| 1 | # 🤖 The public status bucket (issue #550 Parts 11/12): world-readable |
| 2 | # dashboards — fleet.json + books.json (published every 5 minutes by |
| 3 | # deploy/status-publish.sh on the router box) and the two static viewer pages |
| 4 | # (web/status/). Everything in it is AGGREGATE BY DESIGN: fleet counts and |
| 5 | # version distribution with no hostnames, and Stripe income as totals only — |
| 6 | # decision #19 (income publishes aggregated, never per-payer; expenses are the |
| 7 | # deliberate mirror image and publish itemized per provider) and invariant 12 |
| 8 | # (no PII in our stores) are enforced upstream in the generator; this bucket |
| 9 | # only ever receives what passed that gate. docs/status.md is the guide. |
| 10 | # |
| 11 | # NOT YET APPLIED — needs a deliberate, named |
| 12 | # `AWS_PROFILE=… tofu apply` in infra/prod; plan only until then. |
| 13 | |
| 14 | resource "aws_s3_bucket" "status" { |
| 15 | bucket = "eleven-status-${local.account_id}" |
| 16 | } |
| 17 | |
| 18 | resource "aws_s3_bucket_versioning" "status" { |
| 19 | bucket = aws_s3_bucket.status.id |
| 20 | |
| 21 | versioning_configuration { |
| 22 | status = "Enabled" |
| 23 | } |
| 24 | } |
| 25 | |
| 26 | # The JSONs are clobbered every 5 minutes (≈576 noncurrent versions/day), so |
| 27 | # versions are pure rollback/forensic noise past a short window — 7 days is |
| 28 | # plenty to reconstruct "what did the page say when". |
| 29 | resource "aws_s3_bucket_lifecycle_configuration" "status" { |
| 30 | bucket = aws_s3_bucket.status.id |
| 31 | |
| 32 | rule { |
| 33 | id = "expire-noncurrent-7d" |
| 34 | status = "Enabled" |
| 35 | |
| 36 | filter {} |
| 37 | |
| 38 | noncurrent_version_expiration { |
| 39 | noncurrent_days = 7 |
| 40 | } |
| 41 | } |
| 42 | } |
| 43 | |
| 44 | # Deliberately PUBLIC-READ, like the releases bucket (releases.tf) and against |
| 45 | # the everything-else-blocked posture (backup.tf, hibernate.tf): a public |
| 46 | # status page is the point — the content is aggregates that were reviewed for |
| 47 | # publication before the generator ever wrote them (no hostnames, no per-payer |
| 48 | # data, no PII exists upstream to leak). ACLs stay fully blocked; only the |
| 49 | # bucket *policy* door is opened, and the GET-only policy below is the entire |
| 50 | # public surface (no anonymous List — object names are known, enumeration |
| 51 | # isn't offered). |
| 52 | resource "aws_s3_bucket_public_access_block" "status" { |
| 53 | bucket = aws_s3_bucket.status.id |
| 54 | |
| 55 | block_public_acls = true |
| 56 | ignore_public_acls = true |
| 57 | block_public_policy = false |
| 58 | restrict_public_buckets = false |
| 59 | } |
| 60 | |
| 61 | data "aws_iam_policy_document" "status_public_read" { |
| 62 | statement { |
| 63 | sid = "PublicReadStatusObjects" |
| 64 | actions = ["s3:GetObject"] |
| 65 | resources = ["${aws_s3_bucket.status.arn}/*"] |
| 66 | |
| 67 | principals { |
| 68 | type = "*" |
| 69 | identifiers = ["*"] |
| 70 | } |
| 71 | } |
| 72 | |
| 73 | # Public means anonymous, not unencrypted: deny any request over plain |
| 74 | # HTTP. The viewer pages and the publisher both use the https endpoint |
| 75 | # already; this closes the door on downgraded fetches. |
| 76 | statement { |
| 77 | sid = "DenyInsecureTransport" |
| 78 | effect = "Deny" |
| 79 | actions = ["s3:*"] |
| 80 | resources = [ |
| 81 | aws_s3_bucket.status.arn, |
| 82 | "${aws_s3_bucket.status.arn}/*", |
| 83 | ] |
| 84 | |
| 85 | principals { |
| 86 | type = "*" |
| 87 | identifiers = ["*"] |
| 88 | } |
| 89 | |
| 90 | condition { |
| 91 | test = "Bool" |
| 92 | variable = "aws:SecureTransport" |
| 93 | values = ["false"] |
| 94 | } |
| 95 | } |
| 96 | } |
| 97 | |
| 98 | resource "aws_s3_bucket_policy" "status" { |
| 99 | bucket = aws_s3_bucket.status.id |
| 100 | policy = data.aws_iam_policy_document.status_public_read.json |
| 101 | |
| 102 | # The policy grants public access, so the access block must relax |
| 103 | # block_public_policy before it can be attached. |
| 104 | depends_on = [aws_s3_bucket_public_access_block.status] |
| 105 | } |
| 106 | |
| 107 | # The publisher's credentials: object put/get + list on this bucket plus |
| 108 | # read-only Cost Explorer, nothing else in the account — and no DeleteObject, |
| 109 | # so a leaked publisher key can overwrite the current dashboards (noncurrent |
| 110 | # versions survive; versioning is the rollback) but never destroy history. |
| 111 | # Mint the access key by hand |
| 112 | # (aws iam create-access-key --user-name status-publisher) — keys never land |
| 113 | # in tofu state; they go in /data/status.env on the router box. |
| 114 | resource "aws_iam_user" "status_publisher" { |
| 115 | name = "status-publisher" |
| 116 | } |
| 117 | |
| 118 | data "aws_iam_policy_document" "status_publisher" { |
| 119 | statement { |
| 120 | sid = "ListStatusBucket" |
| 121 | actions = ["s3:ListBucket"] |
| 122 | resources = [aws_s3_bucket.status.arn] |
| 123 | } |
| 124 | |
| 125 | statement { |
| 126 | sid = "WriteStatusObjects" |
| 127 | actions = [ |
| 128 | "s3:GetObject", |
| 129 | "s3:PutObject", |
| 130 | ] |
| 131 | resources = ["${aws_s3_bucket.status.arn}/*"] |
| 132 | } |
| 133 | |
| 134 | # Read-only access to the mesh's stats side-channel in the hibernation |
| 135 | # bucket (hibernate.tf's prod_instances) — deploy/status-publish.sh's |
| 136 | # mesh_peer_boxes reads every live mesh peer's self-published capacity |
| 137 | # snapshot (band words + counts only — never raw ratios, meshstats.go) to |
| 138 | # build fleet.json's multi-host hosts.boxes array. Scoped to the "*-stats/" |
| 139 | # sibling prefix internal/activator/heartbeat.go's PutStats writes to, not |
| 140 | # the whole bucket: the publisher must never be able to read or restore |
| 141 | # actual (ciphertext) instance replicas, only the small stats objects next |
| 142 | # to them. No s3:PutObject/DeleteObject here — this credential only reads. |
| 143 | statement { |
| 144 | sid = "ListMeshStatsPrefix" |
| 145 | actions = ["s3:ListBucket"] |
| 146 | resources = [aws_s3_bucket.prod_instances.arn] |
| 147 | condition { |
| 148 | test = "StringLike" |
| 149 | variable = "s3:prefix" |
| 150 | values = ["*-stats/*"] |
| 151 | } |
| 152 | } |
| 153 | |
| 154 | statement { |
| 155 | sid = "ReadMeshStatsObjects" |
| 156 | actions = ["s3:GetObject"] |
| 157 | resources = ["${aws_s3_bucket.prod_instances.arn}/*-stats/*"] |
| 158 | } |
| 159 | |
| 160 | # The books page's expenses section: the publisher asks Cost Explorer for |
| 161 | # the account's month-to-date spend (deploy/status-publish.sh, cached — CE |
| 162 | # bills per request). ce:GetCostAndUsage has no resource-level scoping, so |
| 163 | # "*" is the narrowest possible grant; it exposes only read-only cost |
| 164 | # metadata, which is exactly what we deliberately publish anyway (decision |
| 165 | # #19: expenses itemize). |
| 166 | statement { |
| 167 | sid = "ReadCostAndUsage" |
| 168 | actions = ["ce:GetCostAndUsage"] |
| 169 | resources = ["*"] |
| 170 | } |
| 171 | } |
| 172 | |
| 173 | resource "aws_iam_user_policy" "status_publisher" { |
| 174 | name = "status-publisher-bucket" |
| 175 | user = aws_iam_user.status_publisher.name |
| 176 | policy = data.aws_iam_policy_document.status_publisher.json |
| 177 | } |
| 178 | |
| 179 | output "status_bucket" { |
| 180 | value = aws_s3_bucket.status.bucket |
| 181 | } |
| 182 | |
| 183 | # Where the dashboards live once published. |
| 184 | output "status_url" { |
| 185 | value = "https://${aws_s3_bucket.status.bucket_regional_domain_name}/index.html" |
| 186 | } |
| 187 | |
| 188 | # ---- ledger streams (issue #1224) --------------------------------------------- |
| 189 | # The append-only, hash-chained ledger streams under ledgers/<name>/ — writes |
| 190 | # stream live from contributor machines (tools/ledger-append.mjs / |
| 191 | # tools/music-ledger.mjs --stream) instead of riding the release train; the |
| 192 | # viewer pages read them through the same public GET door as everything else |
| 193 | # (no anonymous List — pages fetch HEAD.json + derived views by known key, |
| 194 | # and tools/ledger-verify.mjs walks the prev-hash chain, so enumeration stays |
| 195 | # unoffered). Tamper-EVIDENT, not tamper-proof: the chain (plus a future |
| 196 | # anchor of the head hash into the public releases repo) is the guarantee; |
| 197 | # this credential simply can't delete, and versioning keeps a short forensic |
| 198 | # window like the rest of the bucket. |
| 199 | # Mint the access key by hand (aws iam create-access-key --user-name |
| 200 | # status-ledger-writer) — keys never land in tofu state; store it in |
| 201 | # Bitwarden per deploy/vault-items.sh and hand it only to contributor |
| 202 | # machines that stream ledgers. |
| 203 | resource "aws_iam_user" "ledger_writer" { |
| 204 | name = "status-ledger-writer" |
| 205 | } |
| 206 | |
| 207 | data "aws_iam_policy_document" "ledger_writer" { |
| 208 | # PutObject only, and only under ledgers/ — this key can append entries, |
| 209 | # blobs, and derived views, and nothing else: no reads beyond the public |
| 210 | # door everyone has, no deletes, no touching the dashboards' own JSONs. |
| 211 | statement { |
| 212 | sid = "AppendLedgerObjects" |
| 213 | actions = ["s3:PutObject"] |
| 214 | resources = ["${aws_s3_bucket.status.arn}/ledgers/*"] |
| 215 | } |
| 216 | } |
| 217 | |
| 218 | resource "aws_iam_user_policy" "ledger_writer" { |
| 219 | name = "status-ledger-writer-append" |
| 220 | user = aws_iam_user.ledger_writer.name |
| 221 | policy = data.aws_iam_policy_document.ledger_writer.json |
| 222 | } |
| 223 | |
amadan