUploadAndRegisterWithDirStore`, `TestUploadLimits`, `TestSvgUploadIsSanitisedBeforeItIsServed`, `TestAssetServeRedirects`, `TestAssetIsKeyedByTheDeckThatHoldsIt`, `TestSharedDeckServesItsOwnAssets`, `TestPresentedDeckServesItsOwnAssets`, `TestSvgIsSanitised`, plus the render-package tests; Node: `uploads.test.mjs`, `assets.test.mjs` — all green; `go vet` and `gofmt -l` clean). The named-risk areas hold up under direct inspection: the SVG sanitiser is a real XML-parse-then-scan implementation that refuses (not silently patches) XXE/entity vectors and every external-reference class named in the brief, sanitised bytes are what gets stored and re-served, cross-deck asset isolation is both implemented and tested, content-type on serve is sniffed rather than trusted, security headers are present on every served asset, and the dev-only PUT path is unreachable in any realistic production configuration given how this app's own `newBlobs` binds stores. No critical or important issues found; the minor items are pre-existing or already self-disclosed concerns for follow-up work, not defects in this task.</result> <usage><subagent_tokens>135559</subagent_tokens><tool_uses>56</tool_uses><duration_ms>255301</duration_ms></usage> </task-notification>

Human

<task-notification> <task-id>a09be88f863807c6e</task-id> <tool-use-id>toolu_01WpvaRr1TS18RJ3FmE5H6qv</tool-use-id> <output-file>/home/paulca/.cache/tmp/claude-1001/-home-paulca-amadan-net-oficina/2420c44b-a27a-4e0d-bbe7-8b3ca0464c21/tasks/a09be88f863807c6e.output</output-file> <status>completed</status> <summary>Agent "S2 Task 6: assets and uploads" finished</summary> <note>A task-notification fires each time this agent stops with no live background children of its own. The user can send it another message and resume it, so the same task-id may notify more than once.</note> <result>Status: done. Tree clean, gate green at HEAD. **Commit** `1533194` — `feat: image upload and assets` **Tests** - `make ci` green; node `128 pass / 0 fail` (new: `uploads.test.mjs` 10, `assets.test.mjs` 5). - New Go tests: `TestSvgIsSanitised` (unit), `TestUploadWithoutStoreIs503`, `TestUploadAndRegisterWithDirStore`, `TestUploadLimits`, `TestSvgUploadIsSanitisedBeforeItIsServed`, `TestAssetServeRedirects` (fake presigning store), `TestAssetIsKeyedByTheDeckThatHoldsIt`, `TestSharedDeckServesItsOwnAssets`, `TestPresentedDeckServesItsOwnAssets`, plus two renderer tests. Four goldens regenerated. - **Browser drive RAN**: `TestBrowserUploadsAnImage` and the whole suite (7 drives) green in 38.7 s, with the sandbox off — Chromium's singleton `socket()` is denied inside it, as in tasks 3–5. - Bundle reproducible: `editor.d193d83bc4c2adaa.js`, same hash on two builds. **Concerns**: `serveAsset` runs an `openDeck` per image request (wasm + log replay) to check the ref against the deck's assets map — wants a `(deck, seq)` cache. Presigned PUT is untested against a real bucket; the CORS note is in `docs/api.md` and the README. `crypto.subtle` needs a secure context, so plain-http non-localhost fails at the hash step with a vague message. The drive found a real bug: nothing had ever observed the Y.Doc's `assets` root, so asset changes never refreshed the UI — now observed in `editor-entry.js`. **Report**: `/home/paulca/amadan.net/oficina/slides/.claude/worktrees/slice-1/.superpowers/sdd/2026-09-07-slice-2-editor/task-6-report.md`</result> <usage><subagent_tokens>333483</subagent_tokens><tool_uses>212</tool_uses><duration_ms>2137880</duration_ms></usage> </task-notification>

Human

<task-notification> <task-id>a8739deea858943c0</task-id> <tool-use-id>toolu_01WNAeD5YcfHAvnNwnd5LL6Q</tool-use-id> <output-file>/home/paulca/.cache/tmp/claude-1001/-home-paulca-amadan-net-oficina/2420c44b-a27a-4e0d-bbe7-8b3ca0464c21/tasks/a8739deea858943c0.output</output-file> <status>completed</status> <summary>Agent "Review editor fixes + presence" finished</summary> <note>A task-notification fires each time this agent stops with no live background children of its own. The user can send it another message and resume it, so the same task-id may notify more than once.</note> <result>## Review: Task 4 fix round (`cdea342`) + Task 5 presence (`b7f3d61`) **Base:** a863fb6 **Head:** b7f3d61 (current HEAD; working tree clean, matches head — verified before relying on any live-file reads) ### Fix round verdicts | Finding | Verdict | File:line | Covering test | |---|---|---|---| | CRITICAL: `[hidden]` reset | **ADDRESSED** | `internal/slides/static/editor.css:33-35` (`[slides-editor] [hidden] { display: none !important; }`) | `TestBrowserInspectorAndCanvas` (`internal/slidestest/browser_test.go:480-485`, `checkVisibility()===false` on block form and confirm), `TestBrowserDeleteToEmptyThenNewSlide` (:643,649) | | `mountStrip`/`mountSelection`/`mountInspector` `destroy()` called by `attemptResync`; no duplicated listeners | **ADDRESSED** | All three use `AbortController` (`fixtures/strip.mjs:148`, `fixtures/selection.mjs:122`, `fixtures/inspector.mjs:201`); `attemptResync` destroys all six mounts (stage/phoneStage/canvas/strip/selection/inspector) before remounting (`fixtures/editor-entry.js:397-404`) | `strip.test.mjs:18`, `selection.test.mjs:22`, `inspector.test.mjs` (AbortController-based) — node tests pass | | `fillBlocksList` reconciles by id; focus survives | **ADDRESSED** | `fixtures/inspector.mjs:42-78` (`fillBlocks`, `have`/`want` Map diff, same elements moved not replaced, text/attr written only when changed) | `inspector.test.mjs:205` "the Blocks list reconciles by id and keeps its buttons" — passes | | `commitUpdate` gates meta mirroring instead of parsing whole deck per update inside the transaction | **ADDRESSED** | `internal/slides/live.go:314-364` (`commitUpdate`, no deck read inside `Transaction`); `mirrorMeta` (:389-419) runs after `PublishSeq` outside the transaction, gated by `metaRowChanges` (:431-443, returns nil when nothing differs) | `TestMetaRowChangesWritesOnlyWhatDiffers` (`internal/slides/live_test.go:19`) — ran, green; `TestPostedMetaReachesTheDeckRow` (`internal/slidestest/live_test.go:539`) — ran, green | **Minors, verified against the claims:** - Nudge coalescing (`fixtures/canvas.mjs:277-311`, `NUDGE_COALESCE_MS` timer, `flushNudge()` on `destroy()`) — implemented, correctly untested at the interactive level (report's admission stands). - `setValue` focus guard (`fixtures/inspector-block.mjs:26-39`) — guards SELECT/text/number/url/color while focused. Confirmed. - ETag never set on 404 (`internal/slides/editor.go:306-343`, header set only on 304/200 paths). Confirmed. - Dead copy `slides.editor.canvas.deselect` removed from `en.toml` in `cdea342`. Confirmed. - `[slides-inspector-empty]` shown/hidden correctly (`fixtures/inspector.mjs:141-142`). Confirmed. - `localStorage` accessors wrapped in try/catch at both call sites (`editor-entry.js:346,352,503-508`) and inside `switcher.mjs:66,75`. Confirmed. - **Stage phone-override badge: confirmed NOT done.** Only the pre-existing inspector Block-section badge (`[slides-phone-badge]` in `editor.html:310`) exists; no on-canvas/stage badge was added. The report's admission is accurate. ### Presence: Spec Compliance All named risks checked directly against source, not just the report's claims: - **(a) name/colour server-only:** `deckPresence` (`internal/slides/live.go:588-632`) decodes only `{client, slide, block}` from the body — no `Name`/`Colour` field exists in the struct — and stamps `name`/`colour` from `u.Name`/`u.Email`/`u.Colour`. `presence.mjs`'s `post()` call (`editor-entry.js:154-159`) sends only `client/slide/block`. **Confirmed.** - **(b) aria-live only on arrival/departure:** `presence-view.mjs:182-192` `announce()` builds its message only from `added`/`removed`; `moved` is computed by `diffSets` but never fed to the live region. **Confirmed.** - **(c) outline keyed by block id, survives `refresh()`:** `place()` (`presence-view.mjs:144-163`) re-queries `[slides-block][data-id="..."]` fresh each call; `refresh()` (`stage.mjs:246`) is `() =&gt; load(current)`, and `load` fires `onLoaded`, which calls `presenceView.place()` (`editor-entry.js:231`). **Confirmed.** - **(d) posting stops/resumes on visibility change:** `visibilitychange` handler calls `presence.noteHidden()`/`noteVisible()` (`editor-entry.js:570-578`); mount-time also checks `document.hidden` immediately after `presence.start()` (:493-494). **Confirmed.** - **(e) no English literals in JS:** all presence strings (`slide/block/more/joined/left`) are read from `data-text-presence-*` attributes (`editor.html:50-54`, sourced from `en.toml:224-228`); JS only interpolates via `format()`. **Confirmed.** - **(f) `live-updates.mjs` untouched:** `git diff a863fb6..b7f3d61 -- fixtures/live-updates.mjs` is empty. Presence is wired as a listener directly on the one `EventSource` in `editor-entry.js:464-470` (`es.addEventListener('presence', ...)`), a thin wrapper as specified. **Confirmed.** Other spec points verified: `createPresence({post, clientId, getState})` posts on connect / every 20s (`HEARTBEAT_MS`) / on change with 200ms debounce (`CHANGE_MS`) — `fixtures/presence.mjs:31,36,136-247`. `applySet` diffs excluding self via `toMap(set, mine)` (:88-96). Avatars capped at 3 then "+N" (`MAX_AVATARS = 3`, `presence-view.mjs:30,106-107`), initials in colour with `title`+`aria-label` from the catalog. Name is never colour-only: the block chip always renders `p.name` as text (`presence-view.mjs:136`), not just in a hover tooltip. Nothing touches the Y.Doc (verified — `presence.mjs`/`presence-view.mjs` have no `Y.` references). ### Strengths - The fix round's meta-gating fix is a genuinely good design: gating on a diff (`metaRowChanges`) rather than an unconditional write is both cheaper and correct under the seq-guard race. - Presence's client-side design cleanly separates timing/diffing (`presence.mjs`, pure and fake-clock-testable) from DOM (`presence-view.mjs`), and the server never trusts client-supplied identity — a real security-relevant property, not just spec box-ticking. - `TestBrowserPresenceShowsEachOther` is a strong end-to-end test: two real chromedp tabs, real POSTs, real SSE, pixel-rect alignment check against the actual block, and an explicit WCAG 1.4.1 assertion (non-empty `aria-label`). - Destroy/reconcile fixes are systematic — the same `AbortController` pattern applied uniformly across strip/selection/inspector rather than three different fixes. ### Issues (Critical / Important / Minor) **Critical:** none found. **Important:** none found. Every claim in both reports was checked against the actual diff/source and holds. **Minor:** - Keyboard nudge coalescing (`canvas.mjs`) still has no dedicated unit test for the interactive path — acknowledged by the implementer, correctly flagged as a gap rather than hidden. - The stage-level phone-override badge remains unimplemented (Task 4 review minor, correctly disclosed as not done in the Task 5 report rather than silently dropped). - `mirrorMeta`'s eventual-consistency window (row can lag the document by one update on a failure) is accepted-and-documented, not a defect, but worth keeping in mind for a future audit of the deck list's freshness guarantees. ### Assessment: **Approved** Both commits deliver exactly what their reports claim, with no undisclosed gaps found. The one CRITICAL and three Important items from the Task 4 review are all genuinely fixed with meaningful covering tests (2 focused Go tests run green in this review: `TestPostedMetaReachesTheDeckRow`, `TestMetaRowChangesWritesOnlyWhatDiffers`; full node suite run green: 112/112). Presence matches its brief's interface and all six named risks precisely, including the subtle ones (self-exclusion, move-vs-arrival distinction in the live region, name never colour-alone). The two admitted gaps (nudge test coverage, stage phone badge) are minor and honestly disclosed rather than papered over — that disclosure itself is a point in favor of trusting this implementer's other claims, which independent verification bore out.</result> <usage><subagent_tokens>111996</subagent_tokens><tool_uses>77</tool_uses><duration_ms>220707</duration_ms></usage> </task-notification>

Human

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Human

<task-notification> <task-id>a324ff6c99c5c1ea9</task-id> <tool-use-id>toolu_01QPcyeZbDJdHATuVzMLhYhi</tool-use-id> <output-file>/home/paulca/.cache/tmp/claude-1001/-home-paulca-amadan-net-oficina/2420c44b-a27a-4e0d-bbe7-8b3ca0464c21/tasks/a324ff6c99c5c1ea9.output</output-file> <status>completed</status> <summary>Agent "Finish editor fix round, then presence" finished</summary> <note>A task-notification fires each time this agent stops with no live background children of its own. The user can send it another message and resume it, so the same task-id may notify more than once.</note> <result>Status: Both parts complete and committed on `slice-2-editor`. Commits: - `cdea342` fix: editor review round 1 — hidden reset, resync destroy, blocks list reconcile, meta gating - `b7f3d61` feat: presence Tests: `node --test *.test.mjs` 112/112 green; bundle rebuilt twice reproducibly (`editor.626eebe67341d5d8.js`, exactly one committed); `make ci` green; `go test -tags browser ./internal/slidestest/...` **ran** (sandbox blocked Chromium's socket on first try as anticipated, ran again with sandbox off) — all green including new `TestBrowserPresenceShowsEachOther` (two real tabs, mutual avatars, aligned block outline+chip, announcement). Concerns: phone-override-on-stage-block badge (Task 4 minor) not implemented — flagged rather than risked against canvas positioning; nudge coalescing added but has no dedicated test (no harness exists yet for `mountCanvas`'s interactive path); both presence-drive tabs are the same signed-in user (harness only allows one address), so name/colour distinctness between people is covered server-side by `TestPresencePostReachesTheStream`, not visually in the browser drive. Report: `/home/paulca/amadan.net/oficina/slides/.claude/worktrees/slice-1/.superpowers/sdd/2026-09-07-slice-2-editor/task-5-report.md`</result> <usage><subagent_tokens>284044</subagent_tokens><tool_uses>166</tool_uses><duration_ms>1311771</duration_ms></usage> </task-notification>

Human

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