| 1 | package conformance_test |
| 2 | |
| 3 | import ( |
| 4 | "encoding/json" |
| 5 | "net/http" |
| 6 | "strconv" |
| 7 | "strings" |
| 8 | "testing" |
| 9 | |
| 10 | "amadan.net/oficina/suite" |
| 11 | "amadan.net/oficina/suite/conformance" |
| 12 | ) |
| 13 | |
| 14 | // referenceServer is a correct server half, built straight from the fixture. |
| 15 | // It exists so the harness can be tested against something that should pass — |
| 16 | // and, with its behaviour bent, against things that should fail. |
| 17 | type referenceServer struct { |
| 18 | fixture suite.CustodyFixture |
| 19 | |
| 20 | // The bugs each broken variant introduces. |
| 21 | forbidInsteadOfNotFound bool // answers 403 where the contract says 404 |
| 22 | honourGrantOverCustody bool // answers VISIBLE for a granted item |
| 23 | leakVisibilityInFeed bool // adds a field the feed row may not carry |
| 24 | leakBodyInRefusal bool // right status, and the item's secrets in the body |
| 25 | wrongBodyForTeamItem bool // 200, carrying a different item's bytes |
| 26 | tellExistenceApart bool // a different refusal for "never existed" |
| 27 | ignoreAskerAndRevision bool // VISIBLE for any asker, at any revision |
| 28 | } |
| 29 | |
| 30 | func (s *referenceServer) find(itemID string) (suite.CustodyCase, bool) { |
| 31 | for _, c := range s.fixture.Cases { |
| 32 | if c.ItemID == itemID { |
| 33 | return c, true |
| 34 | } |
| 35 | } |
| 36 | return suite.CustodyCase{}, false |
| 37 | } |
| 38 | |
| 39 | func (s *referenceServer) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { |
| 40 | switch { |
| 41 | case strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, suite.RouteS3+"/"): |
| 42 | s.serveS3(w, r) |
| 43 | case r.URL.Path == suite.RouteS2: |
| 44 | s.serveS2(w, r) |
| 45 | case r.URL.Path == suite.RouteS1: |
| 46 | s.serveS1(w, r) |
| 47 | default: |
| 48 | http.NotFound(w, r) |
| 49 | } |
| 50 | } |
| 51 | |
| 52 | func (s *referenceServer) serveS3(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { |
| 53 | id := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, suite.RouteS3+"/") |
| 54 | c, ok := s.find(id) |
| 55 | if !ok { |
| 56 | w.WriteHeader(404) |
| 57 | if s.tellExistenceApart { |
| 58 | // A different refusal for something that never existed lets a |
| 59 | // consumer separate "no such item" from "not yours", which is |
| 60 | // exactly what §4.2 forbids. |
| 61 | w.Write([]byte("no such item")) |
| 62 | } |
| 63 | return |
| 64 | } |
| 65 | if c.Rung == suite.RungTeam { |
| 66 | w.WriteHeader(200) |
| 67 | if s.wrongBodyForTeamItem { |
| 68 | w.Write([]byte("the bytes of some other document entirely")) |
| 69 | return |
| 70 | } |
| 71 | w.Write([]byte(c.S3Body)) |
| 72 | return |
| 73 | } |
| 74 | if s.forbidInsteadOfNotFound { |
| 75 | w.WriteHeader(403) |
| 76 | return |
| 77 | } |
| 78 | w.WriteHeader(404) |
| 79 | if s.leakBodyInRefusal { |
| 80 | // The status the contract demands, and the secret in the body anyway. |
| 81 | w.Write([]byte("refused: " + c.Name + " at revision " + strconv.FormatInt(c.Revision, 10))) |
| 82 | } |
| 83 | } |
| 84 | |
| 85 | func (s *referenceServer) serveS2(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { |
| 86 | var req suite.S2Request |
| 87 | if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil { |
| 88 | w.WriteHeader(400) |
| 89 | return |
| 90 | } |
| 91 | |
| 92 | type result struct { |
| 93 | ItemID string `json:"item_id"` |
| 94 | Revision int64 `json:"revision"` |
| 95 | Result suite.Authorization `json:"result"` |
| 96 | } |
| 97 | out := struct { |
| 98 | Results []result `json:"results"` |
| 99 | }{} |
| 100 | |
| 101 | stranger := req.Asker.Value != s.fixture.Asker.Value |
| 102 | |
| 103 | for _, p := range req.Pairs { |
| 104 | c, ok := s.find(p.ItemID) |
| 105 | answer := suite.NOT_VISIBLE |
| 106 | switch { |
| 107 | case !ok: |
| 108 | answer = suite.NOT_VISIBLE |
| 109 | |
| 110 | case s.ignoreAskerAndRevision: |
| 111 | // Answers from the rung alone: any asker, any revision. This is |
| 112 | // the shape a server takes when nobody ever varied either. |
| 113 | if c.Rung == suite.RungTeam { |
| 114 | answer = suite.VISIBLE |
| 115 | } |
| 116 | |
| 117 | case stranger: |
| 118 | // No team standing reaches nothing, the team rung included. |
| 119 | answer = suite.NOT_VISIBLE |
| 120 | |
| 121 | case c.Rung == suite.RungTeam && p.Revision != c.Revision: |
| 122 | answer = suite.STALE |
| 123 | |
| 124 | case c.Rung == suite.RungTeam: |
| 125 | answer = suite.VISIBLE |
| 126 | |
| 127 | case s.honourGrantOverCustody && c.Rung == suite.RungGranted: |
| 128 | // The bug the intersection exists to prevent: answering from the |
| 129 | // grants join alone, so a grantee learns a non-team item exists. |
| 130 | answer = suite.VISIBLE |
| 131 | } |
| 132 | out.Results = append(out.Results, result{ItemID: p.ItemID, Revision: p.Revision, Result: answer}) |
| 133 | } |
| 134 | |
| 135 | w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") |
| 136 | json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(out) |
| 137 | } |
| 138 | |
| 139 | func (s *referenceServer) serveS1(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { |
| 140 | rows := []map[string]any{} |
| 141 | for _, c := range s.fixture.Cases { |
| 142 | row := map[string]any{ |
| 143 | "item_id": c.ItemID, |
| 144 | "revision": c.Revision, |
| 145 | "gone": c.Rung != suite.RungTeam, |
| 146 | "touched_at": "2026-09-05T09:00:00Z", |
| 147 | } |
| 148 | if s.leakVisibilityInFeed { |
| 149 | row["visible_to_team"] = c.Rung == suite.RungTeam |
| 150 | } |
| 151 | rows = append(rows, row) |
| 152 | } |
| 153 | w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") |
| 154 | json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"cursor": "c-" + strconv.Itoa(len(rows)), "rows": rows}) |
| 155 | } |
| 156 | |
| 157 | func newReference(t *testing.T) *referenceServer { |
| 158 | t.Helper() |
| 159 | f, err := suite.LoadCustodyFixture() |
| 160 | if err != nil { |
| 161 | t.Fatalf("loading fixture: %v", err) |
| 162 | } |
| 163 | return &referenceServer{fixture: f} |
| 164 | } |
| 165 | |
| 166 | // A correct server half passes. Without this the harness could fail |
| 167 | // everything and still catch every bug below. |
| 168 | func TestHarnessPassesACorrectServer(t *testing.T) { |
| 169 | report := conformance.Check(newReference(t)) |
| 170 | |
| 171 | if len(report.Failures) != 0 { |
| 172 | t.Errorf("a correct server failed conformance: %v", report.Failures) |
| 173 | } |
| 174 | } |
| 175 | |
| 176 | // Gate 3's real target. A server answering 403 for a non-team item tells the |
| 177 | // caller the item exists, which is what "404, never 403" hides. |
| 178 | func TestHarnessCatches403ForANonTeamItem(t *testing.T) { |
| 179 | s := newReference(t) |
| 180 | s.forbidInsteadOfNotFound = true |
| 181 | |
| 182 | report := conformance.Check(s) |
| 183 | |
| 184 | if len(report.Failures) == 0 { |
| 185 | t.Error("harness passed a server answering 403 where 404 is required") |
| 186 | } |
| 187 | } |
| 188 | |
| 189 | // §4.3's custody intersection. A server answering from its grants join alone |
| 190 | // says VISIBLE for an individually granted item, and a consumer holding that |
| 191 | // item's id learns it still exists. |
| 192 | func TestHarnessCatchesGrantBeatingCustody(t *testing.T) { |
| 193 | s := newReference(t) |
| 194 | s.honourGrantOverCustody = true |
| 195 | |
| 196 | report := conformance.Check(s) |
| 197 | |
| 198 | if len(report.Failures) == 0 { |
| 199 | t.Error("harness passed a server whose S2 ignored the custody intersection") |
| 200 | } |
| 201 | } |
| 202 | |
| 203 | // Status alone is not enough. A server can return the required 404 and put |
| 204 | // the item's secrets in the body, and every caller that reads the raw response |
| 205 | // gets them. GPT-6 module review, finding 3. |
| 206 | func TestHarnessCatchesASecretInARefusalBody(t *testing.T) { |
| 207 | s := newReference(t) |
| 208 | s.leakBodyInRefusal = true |
| 209 | |
| 210 | report := conformance.Check(s) |
| 211 | |
| 212 | if len(report.Failures) == 0 { |
| 213 | t.Error("harness passed a server leaking the item in its 404 body") |
| 214 | } |
| 215 | } |
| 216 | |
| 217 | // A 200 carrying the wrong item's bytes is a leak in the other direction, and |
| 218 | // checking only the status misses it. |
| 219 | func TestHarnessCatchesTheWrongBodyForATeamItem(t *testing.T) { |
| 220 | s := newReference(t) |
| 221 | s.wrongBodyForTeamItem = true |
| 222 | |
| 223 | report := conformance.Check(s) |
| 224 | |
| 225 | if len(report.Failures) == 0 { |
| 226 | t.Error("harness passed a server returning another item's bytes") |
| 227 | } |
| 228 | } |
| 229 | |
| 230 | // "Not team-visible" and "does not exist" must be the same answer, and no |
| 231 | // fixture case can prove it — every case is an item that exists. |
| 232 | func TestHarnessCatchesDistinguishableNonexistence(t *testing.T) { |
| 233 | s := newReference(t) |
| 234 | s.tellExistenceApart = true |
| 235 | |
| 236 | report := conformance.Check(s) |
| 237 | |
| 238 | if len(report.Failures) == 0 { |
| 239 | t.Error("harness passed a server whose refusal reveals whether the item exists") |
| 240 | } |
| 241 | } |
| 242 | |
| 243 | // S2 carries a named asker and a revision, and a server can pass a |
| 244 | // status-and-rung harness while reading neither. GPT-6 module review, |
| 245 | // finding 5. |
| 246 | func TestHarnessCatchesAServerIgnoringAskerAndRevision(t *testing.T) { |
| 247 | s := newReference(t) |
| 248 | s.ignoreAskerAndRevision = true |
| 249 | |
| 250 | report := conformance.Check(s) |
| 251 | |
| 252 | if len(report.Failures) == 0 { |
| 253 | t.Error("harness passed a server that answers from the rung alone, reading neither asker nor revision") |
| 254 | } |
| 255 | } |
| 256 | |
| 257 | // The leak memoria's draft 1 shipped: a visibility flag on a feed row. |
| 258 | func TestHarnessCatchesAFeedRowCarryingVisibility(t *testing.T) { |
| 259 | s := newReference(t) |
| 260 | s.leakVisibilityInFeed = true |
| 261 | |
| 262 | report := conformance.Check(s) |
| 263 | |
| 264 | if len(report.Failures) == 0 { |
| 265 | t.Error("harness passed a feed row carrying a visibility flag") |
| 266 | } |
| 267 | } |
| 268 | |
amadan