eleven / ocho Public

docs: state the asynchronous membership and history boundary

Co-Authored-By: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

Paul Campbell pushed by codex 1 month ago 7daa45a04c4f6a4323697fe1b3539906d16f43cc parent 4c6bb26

2 files changed, +2 −2

DESIGN.md +1 −1
docs/infinity/status.md +1 −1

diff --git a/DESIGN.md b/DESIGN.md

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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Status: implementation in progress. Product brief: Paul, 2026-09-05. Technical c

## Trust boundary

-The client creates encryption and signing keys. Contact links pin the inviter's public identity in the URL fragment. Contact acceptance binds both identities; identity changes must never silently replace a trusted key. Servers store encrypted envelopes and relay them through consent-scoped inbox capabilities. The owner authenticates separately from delivery capabilities. Every message is signed and its conversation and membership are bound into authenticated content. Group membership changes are signed by the creator; removed members receive no later envelopes. Content is encrypted independently for each recipient, avoiding a reusable group key retained by removed members.

+The client creates encryption and signing keys. Contact links pin the inviter's public identity in the URL fragment. Contact acceptance binds both identities; identity changes must never silently replace a trusted key. Servers store encrypted envelopes and relay them through consent-scoped inbox capabilities. The owner authenticates separately from delivery capabilities. Every message is signed and its conversation and membership are bound into authenticated content. Group membership changes are signed by the creator. After a sender receives an update, it encrypts subsequent messages only to the remaining members. Delivery is asynchronous: a sender that has not received the update can still send under the old membership. Content is encrypted independently for each recipient, avoiding a reusable group key retained by removed members. Previous epochs remain valid for authenticated history; this initial protocol has no cryptographically enforced global cutoff for delayed or backdated old-epoch messages.

Routing origins, public keys, delivery times, envelope sizes and access IPs are observable metadata. Browser code is served by an origin: an actively compromised origin can serve malicious code. A copied recipient private key can expose recorded messages under static recipient encryption; do not label this forward secrecy. Recovery material grants identity and history access; the server cannot reset it. Server-blindness protects stored content, not a compromised unlocked client.

diff --git a/docs/infinity/status.md b/docs/infinity/status.md

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@@ -16,6 +16,6 @@ Account `ocho` / `bdy`; apps `infinity` and `infinity-home`; channel `canary/inf

## Explicit limits

-This is an early text-chat implementation, not an independently audited security product. Recipient-key encryption has no double-ratchet forward secrecy. Web clients trust code served by their origin. Routing metadata, timing, sizes, public keys and outbound delivery capabilities are server-visible. Recovery currently clones the identity across devices; independent device revocation and passkey-based recovery remain future work. Apple apps share the tested web UI; universal links, background push and App Store signing are not configured. Attachments, voice and video are not implemented.

+This is an early text-chat implementation, not an independently audited security product. Recipient-key encryption has no double-ratchet forward secrecy. Group removal takes effect at a sender when it receives the membership update; old epochs remain valid for authenticated history, with no global cutoff for delayed/backdated old-epoch messages. Web clients trust code served by their origin. Routing metadata, timing, sizes, public keys and outbound delivery capabilities are server-visible. Recovery currently clones the identity across devices; independent device revocation and passkey-based recovery remain future work. Apple apps share the tested web UI; universal links, background push and App Store signing are not configured. Attachments, voice and video are not implemented.

Source work is on `infinity-v1` in the isolated `.worktrees/infinity` checkout. The root checkout preserves the Eleven fork baseline; no main-branch merge has been performed. A private `ocho/ocho` Amadan remote is proposed, but does not yet exist. The forge requires a disclosed agent identity; setting up a Codex identity and namespace grants is awaiting approval. This status is updated as verification progresses; it is not a completion claim.