Separate Home credential routes from the directory host
Guard every application request against canonical hosts and restrict authentication and passkey assets to the credential host. Redirect credential root to the directory without rendering its content.
Validation: make test passed, including race detector. Removing credentialOnly or serveKnownHost rejection made the corresponding adversarial route test fail (both exit 1).
Paul Campbellpushed by paul@keymail.devca1b14d462898aa0c34f496ca4e9982f5ca542cbparent bb95399
Independently review this security prerequisite design AND implementation as Claude Fable. Do not edit files or execute mutations. Report exact severity, file, issue, and verdict. Scope: one binary serves credential origin id.oficina.works and directory oficina.works; reject unknown Host and credential routes on directory; keep existing credential root login completion working via empty-body 303 to directory root. Static CSS and health public on both. No new product copy. No assertion secrets/protocol decisions in this slice. Review host-header trust, router coverage, no cookie or RP broadening, downstream proxy/canary assumptions, regressions, missing tests. The draft plan origin task is unreviewed; review this bounded plan independently, not whole assertion protocol. Strict exact Host intentionally rejects alternate port/case hosts until edge evidence. Give plan verdict and branch verdict separately. Binding instructions:
# π€ The Oficina home
The suite's glue: identity, directory, provisioning, person preferences.
Consumed by `oficina/sheets` and `oficina/docs`. **It is not an application
and holds no documents.**
This file is binding. Where it disagrees with a general skill, this file
wins. Where it disagrees with the design spec, the spec wins and this file
is wrong β fix it in the same commit.
**The design:** `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-30-home-design.md`. Β§1 is
the settled-decisions table: dated, attributed, with the rejected
alternative beside each.
---
## The one rule
> **The home is glue: thin, blind, replaceable. It knows that you exist and
> where your teams are. It never stores a readable address, and it never
> retains what is in anything.**
**"Retains", amended from "learns" on 2026-09-05** β spec ruling 18 and
`design-activity-pull`, approved that day. The falsifiable form is unchanged **by that amendment** β ruling 23 later changed it, and the form above is the current one.
**It means holds without a bound**: the home does see titles and does keep
them in RAM across requests, bounded by a TTL and a hard maximum; at rest is
the unbounded case, and that is what it never does. "Blind" above is Factor
XI's category label, not a claim it never sees one. Spec Β§0 carries the full
gloss.
The falsifiable form: **publish this database in full and the worst anyone
learns is how many people exist, what their teams are called, which person
refs belong to which team, and which of them own it.** No document. No cell.
No readable address.
**"And which of them own it" arrived with ruling 23** and is the whole cost
of the membership roster: an owner row names a person ref from one team plus
a fact that is usually public, where the old wording needed several teams
and an outside fact. Spec Β§0 and Β§3.3 carry the full reasoning.
*Two absolutes were argued and lost, and stay lost:* **"never stores your
address"** β a magic link's address is at rest between send and click,
sealed (Β§3.2), not absent β and **"some unidentified person"**: a team-set
fingerprint plus one outside fact names the row (Β§3.3).
Three gates enforce it (Β§12; Β§13 step 1 lists all three): a **plaintext
grep** over the raw SQLite file and WAL **plus this app's store objects**,
against a seeded corpus of known addresses; a **no-address-at-rest** test
asserting the schema has no address column and that a full sign-in plus
directory upsert **plus rekey plus the roster seed verb** leaves no readable
address anywhere, **WAL
included**; and **no-content-in-logs** (gate 9). **Gate 9 needs no database** β it scans strings, and `cmd/home/main.go`
emits log lines β **so it was never sequenced behind one**, and it landed
beside the skeleton. Gates 1 and 2 do need one, and it now exists: gate 1
scans the raw file, WAL and SHM for canaries, and gate 2 runs in two
halves, a static read of every migration and a full sign-in asserted to
leave no readable address anywhere. Gate 2's expensive half must be
**extended, not replaced**, when the directory upsert, the rekey and the
roster seed verb land β it asserts the sign-in third of its sentence
today. A guard written after the code it guards is a guard written to
pass. (Stated as the rule rather than as a status: which gates exist today
is a question for `git log`, and a status line in a binding file is a
sentence that goes stale without anyone noticing.)
---
## The four things this service never does
Each of these is something somebody will propose, in good faith, as an
improvement.
1. **Never *store* content from an instance.** No previews at rest, no sheet
thumbnails, no cell values, no titles in a database, a log, an error
string, a metric label or an on-disk cache. It **may render**, transiently
and per request, **and only to that person**, what an instance hands it
for the person it hands it for β and nothing wider: no search over pulled
content, no cross-person aggregation, no analytics, no operator view, and
no retry queue holding a response body.
**"Per request" does not forbid the cache the spec approves.**
`design-activity-pull`'s Β§7 keeps pulled titles in RAM across requests,
bounded by a refresh TTL and a hard maximum. Read alone, "transiently and
per request" would rule that out, so read it with spec Β§0's gloss:
**retains means holds without a bound**, at rest is the unbounded case,
and the RAM hold is permitted because it is bounded and tested.
**Amended 2026-09-05** from *never render*, on spec ruling 18. "Renders"
was doing custody's work: the clause exists to stop the home becoming a
place documents live, and storage is what makes it that. It also gained a
test β spec Β§12's gates 1 and 9 grew a corpus of known titles, URLs and
actor strings that day, so *never stores* has a grep behind it where
*never renders* had none.
2. **Never hold a per-item grant.** Which sheets you may edit, which
document a guest may comment on: all instance-side, decided there on
every request. **The home does hold the membership roster** β
`(team, person_ref, role)`, ruling 23 β so it knows who is on a team and
who owns it. It never knows what they may do with any particular thing.
This replaced *"never hold an authorization model"* on 2026-09-05; the
line moved from *facts versus may-this-person* to **resources the home
owns versus an instance's items**, because the roster is a person-level
entitlement the home now holds on purpose.
3. **Never cross a team.** Data does not cross a team label; a team's
instances across apps are one trust domain (spec ruling 23, suite ruling
1). This replaced *"never federate β data does not cross an instance
boundary"* on 2026-09-05: the boundary was drawn in the wrong place, since
`acme.docs` and `acme.sheets` are the same team and always were. **Sharing across teams** is a guest grant on the
instance, never a copy. **Team standing is the roster**, not a grant and
not a directory row (spec Β§5.5, Β§6: a directory row never grants team
standing whatever its `kind` says). Β§6 keeps the
two apart deliberately: "a row implying an org membership someone does
not have is a lie the directory tells on the org's behalf".
4. **Never become a support console.** Reading someone's data to help them
is precisely what **rule 1 above** forbids β "only to that person", "no
operator view". It used to be the one rule; since the 2026-09-05
amendment "never retains" no longer reaches a console that displays
without keeping, so the anchor moved and a reference left pointing at
the one rule would rest on nothing.
**And it stays small.** Every proposed feature is weighed against "does this
belong in an instance instead?" The answer is usually yes. This service has
a suite-wide blast radius, and a home that grows features grows that radius.
---
## Review β RULED 2026-08-30 by Paul
**Every spec and every branch is reviewed by the highest-capability model
available before it is approved or merged.** Cheaper models draft; the most
capable available reviews. A review by a weaker model than the author is not
a review.
**Record which model reviewed** β in the spec's status line, and in the
branch discussion for a branch. A review nobody can attribute is a review
nobody can check. The model is **discovered, not hardcoded**; a session that
cannot reach one at least as capable as the author's says so and waits.
---
## Shipping cadence β RULED 2026-08-30 by Paul
Everything on a worktree, on a branch. Never directly on `main`.
1. Branch per piece of work, cut from `main`.
2. Commit regularly and push to the branch.
3. **Squash-merge to `main` only when** the work is done, it is approved
(including the review pass above), and **CI is actually green** β
checked, not assumed. Any one of the three missing means it does not
merge.
Review on a deployed canary, never localhost.
**Every branch gets a discussion, and that discussion is the review
record** β it survives a squash where a PR body does not. Tasks are a
checklist, not a log. **A refusal gets surfaced in the discussion, never
routed around** (amadan's own house rule, and the one most likely to be
quietly ignored).
---
## Mechanical rules
**Identity**
- The **credential origin** serves sign-in, WebAuthn, recovery and assertion
minting, and **never renders an account-authored string**. It is the
relying party. This is a permanent constraint with its own test, not a
naming choice.
- **The RP ID is the full host β `id.oficina.works` β asserted by a test.**
Never widen it to a registrable suffix. WebAuthn *permits* an RP ID that
is a suffix of the origin's hostname, so `oficina.works` would be
accepted; it is also valid at every host in the zone, the directory and
every team instance included, which collapses the very split the two
origins exist to make (Β§4, rulings 2 and 13; the host itself is ruling
16). Note where the first door actually is: `passkey.Config` has no RP ID
field β the RP ID is always `Origin`'s hostname β so the way to widen it
is to widen `Origin`, or to bypass `passkey` and build a
`webauthn.Config` directly. The second door is
`passkey.Config.LegacyRPID`, passed straight through as an RP ID accepted
**for assertions only** (registration never takes it), so it must stay
empty unless a rename drill (Β§5.7) is actually running, and then hold a
full host. The test asserts both: `Origin`'s hostname is exactly
`id.oficina.works`, and `LegacyRPID` is empty or a full host. Both are
accepted silently, which is why neither can rest on care.
- Assertions carry **identity and display preferences, never
authorization**. The boundary test (Β§5.4) is **two-sided**: a claim may
ride the assertion only if **(a)** the instance makes no trust decision
based on it, validating against a **closed enumerated set** and treating a
failed match as *absent* rather than as the raw value; **and (b)** the
home already holds it for its own purposes, so carrying it adds nothing to
what the home knows. Theme passes both. A role fails (a). **"Which
documents you can see" passes (a) and fails (b)** β it hands the home a
document-level graph it has no business holding.
- **Do not restore "the instance would behave identically given a hostile
value."** Β§5.4 retracts it: a hostile theme gives an ugly page, which *is*
different behaviour, so the test's own example fails it β and without (a)'s
closed set, a free-string theme in CSS is an injection, not an ugly page.
- Assertion expiry is **120 seconds, not "seconds"** β sized to worst-case
cold wake plus clock skew, because the exchange request *is* what wakes a
hibernating instance and a tighter window makes the first sign-in to any
cold instance fail and loop. Widening it costs nothing **against the
threat model**, because **single-use `jti` is what stops replay**, not
brevity. The long-lived thing is the session the instance mints.
- Every assertion names the **app and instance host** it is for. Without
audience binding, team A's assertion replays against team B, and a
deployment has thousands of siblings to replay against.
- **Signed identity claims are trusted for identity; every other claim must
be cosmetically failable.** The subject flagrantly fails (a) β a hostile
subject is account takeover β so the test must exempt identity by
construction or it proves too much and gets argued around.
**One narrow exception, added 2026-09-05 with ruling 23: `roster_epoch`.**
It is not a closed enumerated set and does not fail cosmetically, so it
would fail test (a) as written. What admits it is that **the instance
decides nothing from it** β an unparseable value is ignored, a differing
value buys exactly one call-8 refetch, and call 8's answer is what is
enforced. A builder following the test without this exception rejects a
claim Β§5.3 now puts on every assertion. Spec Β§5.4 carries the reasoning.
- **Any "prune when all consumers have caught up" is unbounded in a
hibernating fleet.** A dormant instance runs no timers to advance its
cursor. Retention is a fixed horizon or a per-consumer TTL, never a
slowest-consumer rule. This shipped twice in one spec before it was
caught.
**Data**
- **No address column exists**, so there is none to accidentally populate.
Addresses are learned transiently and hashed β and where one must survive
a restart (a magic link between send and click), it is **sealed before it
is written**, never cleaned up afterwards. Deleting a row does not erase
bytes: SQLite leaves deleted pages and Litestream ships WAL frames
continuously, so a transiently readable write reaches the bucket before
any delete. `PRAGMA secure_delete` is on.
- **The session Subject is an opaque person ref, never an address.**
`rastrillo/auth` as shipped sets `Subject: id.Address` and stores readable
addresses in `auth_links.address` and, via `Subject: id.Address`, in
`sessions.subject` β `auth_sessions` is no longer written at v0.22.0, its
rows having been migrated into the shared `sessions` table, so the leak
moved rather than closed. Verified at source, filed upstream as
`rastrillo/rastrillo` #2. We hand-roll session minting until that lands,
and take classification and the Keymail upgrade from **`keymaildev/signin`
directly, not from `auth`** β corrected 2026-09-05: `auth`'s
classification is reachable only through `auth.Begin`, which hardwires
`Links: &linkStore{db: cfg.DB}` and writes `auth_links.address`, so "use
`auth` only for the parts that hold nothing" was never a thing that could
be done. `signin.Flow` takes a `LinkStore` the app supplies, so the app
seals what it stores.
- **The home hashes; instances never hold the pepper.** A pepper on every
instance makes one compromise an offline dictionary attack against the
whole suite directory.
- Migrations are additive-only.
- **No address, team name, queue payload, or pulled content β a title, a
URL, an actor (added 2026-09-05 with Β§2.2's amendment) β in any log line, error string,
job status message or metric label.** Platform-held logs are storage we
cannot grep.
**Frontend**
- **Write the attribute spelling: `rst-btn`, not `class="rst-btn"`** β
spec ruling 20, 2026-09-05. Β§11 ruled the class vocabulary on 2026-08-30
and every reason it gave has since died, so it went back to Paul rather
than being propped up with a third. rastrillo's design system rules "One
spelling, not two. No permanent class fallback" and drops the class
selectors before 1.0; this app has no `rst-` markup yet, so it starts on
the spelling that survives β free today, a sweep after the first
template.
**The seven utilities are the exception, and they are not a loophole.**
`rst-sr-only`, `rst-mono`, `rst-m-hide`, `rst-grow`, `rst-nm`,
`rst-danger` and `rst-cell-mut` keep `class=`, because at v0.22.0 they
have **no attribute twin at all** β five `.rst-sr-only` selectors, zero
`[rst-sr-only]`. tokens.css's header says why ("Utilities keep the class
spelling and are not paired⦠they stay class after the move") and §6-v3
agrees ("`class` is for utilities and the app's own CSS"). Write
`<span rst-sr-only>` and nothing matches, so screen-reader-only text
renders **visible**. Kinds, variants and parts are attributes; these
seven are classes. This is also what the 6 surviving `class=` occurrences
in v0.22.0's partials are β utilities, not residue awaiting a flip.
Record the graveyard, so neither dead reason is revived:
- *"The attribute grammar is ruled but not released."* Dead since
**v0.21.0**, this repo's *first* pin. tokens.css there pairs every
*component* rule with an attribute twin and says so in its own header: "TWO
SPELLINGS, ON PURPOSE, FOR ONE RELEASE." The original claim β zero bare
`rst-*` selectors against ~528 class occurrences β was verified on
2026-08-30 against v0.20.x, was true then, and was already false by the
time the skeleton existed. No later bump falsified it.
- *"The partials we render alongside write classes."* Dead at
**v0.22.0**, the current pin, where the shipped partials flipped to the
attribute spelling β rastrillo's design-system Β§6-v3 stage 2. Counted
in `ui/partials/` with template comments stripped, the class spelling
falls from **124 occurrences at v0.21.0 to 6 at v0.22.0**, replaced by
the attribute spelling. (Count the class spelling, not the attribute
one: `class="rst-β¦"` is unambiguous, while attribute-spelling totals
move with how you treat valued attributes like `rst-tone="β¦"`, and two
careful counts of it disagreed.) `callout.html` at the pin
is `<div rst-callout rst-tone="β¦">`. tokens.css's header still claims
"the class spelling is what every app and every shipped partial writes
today" β **that sentence is stale upstream**, and this file quoted it
as evidence until it was checked.
**Re-check on every pin move, name the version you checked, and count
both `ui/tokens.css` and `ui/partials/`** β checking one and not the
other is how the second reason survived a pass that was looking for
exactly this.
- **`rastrillo doctor` has landed** β in v0.21.0, the first version this
repo pinned. "Adopt it the day it lands" was a trigger that had already
fired when it was written. When this app vendors `static/`, run
`rastrillo doctor --fix` on each upgrade rather than re-copying by hand,
and add the `TestVendoredAssetsMatchTheLibrary` that `rastrillo new`
scaffolds as the standing gate β "add", not "keep": this repo was
hand-written, not scaffolded, so it has no `internal/hometest/` and no
copy of that test. There is no vendored `static/` in the
tree today β `internal/home/page.go` links no stylesheet, deliberately β
so this is an instruction with no object until the first asset arrives.
- Zero JS, **with exactly one carve-out** (ruling 21): the passkey
enrolment and ceremony screens **may load script**. rastrillo ships the
hard half β `webauthn.JS()` embeds `js/webauthn.mjs` β but that module
only exports `navigator.credentials` wrappers and makes no network call,
so the page also needs a few lines of app glue to import it, call it and
POST the result. Both are allowed; both are **static same-origin files,
never inline `<script>`**.
That sentence used to read "no surface here has any reason to require
script, and the day one does is the day the spec is wrong" β and the day
came, with passkeys. It was a tripwire and it fired correctly. Everything
else stays scriptless: magic-link sign-in, recovery-code redemption and
the springboard, so script-off keeps a working sign-in and loses only an
optional second factor. The no-`<script>` test carries an **explicit
allowlist of the carved-out screens** β never a blanket exemption, because
a rule with a list is checkable and a rule with an escape hatch is not.
**Deploys**
- One binary, `CGO_ENABLED=0`, cgo-free SQLite.
- A 200 is not a deploy verification. Only `X-Carlos-Version` on the
canonical host, after the watch.
- A promote is not a deploy. Until the process cycles, the old binary serves.
- **The home does not hibernate.** It is the one app on the estate where
cold-wake latency is a suite-wide outage. Stated because hibernation is
the platform default and would otherwise apply silently.
- **A backup you have never restored is a hope, not a backup.** Losing this
database loses credentials **and the roster**, neither of which rebuilds β call 2 cannot write membership and no channel carries an instance's copy back, so roster recovery is an operator reading instances out and re-seeding (spec Β§10). The restore drill runs
before launch.
---
## Authorship
π€ / π¨ markers, `Co-Authored-By: Claude β¦` trailers, published prompt and
carbon ledgers. AI is a guest with a name tag: opt-in, disclosed, and every
path works with it switched off.
Diff:
diff --git a/internal/home/app.go b/internal/home/app.go
index e5562cb..ef62fdd 100644
--- a/internal/home/app.go
+++ b/internal/home/app.go
@@ -136,9 +136,17 @@ func (a *App) Router() http.Handler {
// blind-SSRF surface by design β and csrf.Protect is pure origin
// evidence (Sec-Fetch-Site, then Origin, then Referer) that never
// consults a session, so it works before anybody is signed in.
+ r.Use(serveKnownHost)
r.Use(csrf.Protect(Origin))
- r.Get("/", a.handleIndex)
+ r.Get("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+ if r.Host == credentialHost {
+ w.Header().Set("Location", directoryOrigin+"/")
+ w.WriteHeader(http.StatusSeeOther)
+ return
+ }
+ a.handleIndex(w, r)
+ })
// This /healthz is NOT what answers in a deployed instance:
// rastrillo.Serve registers its own GET /healthz on the outer mux
// (serve.go's buildHandler), and Go 1.22+ http.ServeMux prefers that
@@ -150,48 +158,51 @@ func (a *App) Router() http.Handler {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})
- r.Get("/signin", a.handleSigninForm)
- r.Post("/signin", a.handleSigninBegin)
- r.Get("/signin/sent", a.handleSigninSent)
- // GET renders, POST redeems. See handleVerifyForm for why.
- r.Get(linkPath, a.handleVerifyForm)
- r.Post(linkPath, a.handleVerify)
- r.Get(callbackPath, a.handleCallback)
-
- // The second factor. The ceremony endpoints are JSON POSTs driven by
- // static/passkey.js; the recovery POST is a plain form and works
- // with script off, because recovery is exactly the moment WebAuthn
- // is not working.
- r.Get(confirmPath, a.handlePasskeyConfirm)
- r.Post("/passkey/stepup/begin", a.passkeys.StepUpBegin)
- r.Post("/passkey/stepup/finish", a.passkeys.StepUpFinish)
- r.Post("/passkey/signin/begin", a.passkeys.SignInBegin)
- r.Post("/passkey/signin/finish", a.passkeys.SignInFinish)
- r.Post("/passkey/signin/recovery", a.passkeys.SignInRecovery)
- // Enrolling changes who can get in, and there is no operator reset,
- // so it wants a recent session rather than merely a valid one β see
- // enrolFreshness for the lockout this closes.
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
- r.Use(a.sessions.RequireFresh(enrolFreshness))
- r.Get("/passkey/enrol", a.handlePasskeyEnrol)
- r.Post("/passkey/register/begin", a.passkeys.RegisterBegin)
- r.Post("/passkey/register/finish", a.passkeys.RegisterFinish)
+ r.Use(credentialOnly)
+ r.Get("/signin", a.handleSigninForm)
+ r.Post("/signin", a.handleSigninBegin)
+ r.Get("/signin/sent", a.handleSigninSent)
+ // GET renders, POST redeems. See handleVerifyForm for why.
+ r.Get(linkPath, a.handleVerifyForm)
+ r.Post(linkPath, a.handleVerify)
+ r.Get(callbackPath, a.handleCallback)
+
+ // The second factor. The ceremony endpoints are JSON POSTs driven by
+ // static/passkey.js; the recovery POST is a plain form and works
+ // with script off, because recovery is exactly the moment WebAuthn
+ // is not working.
+ r.Get(confirmPath, a.handlePasskeyConfirm)
+ r.Post("/passkey/stepup/begin", a.passkeys.StepUpBegin)
+ r.Post("/passkey/stepup/finish", a.passkeys.StepUpFinish)
+ r.Post("/passkey/signin/begin", a.passkeys.SignInBegin)
+ r.Post("/passkey/signin/finish", a.passkeys.SignInFinish)
+ r.Post("/passkey/signin/recovery", a.passkeys.SignInRecovery)
+ // Enrolling changes who can get in, and there is no operator reset,
+ // so it wants a recent session rather than merely a valid one β see
+ // enrolFreshness for the lockout this closes.
+ r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
+ r.Use(a.sessions.RequireFresh(enrolFreshness))
+ r.Get("/passkey/enrol", a.handlePasskeyEnrol)
+ r.Post("/passkey/register/begin", a.passkeys.RegisterBegin)
+ r.Post("/passkey/register/finish", a.passkeys.RegisterFinish)
+ })
+
+ // The codes page shows ten codes once, so it wants a recent session
+ // rather than merely a valid one.
+ r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
+ r.Use(a.sessions.RequireFresh(codesFreshness))
+ r.Get("/passkey/codes", a.handleRecoveryCodesPage)
+ r.Post("/passkey/codes", a.handleRegenerateRecoveryCodes)
+ })
+
+ // Stable, unfingerprinted paths: Task 7's scriptless allowlist has
+ // to name them, and a rule that cannot name its subject is not a
+ // rule.
+ r.Get("/static/webauthn.mjs", serveAsset(webauthnJS(), "text/javascript; charset=utf-8"))
+ r.Get("/static/passkey.js", serveAsset(staticAsset("passkey.js"), "text/javascript; charset=utf-8"))
})
- // The codes page shows ten codes once, so it wants a recent session
- // rather than merely a valid one.
- r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
- r.Use(a.sessions.RequireFresh(codesFreshness))
- r.Get("/passkey/codes", a.handleRecoveryCodesPage)
- r.Post("/passkey/codes", a.handleRegenerateRecoveryCodes)
- })
-
- // Stable, unfingerprinted paths: Task 7's scriptless allowlist has
- // to name them, and a rule that cannot name its subject is not a
- // rule.
- r.Get("/static/webauthn.mjs", serveAsset(webauthnJS(), "text/javascript; charset=utf-8"))
- r.Get("/static/passkey.js", serveAsset(staticAsset("passkey.js"), "text/javascript; charset=utf-8"))
-
// Vendored from rastrillo's ui package, not linked from it: an app
// owns its stylesheet from the moment it lands, and
// `rastrillo doctor --fix` is what reconciles it on an upgrade.
diff --git a/internal/home/app_test.go b/internal/home/app_test.go
index 76b5755..efd584e 100644
--- a/internal/home/app_test.go
+++ b/internal/home/app_test.go
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
func TestIndex(t *testing.T) {
app := newTestApp(t)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+ req.Host = directoryHost
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
app.Router().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ func TestIndex(t *testing.T) {
func TestHealthz(t *testing.T) {
app := newTestApp(t)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/healthz", nil)
+ req.Host = directoryHost
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
app.Router().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
diff --git a/internal/home/keymailstub_test.go b/internal/home/keymailstub_test.go
index bc28754..1cde613 100644
--- a/internal/home/keymailstub_test.go
+++ b/internal/home/keymailstub_test.go
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ func callback(t *testing.T, app *testApp, code, state string, cookies ...*http.C
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet,
callbackPath+"?code="+url.QueryEscape(code)+"&state="+url.QueryEscape(state), nil)
+ req.Host = credentialHost
for _, c := range cookies {
if c != nil {
req.AddCookie(c)
diff --git a/internal/home/logs_test.go b/internal/home/logs_test.go
index 73dbdea..ef84f57 100644
--- a/internal/home/logs_test.go
+++ b/internal/home/logs_test.go
@@ -122,6 +122,10 @@ func TestNoContentInLogs(t *testing.T) {
}.Encode())
req := httptest.NewRequest(tg.method, tg.path+"?q="+url.QueryEscape(logtest.Canaries[0]), body)
+ req.Host = credentialHost
+ if req.URL.Path == "/" {
+ req.Host = directoryHost
+ }
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
// csrf.Protect is mounted router-wide and short-circuits a
// state-changing request with no origin evidence β before chi
@@ -172,6 +176,10 @@ func TestNoContentInLogs(t *testing.T) {
}
body := strings.NewReader(url.Values{"address": {logtest.Canaries[0]}}.Encode())
req := httptest.NewRequest(tg.method, tg.path, body)
+ req.Host = credentialHost
+ if req.URL.Path == "/" {
+ req.Host = directoryHost
+ }
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
req.Header.Set("Referer", "https://"+logtest.Canaries[1]+".example.invalid")
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", logtest.Canaries[0])
diff --git a/internal/home/noscript_test.go b/internal/home/noscript_test.go
index d463d20..51e020d 100644
--- a/internal/home/noscript_test.go
+++ b/internal/home/noscript_test.go
@@ -300,6 +300,10 @@ func TestServedCSPAllowsNoInlineScript(t *testing.T) {
for _, tg := range targets {
p := tg.path
req := httptest.NewRequest(tg.method, p, strings.NewReader("address=someone@example.invalid"))
+ req.Host = credentialHost
+ if req.URL.Path == "/" {
+ req.Host = directoryHost
+ }
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
// The POSTs are behind csrf.Protect, which short-circuits before
// the handler runs β and a handler that never runs sets no
diff --git a/internal/home/passkey_test.go b/internal/home/passkey_test.go
index fde7d45..6c71d40 100644
--- a/internal/home/passkey_test.go
+++ b/internal/home/passkey_test.go
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ func postJSON(t *testing.T, app *testApp, path string, cookie *http.Cookie, body
payload = "{}"
}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, path, strings.NewReader(payload))
+ req.Host = credentialHost
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("Origin", Origin)
if cookie != nil {
@@ -190,6 +191,7 @@ func TestRecoveryCodeCompletesSignInWithoutScript(t *testing.T) {
form := url.Values{"code": {codes[0]}}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/passkey/signin/recovery", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
+ req.Host = credentialHost
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
req.Header.Set("Origin", Origin)
for _, c := range (&http.Response{Header: gated.Header()}).Cookies() {
@@ -216,6 +218,7 @@ func TestRecoveryCodeCompletesSignInWithoutScript(t *testing.T) {
func subjectOf(t *testing.T, app *testApp, cookie *http.Cookie) string {
t.Helper()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
+ req.Host = credentialHost
req.AddCookie(cookie)
sess, ok := app.sessions.From(req)
if !ok {
@@ -230,6 +233,7 @@ func TestScriptAssetsAreServedOnNamedPaths(t *testing.T) {
app := newTestApp(t)
for _, path := range []string{"/static/webauthn.mjs", "/static/passkey.js"} {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, path, nil)
+ req.Host = credentialHost
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
app.Router().ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
@@ -253,6 +257,7 @@ func TestRecoveryCodesPageNeedsAFreshSession(t *testing.T) {
get := func() int {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/passkey/codes", nil)
+ req.Host = credentialHost
req.AddCookie(cookie)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
app.Router().ServeHTTP(w, req)
@@ -304,6 +309,7 @@ func TestRecoveryCodeProducesAFreshSession(t *testing.T) {
form := url.Values{"code": {codes[0]}}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/passkey/signin/recovery", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
+ req.Host = credentialHost
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
req.Header.Set("Origin", Origin)
for _, c := range (&http.Response{Header: gated.Header()}).Cookies() {
@@ -319,6 +325,7 @@ func TestRecoveryCodeProducesAFreshSession(t *testing.T) {
// The RequireFresh-guarded page opens to it.
page := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/passkey/codes", nil)
+ page.Host = credentialHost
page.AddCookie(recovered)
pw := httptest.NewRecorder()
app.Router().ServeHTTP(pw, page)
@@ -361,6 +368,7 @@ func TestEnrolmentNeedsAFreshSession(t *testing.T) {
// The page itself redirects to re-authenticate rather than 404ing or
// 403ing: a detour, not a dead end.
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/passkey/enrol", nil)
+ req.Host = credentialHost
req.AddCookie(cookie)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
app.Router().ServeHTTP(w, req)
@@ -402,6 +410,7 @@ func TestEnrolThenReadCodesWithoutReauthenticating(t *testing.T) {
enrol(t, app, cookie)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/passkey/codes", nil)
+ req.Host = credentialHost
req.AddCookie(cookie)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
app.Router().ServeHTTP(w, req)
diff --git a/internal/home/signin.go b/internal/home/signin.go
index 4931bcf..973f3c7 100644
--- a/internal/home/signin.go
+++ b/internal/home/signin.go
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import (
// the session cookie and is the WebAuthn RP. Β§4 splits it from the
// directory origin deliberately, and both the CSRF check and the cookie
// attributes are keyed on this exact string.
-const Origin = "https://id.oficina.works"
+const Origin = "https://" + credentialHost
// linkPath is where magic links land. It must match the route mounted
// below; signin's own default is /auth/verify, which this app does not
diff --git a/internal/home/signin_test.go b/internal/home/signin_test.go
index 3a0d078..e21409c 100644
--- a/internal/home/signin_test.go
+++ b/internal/home/signin_test.go
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ func signIn(t *testing.T, app *testApp, addr string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder
t.Helper()
form := url.Values{"address": {addr}}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/signin", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
+ req.Host = credentialHost
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
req.Header.Set("Origin", Origin)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -65,6 +66,7 @@ func redeem(t *testing.T, app *testApp, token string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder
t.Helper()
form := url.Values{"token": {token}}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, linkPath, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
+ req.Host = credentialHost
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
req.Header.Set("Origin", Origin)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -164,6 +166,7 @@ func TestGetDoesNotRedeemTheLink(t *testing.T) {
token := capturedLink(t, app)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, linkPath+"?token="+url.QueryEscape(token), nil)
+ req.Host = credentialHost
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
app.Router().ServeHTTP(w, req)
@@ -197,6 +200,7 @@ func TestVerifyPageDoesNotDistinguishTokens(t *testing.T) {
get := func(token string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, linkPath+"?token="+url.QueryEscape(token), nil)
+ req.Host = credentialHost
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
app.Router().ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w
@@ -331,6 +335,7 @@ func TestSigninPostRequiresOriginEvidence(t *testing.T) {
for _, path := range []string{"/signin", linkPath} {
form := url.Values{"address": {"person@example.invalid"}}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, path, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
+ req.Host = credentialHost
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
app.Router().ServeHTTP(w, req)
@@ -350,6 +355,7 @@ func TestSigninPostRequiresOriginEvidence(t *testing.T) {
func TestClientIPNeverCollapsesToOneBucket(t *testing.T) {
req := func(remote, xff string) *http.Request {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/signin", nil)
+ r.Host = credentialHost
r.RemoteAddr = remote
if xff != "" {
r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", xff)
@@ -396,6 +402,7 @@ func TestCallbackWithNoPendingCookieMintsNothing(t *testing.T) {
"",
} {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, callbackPath+q, nil)
+ req.Host = credentialHost
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
app.Router().ServeHTTP(w, req)
@@ -431,6 +438,7 @@ func TestForgedPendingBlobIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
app := newTestApp(t)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, callbackPath+"?code=x&state=s", nil)
+ req.Host = credentialHost
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{
Name: pendingCookie,
// Well-formed shape β payload.mac β with a MAC that is not one.
@@ -461,6 +469,7 @@ func TestSigninIsRateLimitedPerIPNotGlobally(t *testing.T) {
post := func(ip, addr string) int {
form := url.Values{"address": {addr}}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/signin", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
+ req.Host = credentialHost
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
req.Header.Set("Origin", Origin)
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", ip)
@@ -499,6 +508,7 @@ func TestSigninIsRateLimitedPerAddress(t *testing.T) {
for i := range 12 {
form := url.Values{"address": {"target@example.invalid"}}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/signin", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
+ req.Host = credentialHost
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
req.Header.Set("Origin", Origin)
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", fmt.Sprintf("198.51.100.%d", i+1))
@@ -527,6 +537,7 @@ func TestVerifyPageWritesNothing(t *testing.T) {
before := dumpDatabase(t, app)
for _, tok := range []string{token, "not-a-real-token", ""} {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, linkPath+"?token="+url.QueryEscape(tok), nil)
+ req.Host = credentialHost
app.Router().ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
}
if after := dumpDatabase(t, app); after != before {
FILE internal/home/origins.go
package home
import "net/http"
const (
suiteDomain = "oficina.works"
credentialHost = "id." + suiteDomain
directoryHost = suiteDomain
directoryOrigin = "https://" + directoryHost
)
func serveKnownHost(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Host != credentialHost && r.Host != directoryHost {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
func credentialOnly(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Host != credentialHost {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
FILE internal/home/origins_test.go
package home
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
)
func TestEveryCredentialRouteRefusesDirectoryHost(t *testing.T) {
app := newTestApp(t)
router := app.Router()
routes := router.(chi.Routes)
count := 0
err := chi.Walk(routes, func(method, route string, _ http.Handler, _ ...func(http.Handler) http.Handler) error {
switch route {
case "/", "/healthz", "/static/tokens.css", "/static/theme.css":
return nil
}
count++
req := httptest.NewRequest(method, "https://"+directoryHost+route, nil)
req.Header.Set("Origin", Origin)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound || len(rec.Result().Cookies()) != 0 || rec.Body.Len() != 0 {
t.Errorf("%s %s on directory: status=%d cookies=%d body=%q", method, route, rec.Code, len(rec.Result().Cookies()), rec.Body.String())
}
return nil
})
if err != nil || count < 19 {
t.Fatalf("route walk err=%v credential routes=%d", err, count)
}
if _, ok := app.mailer.last(); ok {
t.Fatal("directory request sent mail")
}
}
func TestDirectoryContentNeverServedOnCredentialHost(t *testing.T) {
app := newTestApp(t)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, Origin+"/?team=untrusted", nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
app.Router().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusSeeOther || rec.Header().Get("Location") != directoryOrigin+"/" || rec.Body.Len() != 0 {
t.Fatalf("credential root: status=%d location=%q body=%q", rec.Code, rec.Header().Get("Location"), rec.Body.String())
}
}
func TestUnknownHostsCannotReachRoutes(t *testing.T) {
app := newTestApp(t)
router := app.Router()
hosts := []string{"", "example.com", "oficina.works.attacker.invalid", "id.oficina.works.attacker.invalid", "ID.OFICINA.WORKS", "id.oficina.works.", "id.oficina.works:443", "oficina.works:443", "localhost"}
err := chi.Walk(router.(chi.Routes), func(method, route string, _ http.Handler, _ ...func(http.Handler) http.Handler) error {
for _, host := range hosts {
req := httptest.NewRequest(method, route, nil)
req.Host = host
req.Header.Set("Origin", Origin)
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", credentialHost)
req.Header.Set("Forwarded", "host="+credentialHost)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound || len(rec.Result().Cookies()) != 0 || rec.Body.Len() != 0 {
t.Errorf("%s %s host=%q status=%d", method, route, host, rec.Code)
}
}
return nil
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
func TestDirectoryIsNotWithinCredentialRP(t *testing.T) {
if credentialHost == directoryHost || rpID() == directoryHost || Origin == directoryOrigin {
t.Fatal("directory overlaps the credential origin or relying party")
}
}
FILE internal/home/page.go
package home
import "net/http"
// indexPage is the entire placeholder page: bare fact, not marketing.
// It has no dynamic content and no user input to escape, so a plain
// constant string stands in for html/template here rather than
// pretending to need one.
//
// No stylesheet is linked. rastrillo's ui/tokens.css needs a theme
// (day, plain or signal β see ui/themes/*.css) to paint anything;
// picking one is a design decision, and design-system questions are
// paused on this project (AGENTS.md's Frontend section assumes a
// themed app, which this skeleton deliberately is not yet). Semantic,
// unstyled HTML is the honest choice until that pause lifts.
const indexPage = `<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<title>Oficina home</title>
</head>
<body>
<main>
<h1>Oficina home</h1>
<p>This is the Oficina suite home: identity, a directory of your teams,
and provisioning, shared by every app in the suite.</p>
<p>It is not built yet. This page is a placeholder that proves the
deploy path works. There is no sign-in, no directory, and no
provisioning here.</p>
<p>The design is at
<code>docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-30-home-design.md</code> in this
repository.</p>
</main>
</body>
</html>
`
// handleIndex serves the one page this skeleton has.
func (a *App) handleIndex(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
w.Write([]byte(indexPage))
}
Humanclaude~paul@keymail.dev
User authorized an overnight implementation of the suite readiness plan, independent Claude Fable reviews, Amadan coordination and continuous reviewed deployments. Parent delegated Home assertion prerequisites, limited here to host routing and origin separation.