oficina / calendar Public

Keymail sign-in in Calendar, without an allowlist oracle

Calendar set force=1 on every permitted POST /signin, so a Keymail
address never reached Keymail (Paul, 2026-10-06: "I do want it to use
keymail"). The reason was an oracle: a permitted Keymail address would
have redirected out while a non-permitted one got ?sent=1.

Now every address reaches Begin and the ceremony depends on the domain
alone. A Keymail address, permitted or not, gets the same continuation
page (connect.OAuthContinuation, both modes; a 303 out of the form POST
is refused by Safari's form-action). Any other address gets ?sent=1 and
admissionMailer mails it only when the allowlist holds it, still
counting refusals in the log without the address. Authorize after
verification is unchanged; its bare-text 403 becomes the door with
?err=refused (doorOnRefusal) until rastrillo has a hook. The form now
carries force on ?force=1&err=keymail, which it never had to before.

Tests stub classification and Keymail in-process (keymailtest).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Paul Campbell pushed by paul@keymail.dev 96f2e562102cd50c7e2a7a252d29291aff2031b2 parent 41641ad
9 files changed, +635 −87
  • AGENTS.md +1 −0
  • internal/calendar/auth.go +10 −71
  • internal/calendar/auth_keymail.go +138 −0
  • internal/calendar/keymail_signin_test.go +250 −0
  • internal/calendar/keymailtest/keymailtest.go +190 −0
  • internal/calendar/render.go +3 −1
  • internal/calendar/routes.go +7 −11
  • internal/calendar/signin.go +31 −1
  • internal/calendar/templates/signin.html +5 −3

CI passed — run details

CI log
=== vet ===
go vet ./...
go vet -tags browser ./internal/calendartest/
=== fmt ===
=== test ===
go test ./...
?   	amadan.net/oficina/calendar/cmd/calendar	[no test files]
ok  	amadan.net/oficina/calendar/internal/calendar	4.893s
?   	amadan.net/oficina/calendar/internal/calendar/icons	[no test files]
?   	amadan.net/oficina/calendar/internal/calendar/keymailtest	[no test files]
?   	amadan.net/oficina/calendar/internal/calendar/seal	[no test files]
ok  	amadan.net/oficina/calendar/internal/calendartest	2.499s
ok  	amadan.net/oficina/calendar/internal/guardstest	0.053s
?   	amadan.net/oficina/calendar/scripts/writeestilo	[no test files]
=== migration-check ===
go tool rastrillo migration check
rastrillo migration check: models and migrations agree
diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md
index 37c2eeb..733b7b2 100644
--- a/AGENTS.md
+++ b/AGENTS.md
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ pass by reading a file the data has not reached.
| 5 | Reminders are per PERSON, not per event | Per-event reminders — two people on one meeting want different warnings, and the fix needs a person column anyway | This session, 2026-09-02 |
| 6 | Delivery is at-least-once; every ambiguous case resolves towards sending | At-most-once — a reminder that never arrives is worse than one that arrives twice | This session, 2026-09-02 |
| 7 | Local sign-in is a magic link, with no passkey second factor | Passkeys — `passkey.Config` derives its relying party from this instance's host, so one person in three team instances enrols three credentials. Same ruling docs made | This session, 2026-09-02 |
+| 7a | Local sign-in uses Keymail for an address whose domain runs Keymail, and the magic link for every other address — chosen by the domain alone, never by the allowlist (an oracle otherwise). The Keymail hop is a continuation page, never a 303 out of the form POST (Safari applies form-action to it) | Forcing every address to a magic link | Paul, 2026-10-06 ("I do want it to use keymail") |
| 8 | A new event defaults to the person's PERSONAL calendar | Defaulting to the team calendar — the cost of forgetting to change a dropdown should fall on the side of privacy | This session, 2026-09-02 |
| H1 | **Optional Home sign-in connects to an existing person after fresh local proof and explicit confirmation; local sign-in remains available** | Treating the Home subject as an email or allocating a new person | User-approved suite connection, 2026-09-10 |
| B1 | A booking is confirmed by a BUTTON on the page the mailed link opens — a same-origin POST — never on submit and never on GET | Instant confirmation; confirming on the GET, which every link-scanning mail gateway would press | Booking spec §1, 2026-09-07 |
diff --git a/internal/calendar/auth.go b/internal/calendar/auth.go
index baf95fd..da93b7c 100644
--- a/internal/calendar/auth.go
+++ b/internal/calendar/auth.go
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
-// Local verification uses an emailed single-use link. Optional Home sign-in
-// resolves an explicitly connected existing account; it never creates a person.
+// Local sign-in is Keymail for an address whose domain runs Keymail and an
+// emailed single-use link for every other address, decided by the domain
+// alone (beginSignin). Optional Home sign-in resolves an explicitly
+// connected existing account; it never creates a person.
package calendar
import (
@@ -9,7 +11,6 @@ import (
"database/sql"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
- "net/http"
"net/url"
"regexp"
"strings"
@@ -182,78 +183,16 @@ func resolveAllowlist(cfg Config) (allowlist, error) {
return allowlist{}, fmt.Errorf("calendar: $CALENDAR_ALLOWED_ADDRESSES is empty and Env is %q, not %q — refusing to start with no allowlist configured; set it to this instance's address(es)", cfg.Env, "development")
}
-// gateBegin wraps rauth.Auth.Begin so a non-permitted address never
-// reaches it. Begin is what sends the mail, while rauth.Config.Authorize
-// is checked afterwards, at the callback, once a link has already been
-// mailed and clicked — so gating only Authorize would leave this app's
-// mail-sending identity an open relay for any address a stranger types
-// into the form.
-//
-// A non-permitted address gets exactly the response Begin's own success
-// path sends: the same 303, to the same signinPath+"?sent=1", built the
-// same way. That is deliberate. Any observable difference — a different
-// status, a different body, even a differently-cased query string —
-// would turn this endpoint into a membership oracle, letting an
-// attacker learn which addresses this instance admits by watching how
-// its response to each one differs.
-//
-// force=1 is set unconditionally on every permitted request. Begin
-// otherwise auto-upgrades an address that resolves to a claimed keymail
-// inbox to the keymail ceremony, which redirects somewhere else
-// entirely — reopening the same oracle one level narrower, since an
-// attacker who suspects an address is keymail-hosted could tell "on the
-// allowlist" from "not" by which way the response went. This app never
-// wants that ceremony anyway (see the package comment), so forcing the
-// plain-link path here makes it a guarantee for every request this
-// handler forwards rather than only for the ones built by our own form.
-// The refusal is COUNTED IN THE LOG, without the address.
-//
-// The response has to stay silent; the log does not, and the two rules
-// that made this route undiagnosable were pulling in the same
-// direction only by accident. The oracle defence forbids telling the
-// CLIENT anything, and the logs rule (AGENTS.md §Logs) forbids writing
-// an ADDRESS anywhere. Neither forbids recording that a refusal
-// happened. Without this line a correctly-configured instance and one
-// whose allowlist is missing the only address anybody types are
-// indistinguishable from outside AND from `carlos logs`: the operator's
-// single remaining move is to read the environment variable and compare
-// it by eye, which is how this was actually found after somebody sat
-// waiting for a link that was never going to arrive.
-//
-// The count is the whole payload. "signin refused" with a running total
-// is enough to answer "is this instance refusing everything?", which is
-// the only question the log needs to answer, and it names nobody.
-func gateBegin(next http.HandlerFunc, list allowlist, signinPath string, logger *slog.Logger, refusals *atomic.Int64) http.HandlerFunc {
- return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
- // A malformed body reads back as address == "" below, which is
- // never on a non-empty allowlist — the same answer Begin would
- // itself reach, just reached before any mail could go out.
- _ = r.ParseForm()
- if list.allows(r.FormValue("address")) {
- if r.Form == nil {
- r.Form = url.Values{}
- }
- r.Form.Set("force", "1")
- next(w, r)
- return
- }
- if logger != nil {
- logger.Warn("calendar: signin refused by allowlist",
- "stage", "signin.gate", "refusals_since_boot", refusals.Add(1))
- }
- http.Redirect(w, r, signinPath+"?sent=1", http.StatusSeeOther)
- }
-}
-
// newAuthPlugin builds the one *rauth.Auth this process shares. One per
// process, never one per request: the underlying flow carries its
// rate-limiter budget on the value, so a plugin per request would get a
// fresh empty budget every time — no rate limiting at all, silently.
//
-// Authorize is list.allows as well as gateBegin's gate. The two defend
-// different things: gateBegin stops the mail going out, Authorize stops
-// a link that was somehow minted for a non-permitted address (mailed
-// before the allowlist changed, say) from minting a session.
+// Authorize is list.allows as well as admissionMailer. The two defend
+// different things: admissionMailer stops the mail going out, Authorize
+// stops a session being minted for a non-permitted address, whether
+// Keymail verified it or a link was somehow minted for it (mailed
+// before the allowlist changed, say).
func newAuthPlugin(origin string, writer *sql.DB, instanceKey string, mailer mail.Sender, list allowlist, logger *slog.Logger, homeEnabled bool) (*rauth.Auth, error) {
signin, signedIn := "/signin", "/"
if homeEnabled {
@@ -265,7 +204,7 @@ func newAuthPlugin(origin string, writer *sql.DB, instanceKey string, mailer mai
SignedInPath: signedIn,
Origin: origin,
InstanceKey: instanceKey,
- Mailer: mailer,
+ Mailer: admissionMailer{next: mailer, list: list, logger: logger, refusals: new(atomic.Int64)},
Authorize: list.allows,
Subject: chrome.EmailSubject("Calendar"),
Logger: logger,
diff --git a/internal/calendar/auth_keymail.go b/internal/calendar/auth_keymail.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd037ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/calendar/auth_keymail.go
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+package calendar
+
+import (
+ "bytes"
+ "context"
+ "log/slog"
+ "net/http"
+ "strings"
+ "sync/atomic"
+
+ "amadan.net/oficina/home/connect"
+ "amadan.net/rastrillo/rastrillo/mail"
+)
+
+// beginSignin is POST /signin, in both modes: rauth's Begin for EVERY
+// address, under connect.OAuthContinuation. What the form answers
+// depends on the address's domain alone, never on the allowlist — any
+// difference between a permitted and a non-permitted address would
+// turn this endpoint into a membership oracle.
+//
+// - A Keymail address (keymail.dev itself, or a domain delegating to
+// Keymail with a `_keymail` TXT record), permitted or not, goes to
+// Keymail. Begin answers with a 303 to Keymail's authorize URL,
+// which OAuthContinuation turns into a page (renderKeymail): CSP's
+// form-action 'self' covers a form submission's whole redirect
+// chain in Safari, so a 303 out of the POST would be refused.
+// Admission is asked only after Keymail has verified the address,
+// by rauth's Authorize, and its refusal is the door saying so
+// (doorOnRefusal) — told only to someone who has just proved they
+// hold the address.
+// - Any other address is answered ?sent=1, and admissionMailer mails
+// the link only if the allowlist holds it, so this app's sending
+// identity is no open relay for whatever a stranger types.
+//
+// Both kinds of address spend the same rate budgets and parse the same
+// way. The one outcome only a permitted address can reach is ?err=1
+// from a send that failed: an operational fault, not an answer.
+//
+// It used to gate the allowlist in front of Begin and set force=1 on
+// every permitted request, which kept Keymail out of Calendar
+// altogether. Paul ruled on 2026-10-06 that Calendar uses Keymail.
+// force now arrives only from the form rastrillo lands a failed
+// Keymail exchange on (?force=1&err=keymail), and asks for an emailed
+// link instead, so nobody is stuck.
+func beginSignin(origin string, begin http.HandlerFunc, render func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request, string)) http.HandlerFunc {
+ return connect.OAuthContinuation(origin, begin, render)
+}
+
+// admissionMailer is the mail half of the allowlist: Begin runs for
+// every address, and this is where a non-permitted one is quietly not
+// mailed. rauth has stored an expiring token by then; one never
+// delivered is never redeemed, and Authorize would refuse it if it
+// were.
+//
+// The refusal is COUNTED IN THE LOG, without the address. The response
+// has to stay silent; the log does not. The oracle defence forbids
+// telling the CLIENT anything, and the logs rule (AGENTS.md §Logs)
+// forbids writing an ADDRESS anywhere, but neither forbids recording
+// that a refusal happened. Without this line a correctly-configured
+// instance and one whose allowlist is missing the only address anybody
+// types are indistinguishable from outside AND from `carlos logs`.
+type admissionMailer struct {
+ next mail.Sender
+ list allowlist
+ logger *slog.Logger
+ refusals *atomic.Int64
+}
+
+func (m admissionMailer) Send(ctx context.Context, to, subject, body string) error {
+ if !m.list.allows(to) {
+ if m.logger != nil {
+ m.logger.Warn("calendar: signin refused by allowlist",
+ "stage", "signin.gate", "refusals_since_boot", m.refusals.Add(1))
+ }
+ return nil
+ }
+ return m.next.Send(ctx, to, subject, body)
+}
+
+// authRefusal is the bare-text body rastrillo/auth's admit() writes,
+// with a 403, when a verified address is not admitted. rastrillo at the
+// version pinned here has no hook to render anything else, so
+// doorOnRefusal recognises this exact answer; TestKeymailRefusalIsTheDoor
+// pins it, so a bump that changes the sentence fails loudly.
+const authRefusal = "This address is verified but not admitted here."
+
+// doorOnRefusal wraps rauth's Callback and Verify, the handlers that end
+// in admission, and turns its bare-text refusal into the door: a 303 to
+// the local form with ?err=refused, which says the address cannot sign
+// in here and offers the form for a different one. Every other answer,
+// cookies included, passes through untouched. Remove it when rastrillo
+// has a refusal hook and the pin is bumped.
+func doorOnRefusal(next http.HandlerFunc, form string) http.HandlerFunc {
+ return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+ rec := &bufferedResponse{header: make(http.Header)}
+ next(rec, r)
+ if rec.status == http.StatusForbidden && strings.TrimSpace(rec.body.String()) == authRefusal {
+ for _, c := range rec.header.Values("Set-Cookie") {
+ w.Header().Add("Set-Cookie", c)
+ }
+ w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+ http.Redirect(w, r, form+"?err=refused", http.StatusSeeOther)
+ return
+ }
+ for name, values := range rec.header {
+ for _, v := range values {
+ w.Header().Add(name, v)
+ }
+ }
+ if rec.status == 0 {
+ rec.status = http.StatusOK
+ }
+ w.WriteHeader(rec.status)
+ _, _ = w.Write(rec.body.Bytes())
+ }
+}
+
+// bufferedResponse holds a whole answer so doorOnRefusal can decide what
+// to send after seeing it. Callback and Verify answer with a redirect
+// or a line of text, never anything large.
+type bufferedResponse struct {
+ header http.Header
+ status int
+ body bytes.Buffer
+}
+
+func (b *bufferedResponse) Header() http.Header { return b.header }
+func (b *bufferedResponse) WriteHeader(status int) {
+ if b.status == 0 {
+ b.status = status
+ }
+}
+func (b *bufferedResponse) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
+ if b.status == 0 {
+ b.status = http.StatusOK
+ }
+ return b.body.Write(p)
+}
diff --git a/internal/calendar/keymail_signin_test.go b/internal/calendar/keymail_signin_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06e8013
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/calendar/keymail_signin_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+package calendar
+
+import (
+ "bytes"
+ "context"
+ "encoding/base64"
+ "encoding/json"
+ "fmt"
+ "html"
+ "io"
+ "log/slog"
+ "net/http"
+ "net/http/httptest"
+ "net/url"
+ "os"
+ "path/filepath"
+ "regexp"
+ "strings"
+ "sync"
+ "testing"
+
+ "amadan.net/oficina/calendar/internal/calendar/keymailtest"
+ "amadan.net/oficina/home/connect"
+ assertioncrypto "amadan.net/rastrillo/rastrillo/crypto"
+)
+
+// TestMain keeps Keymail classification inside the process: every DNS
+// query is answered NXDOMAIN and only the Keymail fixtures a test
+// registers answer HTTPS (keymailtest).
+func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
+ restore, err := keymailtest.Install()
+ if err != nil {
+ fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "keymailtest.Install:", err)
+ os.Exit(1)
+ }
+ code := m.Run()
+ restore()
+ os.Exit(code)
+}
+
+const (
+ keymailHost = "keymail.calendar.test"
+ keymailMember = "paul@" + keymailHost
+ keymailStranger = "stranger@" + keymailHost
+ plainMember = "paul@example.test"
+)
+
+// countingMailer remembers every address it was asked to write to.
+type countingMailer struct {
+ mu sync.Mutex
+ to []string
+}
+
+func (m *countingMailer) Send(_ context.Context, to, _, _ string) error {
+ m.mu.Lock()
+ defer m.mu.Unlock()
+ m.to = append(m.to, to)
+ return nil
+}
+
+func (m *countingMailer) sent() []string {
+ m.mu.Lock()
+ defer m.mu.Unlock()
+ return append([]string(nil), m.to...)
+}
+
+type keymailFixture struct {
+ app *App
+ origin string
+ mail *countingMailer
+ km *keymailtest.Server
+}
+
+// newKeymailFixture builds an app admitting plainMember and
+// keymailMember, beside a Keymail deployment holding keymailMember and
+// keymailStranger. home configures Home, which moves the local form to
+// /signin/local.
+func newKeymailFixture(t *testing.T, home bool) *keymailFixture {
+ t.Helper()
+ km := keymailtest.Serve(t, keymailHost, keymailMember, keymailStranger)
+ mail := &countingMailer{}
+ cfg := Config{DBPath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "calendar.db"), Env: "development", Origin: TestOrigin,
+ AllowedAddresses: plainMember + "," + keymailMember, Mailer: mail,
+ Logger: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))}
+ if home {
+ key, err := assertioncrypto.Generate()
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ manifest, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"key": base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(key.SignPub())})
+ cfg.Origin = homeTestOrigin
+ cfg.Home = &connect.Credentials{Issuer: homeTestIssuer, ConsumerID: "calendar-test", KeysBase64: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(manifest), DEKBase64: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(bytes.Repeat([]byte{7}, 32))}
+ }
+ a, err := New(cfg)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ t.Cleanup(func() { a.Close() })
+ return &keymailFixture{app: a, origin: cfg.Origin, mail: mail, km: km}
+}
+
+func (f *keymailFixture) post(form url.Values, cookies ...*http.Cookie) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+ r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, f.origin+"/signin", strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
+ r.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
+ r.Header.Set("Origin", f.origin)
+ for _, c := range cookies {
+ r.AddCookie(c)
+ }
+ w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+ f.app.mux.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+ return w
+}
+
+func (f *keymailFixture) get(path string, cookies ...*http.Cookie) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+ r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, f.origin+path, nil)
+ for _, c := range cookies {
+ r.AddCookie(c)
+ }
+ w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+ f.app.mux.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+ return w
+}
+
+var authorizeHref = regexp.MustCompile(`href="(https://` + regexp.QuoteMeta(keymailHost) + `/oauth/authorize\?[^"]+)"`)
+
+// continuation asserts rec is the page between the form and Keymail —
+// a 200 document with a meta refresh, never a 303 out of the form POST
+// (Safari applies form-action to that redirect) — and returns the
+// authorize URL it carries.
+func continuation(t *testing.T, label string, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder) *url.URL {
+ t.Helper()
+ if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || rec.Header().Get("Location") != "" {
+ t.Fatalf("%s: %d %q, want 200 and the continuation page to Keymail", label, rec.Code, rec.Header().Get("Location"))
+ }
+ body := rec.Body.String()
+ m := authorizeHref.FindStringSubmatch(body)
+ if m == nil || !strings.Contains(body, `http-equiv="refresh"`) {
+ t.Fatalf("%s: no Keymail continuation on the page:\n%s", label, body)
+ }
+ u, err := url.Parse(html.UnescapeString(m[1]))
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ return u
+}
+
+// TestKeymailAddressGoesToKeymailWhetherPermittedOrNot: in both modes,
+// whether an address goes to Keymail depends on its domain alone. A
+// permitted and a non-permitted Keymail address get the same first
+// answer, the continuation page, and neither is mailed. Before, every
+// permitted address was forced to an emailed link and a non-permitted
+// one was answered ?sent=1.
+func TestKeymailAddressGoesToKeymailWhetherPermittedOrNot(t *testing.T) {
+ for _, home := range []bool{false, true} {
+ t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("home=%v", home), func(t *testing.T) {
+ f := newKeymailFixture(t, home)
+ member := f.post(url.Values{"address": {keymailMember}})
+ stranger := f.post(url.Values{"address": {keymailStranger}})
+ mu := continuation(t, "permitted Keymail address", member)
+ su := continuation(t, "non-permitted Keymail address", stranger)
+ mask := func(rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder, u *url.URL) string {
+ return strings.ReplaceAll(rec.Body.String(), html.EscapeString(u.String()), "AUTHORIZE")
+ }
+ if a, b := mask(member, mu), mask(stranger, su); a != b {
+ t.Errorf("the two Keymail answers differ beyond the authorize URL:\n%s\n----\n%s", a, b)
+ }
+ if got := f.mail.sent(); len(got) != 0 {
+ t.Errorf("a Keymail address was mailed: %v", got)
+ }
+ if n := f.km.Lookups(); n != 2 {
+ t.Errorf("Keymail saw %d lookups, want 2", n)
+ }
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+// TestNonPermittedPlainAddressIsAnsweredSentAndNotMailed: an address
+// with no Keymail gets ?sent=1, permitted or not; only the permitted
+// one is mailed.
+func TestNonPermittedPlainAddressIsAnsweredSentAndNotMailed(t *testing.T) {
+ f := newKeymailFixture(t, false)
+ for _, address := range []string{"someone@else.test", plainMember} {
+ rec := f.post(url.Values{"address": {address}})
+ if rec.Code != http.StatusSeeOther || rec.Header().Get("Location") != "/signin?sent=1" {
+ t.Fatalf("POST /signin %q: %d %q, want 303 /signin?sent=1", address, rec.Code, rec.Header().Get("Location"))
+ }
+ }
+ if got := f.mail.sent(); len(got) != 1 || got[0] != plainMember {
+ t.Fatalf("mail = %v, want one, to %s", got, plainMember)
+ }
+}
+
+// TestKeymailFailureFallsBackToAnEmailLink: the page rastrillo lands a
+// failed Keymail exchange on (?force=1&err=keymail) carries force, so
+// the retry mails a link instead of returning to Keymail; the ordinary
+// form carries none.
+func TestKeymailFailureFallsBackToAnEmailLink(t *testing.T) {
+ f := newKeymailFixture(t, false)
+ forced := `name="force" value="1"`
+ if strings.Contains(f.get("/signin").Body.String(), forced) {
+ t.Fatal("the ordinary form forces an email link")
+ }
+ if !strings.Contains(f.get("/signin?force=1&err=keymail").Body.String(), forced) {
+ t.Fatal("the err=keymail form does not carry force; a failed Keymail sign-in would loop back to Keymail")
+ }
+ rec := f.post(url.Values{"address": {keymailMember}, "force": {"1"}})
+ if rec.Code != http.StatusSeeOther || rec.Header().Get("Location") != "/signin?sent=1" {
+ t.Fatalf("forced POST: %d %q", rec.Code, rec.Header().Get("Location"))
+ }
+ if got := f.mail.sent(); len(got) != 1 || got[0] != keymailMember {
+ t.Fatalf("mail = %v, want one link to %s", got, keymailMember)
+ }
+ if f.km.Lookups() != 0 {
+ t.Error("a forced sign-in classified the address")
+ }
+}
+
+// TestKeymailRefusalIsTheDoor: a non-permitted address Keymail verified
+// is refused after verification on the door, with the form for a
+// different address, not in rastrillo's bare text; an admitted one is
+// signed in. Both modes.
+func TestKeymailRefusalIsTheDoor(t *testing.T) {
+ for _, home := range []bool{false, true} {
+ t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("home=%v", home), func(t *testing.T) {
+ f := newKeymailFixture(t, home)
+ form := "/signin"
+ if home {
+ form = "/signin/local"
+ }
+ roundTrip := func(address string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+ begin := f.post(url.Values{"address": {address}})
+ u := continuation(t, address, begin)
+ return f.get("/auth/callback?"+url.Values{"state": {u.Query().Get("state")}, "code": {f.km.Approve(address)}}.Encode(), begin.Result().Cookies()...)
+ }
+ if cb := roundTrip(keymailMember); cb.Code != http.StatusSeeOther || strings.Contains(cb.Header().Get("Location"), "err=") {
+ t.Fatalf("permitted callback: %d %q", cb.Code, cb.Header().Get("Location"))
+ }
+ cb := roundTrip(keymailStranger)
+ if cb.Code != http.StatusSeeOther || cb.Header().Get("Location") != form+"?err=refused" {
+ t.Fatalf("non-permitted callback: %d %q, want 303 %s?err=refused (bare text is the bug)\n%s", cb.Code, cb.Header().Get("Location"), form, cb.Body.String())
+ }
+ door := f.get(form + "?err=refused").Body.String()
+ for _, want := range []string{"estilo-door", `name="address"`, "can’t sign in to Calendar"} {
+ if !strings.Contains(door, want) {
+ t.Errorf("refusal door lacks %q:\n%s", want, door)
+ }
+ }
+ })
+ }
+}
diff --git a/internal/calendar/keymailtest/keymailtest.go b/internal/calendar/keymailtest/keymailtest.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..92ad056
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/calendar/keymailtest/keymailtest.go
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+// Package keymailtest keeps sign-in's Keymail classification inside the
+// test process. It is imported by tests only.
+//
+// rastrillo/auth (at the version this app pins) builds its classifier
+// with no seams: TXT lookups go through net.DefaultResolver and the
+// well-known probe, the federation lookup and the token exchange go
+// through http.DefaultTransport. So those two globals are the hooks,
+// exactly as oficina/docs' auth_keymail_test.go uses them. Install
+// replaces both for the life of the test binary:
+//
+// - every DNS query is answered NXDOMAIN by a resolver on loopback,
+// so no DNS packet leaves the process, and a domain with no
+// `_keymail` record is probed directly — keymail.dev's own shape;
+// - an https request to a host registered with Serve is answered
+// in-process by that fixture; anything else falls through to the
+// real transport, where the resolver above makes a name
+// unreachable (IP literals, which httptest servers use, still work).
+//
+// Every address at a domain nobody registered therefore classifies as
+// "not Keymail", which is what every pre-existing sign-in test assumes.
+package keymailtest
+
+import (
+ "context"
+ "crypto/rand"
+ "encoding/hex"
+ "encoding/json"
+ "net"
+ "net/http"
+ "net/http/httptest"
+ "strings"
+ "sync"
+ "time"
+)
+
+var (
+ mu sync.Mutex
+ servers = map[string]*Server{}
+)
+
+// Install swaps net.DefaultResolver and http.DefaultTransport for the
+// stubs described in the package comment and returns a function that
+// puts them back. Call it once, from TestMain.
+func Install() (restore func(), err error) {
+ dns, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", "127.0.0.1:0")
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ go answerNXDOMAIN(dns)
+ oldResolver, oldTransport := net.DefaultResolver, http.DefaultTransport
+ net.DefaultResolver = &net.Resolver{PreferGo: true, Dial: func(ctx context.Context, _, _ string) (net.Conn, error) {
+ return (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, "udp", dns.LocalAddr().String())
+ }}
+ http.DefaultTransport = transport{next: oldTransport}
+ return func() {
+ net.DefaultResolver, http.DefaultTransport = oldResolver, oldTransport
+ _ = dns.Close()
+ }, nil
+}
+
+// answerNXDOMAIN echoes each query back as a "no such name" answer.
+func answerNXDOMAIN(conn net.PacketConn) {
+ b := make([]byte, 4096)
+ for {
+ n, addr, err := conn.ReadFrom(b)
+ if err != nil {
+ return
+ }
+ if n < 12 {
+ continue
+ }
+ reply := append([]byte(nil), b[:n]...)
+ reply[2], reply[3] = 0x81, 0x83 // response, recursion, NXDOMAIN
+ for i := 6; i < 12; i++ {
+ reply[i] = 0 // no answer, authority or additional records
+ }
+ _, _ = conn.WriteTo(reply, addr)
+ }
+}
+
+type transport struct{ next http.RoundTripper }
+
+func (t transport) RoundTrip(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+ mu.Lock()
+ s := servers[r.URL.Host]
+ mu.Unlock()
+ if s == nil || r.URL.Scheme != "https" {
+ return t.next.RoundTrip(r)
+ }
+ rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+ s.ServeHTTP(rec, r)
+ res := rec.Result()
+ res.Request = r
+ return res, nil
+}
+
+// Server is one Keymail deployment at one host: the well-known
+// document, the federation lookup for the accounts it holds, and the
+// token exchange for the codes Approve hands out.
+type Server struct {
+ host string
+
+ mu sync.Mutex
+ accounts map[string]bool
+ codes map[string]string
+ lookups int
+ tokens int
+}
+
+// Serve registers a Keymail deployment at host (which is also the
+// address domain it answers for, since nothing publishes a `_keymail`
+// record) holding the given accounts. It is unregistered when the test
+// ends.
+func Serve(t interface{ Cleanup(func()) }, host string, accounts ...string) *Server {
+ s := &Server{host: host, accounts: map[string]bool{}, codes: map[string]string{}}
+ for _, a := range accounts {
+ s.accounts[strings.ToLower(a)] = true
+ }
+ mu.Lock()
+ servers[host] = s
+ mu.Unlock()
+ t.Cleanup(func() {
+ mu.Lock()
+ delete(servers, host)
+ mu.Unlock()
+ })
+ return s
+}
+
+// Approve is Keymail's consent screen saying yes for address: it
+// returns the code the browser would carry back to /auth/callback.
+func (s *Server) Approve(address string) string {
+ var b [12]byte
+ _, _ = rand.Read(b[:])
+ code := hex.EncodeToString(b[:])
+ s.mu.Lock()
+ s.codes[code] = address
+ s.mu.Unlock()
+ return code
+}
+
+// Lookups is how many federation lookups reached this deployment.
+func (s *Server) Lookups() int {
+ s.mu.Lock()
+ defer s.mu.Unlock()
+ return s.lookups
+}
+
+// Tokens is how many token exchanges reached this deployment.
+func (s *Server) Tokens() int {
+ s.mu.Lock()
+ defer s.mu.Unlock()
+ return s.tokens
+}
+
+func (s *Server) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+ w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+ switch r.URL.Path {
+ case "/.well-known/keymail":
+ _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"version": "1", "reauth": true})
+ case "/api/federation/lookup":
+ s.mu.Lock()
+ s.lookups++
+ ok := s.accounts[strings.ToLower(r.URL.Query().Get("addr"))]
+ s.mu.Unlock()
+ if !ok {
+ w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
+ }
+ _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]bool{"ok": ok})
+ case "/api/oauth/token":
+ var in map[string]string
+ _ = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&in)
+ s.mu.Lock()
+ s.tokens++
+ address, ok := s.codes[in["code"]]
+ delete(s.codes, in["code"])
+ s.mu.Unlock()
+ if r.Method != http.MethodPost || !ok {
+ w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
+ _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"error": "invalid_grant"})
+ return
+ }
+ _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
+ "access_token": "synthetic", "token_type": "bearer",
+ "address": address, "auth_time": time.Now().Unix(),
+ })
+ default:
+ w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
+ }
+}
diff --git a/internal/calendar/render.go b/internal/calendar/render.go
index 5af6b8a..f01e82a 100644
--- a/internal/calendar/render.go
+++ b/internal/calendar/render.go
@@ -68,7 +68,9 @@ func init() {
t = template.Must(t.ParseFS(appFS, "templates/layout.html", "templates/_chip.html",
"templates/_quickadd.html", "templates/_quickpane.html", "templates/_bookingpane.html",
"templates/"+name+".html"))
- t = template.Must(t.ParseFS(connect.Templates(), "templates/home_link.html"))
+ // home_link for the account pages; oauth for the Keymail
+ // continuation's meta refresh (home-oauth-head) on signin.
+ t = template.Must(t.ParseFS(connect.Templates(), "templates/home_link.html", "templates/oauth.html"))
pages[name] = template.Must(t.ParseFS(credits.Templates(), "templates/*.html"))
}
}
diff --git a/internal/calendar/routes.go b/internal/calendar/routes.go
index 421decf..5f0cf92 100644
--- a/internal/calendar/routes.go
+++ b/internal/calendar/routes.go
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"amadan.net/oficina/home/connect"
"amadan.net/oficina/home/handoff"
"net/http"
- "sync/atomic"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
@@ -58,25 +57,22 @@ func (a *App) routes(h *handlers, authPlugin *rauth.Auth, list allowlist, origin
r.Get("/signin", h.signin)
r.Get("/signed-out", h.signedOut)
}
- // One counter for the life of the router, so the log line can say
- // how many refusals this boot has seen rather than only that one
- // happened. routes runs once per App, so the closure below is the
- // only holder and no reset can race it.
- var refusals atomic.Int64
signinPath := "/signin"
if a.home != nil {
signinPath = "/signin/local"
}
- begin := gateBegin(authPlugin.Begin, list, signinPath, a.logger, &refusals)
+ begin := beginSignin(origin, authPlugin.Begin, h.renderKeymail)
+ callback := doorOnRefusal(authPlugin.Callback, signinPath)
+ verify := doorOnRefusal(authPlugin.Verify, signinPath)
if a.home != nil {
r.Post("/signin", a.home.routes.LocalGuard(begin))
- r.Get("/auth/callback", a.home.routes.LocalGuard(authPlugin.Callback))
- r.Get("/auth/verify", a.home.routes.LocalGuard(authPlugin.Verify))
+ r.Get("/auth/callback", a.home.routes.LocalGuard(callback))
+ r.Get("/auth/verify", a.home.routes.LocalGuard(verify))
r.Post("/signout", a.home.routes.Signout)
} else {
r.Post("/signin", begin)
- r.Get("/auth/callback", authPlugin.Callback)
- r.Get("/auth/verify", authPlugin.Verify)
+ r.Get("/auth/callback", callback)
+ r.Get("/auth/verify", verify)
r.Post("/signout", signOutToSignedOut(authPlugin.Signout))
}
diff --git a/internal/calendar/signin.go b/internal/calendar/signin.go
index 5bee915..09261ea 100644
--- a/internal/calendar/signin.go
+++ b/internal/calendar/signin.go
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
"amadan.net/oficina/estilo.git/chrome"
"amadan.net/oficina/estilo.git/sky"
+ "amadan.net/oficina/home/connect"
)
// The sign-in pages are the Oficina door (estilo chrome): one card on the
@@ -37,6 +38,12 @@ func (h *handlers) signin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
Action: "/signin",
OpenSource: &chrome.Link{Href: "/help/open-source", Label: "Open source"},
}
+ if q.Get("force") != "" {
+ // A failed Keymail exchange lands here as ?force=1&err=keymail.
+ // Posting force back asks for an emailed link instead, so the
+ // retry does not return to the Keymail that just failed.
+ form.Hidden = []chrome.Hidden{{Name: "force", Value: "1"}}
+ }
switch q.Get("err") {
case "":
case "rate":
@@ -45,6 +52,12 @@ func (h *handlers) signin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
form.AddressError = "That does not look like an email address."
case "expired":
form.Error = "That link has expired. Ask for a new one."
+ case "keymail":
+ form.Error = "Your Keymail sign-in couldn’t be completed. Enter your email to get a link instead."
+ case "refused":
+ // Keymail or a link verified the address and the allowlist does
+ // not hold it (doorOnRefusal). The form is the way on.
+ form.Error = "That address can’t sign in to Calendar. Use a different address, or ask whoever runs this team to add it."
default:
form.Error = "That link did not work. Ask for a new one."
}
@@ -67,11 +80,28 @@ func (h *handlers) signin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
// signinData is the sign-in page's own view data: exactly one of the
-// three door cards.
+// door cards. Continue is set beside Sent on the page between the form
+// and Keymail (renderKeymail): its meta refresh goes on to Keymail.
type signinData struct {
Form *chrome.SignIn
Sent *chrome.SignInNotice
SignedOut *chrome.SignInNotice
+ Continue *connect.OAuthData
+}
+
+// renderKeymail is the page between the form and Keymail, in both modes
+// (beginSignin): the door's own card saying where the person is going,
+// a meta refresh that goes there by itself, and a link that does when
+// the refresh is blocked. A navigation from a page, unlike a redirect
+// from a form POST, is outside form-action.
+func (h *handlers) renderKeymail(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, destination string) {
+ p := connect.OAuthPage(destination)
+ notice := chrome.SignInNotice{
+ Icon: assets.Path("static/brand/icon.svg"), App: "Calendar", Sky: sky.For(r.Host),
+ Heading: p.Title, Body: "Taking you to Keymail to finish signing in.",
+ Link: &chrome.Link{Href: p.URL, Label: p.ActionLabel},
+ }
+ render(w, "signin", h.page(r, p.Title, signinData{Sent: &notice, Continue: &p}))
}
// signedOutDoor is where Home sign-out lands, drawn as the door: the
diff --git a/internal/calendar/templates/signin.html b/internal/calendar/templates/signin.html
index 0eac71b..6668e24 100644
--- a/internal/calendar/templates/signin.html
+++ b/internal/calendar/templates/signin.html
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
{{define "title"}}{{.Title}}{{end}}
{{/* The Oficina door (estilo chrome). Exactly one card: the form, the
- check-your-email notice, or where Home sign-out lands. The form posts
- its address as "address", the name gateBegin and the auth plugin
- read. */}}
+ check-your-email notice, the card between the form and Keymail (with
+ .Data.Continue's meta refresh in head), or where Home sign-out lands.
+ The form posts its address as "address", the name the auth plugin
+ reads. */}}
+{{define "head"}}{{with .Data.Continue}}{{template "home-oauth-head" .}}{{end}}{{end}}
{{define "content"}}
{{- with .Data.Form}}{{template "estilo-signin" .}}{{end}}
{{- with .Data.Sent}}{{template "estilo-signin-sent" .}}{{end}}