| 1 | # π€ Funding without control β notes, the waterfall, and the public ledger |
| 2 | |
| 3 | > **Status: designed, not adopted.** No notes exist and no money has been |
| 4 | > taken under this model. This document is the plan of record for how outside |
| 5 | > investment would enter, sit, and leave β it becomes live only after an Irish |
| 6 | > solicitor and tax advisor have reviewed the instrument (Β§ Regulatory |
| 7 | > guardrails) and Series 1 is deliberately opened. Until then it is a spec, |
| 8 | > and like every spec in this repo it is published so it can be argued with. |
| 9 | |
| 10 | Eleven takes no venture capital. The product is public-service *and* |
| 11 | commercial β members pay for what things cost plus resilience |
| 12 | (`docs/tier-economics.md`), and the books are already on the public record |
| 13 | (`docs/status.md`). This document extends the same posture to investment: |
| 14 | money may fund the work, but **money has no control**. There are no investor |
| 15 | shares, no board seats, no votes, no exits. What an investor buys is a |
| 16 | position in a published algorithm; what protects them is not power but |
| 17 | transparency with teeth. |
| 18 | |
| 19 | The model in one paragraph: investors buy **profit-participating notes** in |
| 20 | named series. The money sits through a **seasoning period** and behind a |
| 21 | **reserve floor**, then a quarterly **waterfall** streams distributable |
| 22 | surplus out β pro-rata to noteholders until each hits a fixed **cap |
| 23 | multiple** and the note extinguishes, alongside fixed shares for the team and |
| 24 | the commons. Every parameter, every computation input, and every payment is |
| 25 | published in a machine-readable **ledger** on the status pages. The algorithm |
| 26 | is versioned in this repo; each series pins the version it was sold under. An |
| 27 | independent **verification panel** β funded senior to everyone as an |
| 28 | operating cost β audits the claims: the encryption architecture, the |
| 29 | published economics, and whether the money actually moved the way this |
| 30 | document says it must. |
| 31 | |
| 32 | ## The one rule here: money has no control |
| 33 | |
| 34 | - Notes carry **no votes, no board seats, no vetoes, no information rights** |
| 35 | beyond the public ledger everyone already has. |
| 36 | - The **only enforceable investor rights are the transparency promises**: |
| 37 | that the ledger publishes, that the verification panel stays funded, and |
| 38 | that distributions follow the pinned algorithm. Breach of those β and |
| 39 | nothing else β gives noteholders a remedy (Β§ Events of default). |
| 40 | - The company can always refuse money; money can never redirect the mission. |
| 41 | Mission changes sit behind the guardian's golden share (Β§ Entities), which |
| 42 | no amount of investment can buy. |
| 43 | - Symmetrically, **the company cannot change a sold note**. Algorithm |
| 44 | changes apply to future series only (Β§ Changing the algorithm). |
| 45 | |
| 46 | ## Entities |
| 47 | |
| 48 | Two entities, one of which does almost nothing: |
| 49 | |
| 50 | - **The operating company** β an ordinary Irish private company (a DAC if we |
| 51 | want the mission bound into a legal objects clause). It runs everything: |
| 52 | the fleet, payroll, the raise itself. Deliberately boring to operate. |
| 53 | - **The guardian** β a small passive entity holding a single **golden share** |
| 54 | in the operating company's constitution. Its only powers are vetoes: sale |
| 55 | or merger, weakening the E2EE architecture, gutting the licence, or |
| 56 | applying an algorithm change retroactively to sold notes. It never trades, |
| 57 | never employs, never touches product decisions. (Form β CLG, trust, or an |
| 58 | existing steward foundation β is an open decision; the lesson from the |
| 59 | earlier CLG is that the mission lock must never be the *operating* entity.) |
| 60 | |
| 61 | ## The instrument: profit-participating notes |
| 62 | |
| 63 | A note is a simple contract, identical for every investor in a series: |
| 64 | |
| 65 | - **Principal** β the amount invested. |
| 66 | - **Cap multiple** β the total the note can ever return, as a multiple of |
| 67 | principal (default **2.0Γ**; a series fixes it anywhere in 1.5Γβ3.0Γ). |
| 68 | No interest, no compounding, no fees: the cap is the whole return. |
| 69 | - **No maturity date** β the note lives until its cap is reached through the |
| 70 | waterfall, however long that takes. Distributions scale with revenue and |
| 71 | nothing else. |
| 72 | - **No security** β noteholders rank as unsecured creditors behind ordinary |
| 73 | trade creditors and payroll. This is at-risk money and the note says so |
| 74 | plainly. |
| 75 | - **Algorithm pin** β the note names the git commit of this document it was |
| 76 | sold under. That version governs the note forever. |
| 77 | |
| 78 | ## Series |
| 79 | |
| 80 | Raises happen in **named series** (S1, S2, β¦), the way releases are minted. |
| 81 | A series fixes, before it opens: its size ceiling, cap multiple, seasoning |
| 82 | period, and algorithm version. All of that is published in the ledger when |
| 83 | the series opens β terms are identical for every subscriber and there are no |
| 84 | side letters, by rule. The company may refuse any subscription without |
| 85 | reason (mission-alignment is allowed to be a judgment call), and every |
| 86 | subscriber clears KYC/source-of-funds checks before funds are accepted. |
| 87 | |
| 88 | ## Inflows and seasoning |
| 89 | |
| 90 | Subscribed money lands in the treasury and **sits**: |
| 91 | |
| 92 | - **Seasoning**: no distributions to a series' noteholders until the later |
| 93 | of (a) **24 months** after the series closes and (b) the reserve floor |
| 94 | holding for **two consecutive quarters**. New money funds building first; |
| 95 | it cannot arrive and immediately start extracting. |
| 96 | - Seasoning gates *noteholder* payments only β the verification retainer and |
| 97 | ordinary operations are never gated. |
| 98 | |
| 99 | ## The reserve floor |
| 100 | |
| 101 | Before anything is distributable, the treasury must hold **12 months of |
| 102 | budgeted operating costs** (the budget itself is a published ledger input). |
| 103 | Below the floor, nothing streams and the ledger says so. The floor is |
| 104 | recomputed each quarter from the forward budget, so growth raises it. |
| 105 | |
| 106 | ## The waterfall |
| 107 | |
| 108 | Computed once per quarter, from cash actually received and spent β no |
| 109 | accrual games. Normative pseudocode; the prose around it explains intent, |
| 110 | but a note incorporates this computation by reference: |
| 111 | |
| 112 | ``` |
| 113 | quarter(q): |
| 114 | R = cash revenue received in q |
| 115 | C = operating costs paid in q # includes the verification retainer |
| 116 | F = reserve floor top-up needed # to reach 12 months forward budget |
| 117 | D = R β C β F # distributable surplus |
| 118 | |
| 119 | if D β€ 0: publish inputs; distribute nothing |
| 120 | else: |
| 121 | investors = 0.60 Γ D # pro-rata by remaining cap, seasoned series only |
| 122 | team = 0.25 Γ D # the profit-share pool |
| 123 | commons = 0.15 Γ D # price cuts, free-tier subsidy, aligned grants |
| 124 | |
| 125 | each note's payment = investors Γ (note remaining cap Γ· Ξ£ remaining caps) |
| 126 | a payment reduces the note's remaining cap; at zero the note extinguishes |
| 127 | |
| 128 | rounding: the investor and team pools round down to the cent β leftover |
| 129 | cents always land with the commons, never the money |
| 130 | if no note is seasoned: the investor pool is retained in the treasury |
| 131 | (never redirected to the other pools; team and commons still flow) |
| 132 | if the pool exceeds every remaining cap: notes fill and extinguish, and |
| 133 | the excess is published as residue β its destination is a decision made |
| 134 | and published at the time, like the post-extinguishment fold below |
| 135 | when all notes are extinguished: investors' 60% folds into commons and team |
| 136 | (35% / 25%), or into lower prices β decided and published at the time |
| 137 | ``` |
| 138 | |
| 139 | Notes on intent: |
| 140 | |
| 141 | - **Pro-rata by remaining cap**, not by principal β so early series aren't |
| 142 | crowded out by later, larger ones, and every note converges on its cap at |
| 143 | the same relative pace. |
| 144 | - **The commons share is accounted publicly**: each quarter's ledger entry |
| 145 | says where the 15% went (which prices were cut, what was granted, to whom). |
| 146 | - The split constants (60/25/15), the cap-multiple range, seasoning, and the |
| 147 | reserve months are **parameters of the algorithm version** β changing any |
| 148 | of them is a new version (Β§ Changing the algorithm). |
| 149 | |
| 150 | A worked quarter, for scale honesty: Series 1 raises β¬300k at 2.0Γ β a β¬600k |
| 151 | lifetime obligation ceiling. A quarter brings β¬40k revenue, β¬28k costs, β¬4k |
| 152 | reserve top-up β D = β¬8k β β¬4,800 to noteholders, β¬2,000 to the team pool, |
| 153 | β¬1,200 to the commons. Remaining caps fall to β¬595,200. At that pace the cap |
| 154 | is decades away β the honest reading is that **noteholders are paid back at |
| 155 | the speed the product actually earns**, and possibly never in full. This is |
| 156 | patient, at-risk money by construction, and the offer documents say exactly |
| 157 | that. |
| 158 | |
| 159 | ## Verification: the assurance panel |
| 160 | |
| 161 | The credibility of every public claim β "the server holds only ciphertext", |
| 162 | "the price is the cost plus resilience", "the money moved as published" β |
| 163 | rests on someone independent checking. The panel is what the raise |
| 164 | structurally guarantees: |
| 165 | |
| 166 | - **Funding is senior by construction**: the retainer is an operating cost |
| 167 | (inside `C`), never a waterfall share β it cannot be starved by tuning the |
| 168 | splits. It is prefunded **12 months ahead** in a segregated account, |
| 169 | topped up quarterly; if the balance ever drops below 12 months, that is an |
| 170 | **assurance lapse**, published as a flag on the status pages the day it |
| 171 | happens. |
| 172 | - **Independence is contractual**: at least three members; the company |
| 173 | appoints at most a minority; members cannot be removed, and the retainer |
| 174 | cannot be reduced, in response to findings. |
| 175 | - **Output is public**: at least annually, unredacted after a fixed 30-day |
| 176 | remediation window β (1) an architecture audit of the E2EE claims |
| 177 | (`docs/no-plaintext.md`, the security ledger), (2) a ledger audit (do the |
| 178 | published numbers reconcile to bank statements), (3) an economics audit |
| 179 | (are the published allowances the enforced ones β |
| 180 | `docs/tier-economics.md`), and (4) an **algorithm-compliance audit**: were |
| 181 | the quarter's distributions the pinned algorithm's outputs for the |
| 182 | published inputs. |
| 183 | |
| 184 | ## The ledger |
| 185 | |
| 186 | The money's public record, in the committed-data pattern the status pages |
| 187 | already use (`docs/status.md` β carbon, economics, contributors): |
| 188 | |
| 189 | - **`web/status/funding.json`** β committed data, republished as-is by the |
| 190 | box's status timer alongside `funding.html` (the **Investing** tab of the |
| 191 | status pages, which also carries an interactive simulator that imports and |
| 192 | runs the served algorithm module over a chosen scenario). Three arrays: |
| 193 | - `series[]` β id, opened/closed dates, size, cap multiple, seasoning, |
| 194 | algorithm version (git commit). |
| 195 | - `notes[]` β **pseudonymous** note ids with principal, remaining cap, |
| 196 | series. KYC identities stay private (they are personal data and buy no |
| 197 | influence anyway); amounts and movements are public. |
| 198 | - `quarters[]` β every input (`R`, `C`, `F`, the forward budget behind the |
| 199 | floor) and every output (per-note payments, team, commons, and where the |
| 200 | commons went), plus reserve and retainer balances. |
| 201 | - **All ledger amounts are integer cents** β no floats near money, and every |
| 202 | computation is deterministic to the cent (remainder cents are assigned by |
| 203 | largest fractional remainder, ties broken by note id). |
| 204 | - **The algorithm ships as code**: `web/status/waterfall.js`, a pure function |
| 205 | from `funding.json` to the quarter's payments, Node-tested against pinned |
| 206 | vectors (`test/waterfall.test.mjs` + `test/waterfall-vectors.json`) in the |
| 207 | same style as `format.js` (`tools/waterfall.mjs` re-exports it for |
| 208 | Node-side use). It lives in the published status directory on purpose: the |
| 209 | Investing page serves it *and* imports it, so the public simulator runs the |
| 210 | normative module rather than describing a copy. Anyone can re-run it: **an |
| 211 | audit is a re-execution**. Legally the pinned prose governs; a divergence |
| 212 | between prose and code is a defect fixed in code, in public. |
| 213 | |
| 214 | ## Events of default β the teeth |
| 215 | |
| 216 | The note's only covenants are the transparency promises, so those are the |
| 217 | only defaults. If any of these holds and is not cured within **90 days**: |
| 218 | |
| 219 | 1. the ledger stops publishing, or publishes figures the verification panel |
| 220 | finds irreconcilable with bank records; |
| 221 | 2. the assurance lapse flag stands uncured (the panel defunded); or |
| 222 | 3. a distribution is made off-algorithm, or an algorithm change is applied |
| 223 | retroactively to a sold note β |
| 224 | |
| 225 | then every note's **unreturned principal becomes repayable**. That is the |
| 226 | entire remedy: no step-in rights, no board seats, no control even in |
| 227 | default. Investors can force the money back out; they can never take the |
| 228 | wheel. |
| 229 | |
| 230 | ## Wind-down |
| 231 | |
| 232 | - **Solvent wind-down**: after all obligations, remaining treasury goes |
| 233 | first to notes up to *unreturned principal* (not cap), then to the |
| 234 | commons β published, like everything else. The golden share blocks |
| 235 | sale-for-parts as an exit. |
| 236 | - **Insolvency**: notes rank as unsecured, behind trade creditors and |
| 237 | payroll. The offer documents say so in plain language. |
| 238 | |
| 239 | ## Changing the algorithm |
| 240 | |
| 241 | This document is versioned in git; **a note pins the commit it was sold |
| 242 | under and that version governs it forever**. Changing parameters or |
| 243 | mechanics is a new version that can apply only to series opened after it β |
| 244 | enforced twice: contractually in the note, and by the guardian's golden-share |
| 245 | veto on retroactive application. (The deploy-pinning instinct, applied to |
| 246 | money.) |
| 247 | |
| 248 | ## Regulatory guardrails |
| 249 | |
| 250 | The structure must stay inside these lines, and adoption is gated on |
| 251 | professional review of each: |
| 252 | |
| 253 | - **Prospectus rules** β notes are securities; offers stay inside an EU |
| 254 | Prospectus Regulation exemption (the Irish national threshold β confirm |
| 255 | the current figure with the solicitor β and/or β€149 non-qualified persons |
| 256 | per member state, and/or qualified investors only). Series size ceilings |
| 257 | are set to keep each raise inside the exemption used. |
| 258 | - **Not deposit-taking** β the money is at-risk with contingent, |
| 259 | algorithm-determined returns and is never repayable on demand (default |
| 260 | remedies excepted). Nothing in the copy or the contract may resemble a |
| 261 | deposit. |
| 262 | - **Tax** β profit-participating interest can be treated as a distribution |
| 263 | (non-deductible) in Ireland, and withholding may apply to payments. The |
| 264 | waterfall's economics are only real once the instrument's tax treatment is |
| 265 | nailed down; this is the advisor's first question. |
| 266 | - **Per-series sign-off** β every series gets legal review before it opens, |
| 267 | not just Series 1. |
| 268 | |
| 269 | ## What this is not |
| 270 | |
| 271 | - Not VC: no equity, no exit, capped upside, revenue-paced returns that may |
| 272 | take decades or never complete. It selects for patient, mission-aligned |
| 273 | money β customers, peers, steward-ownership funds β and that is the point. |
| 274 | - Not a bank: money in is at risk, and "sits for a while" is seasoning, not |
| 275 | safekeeping. |
| 276 | - Not governance: the raise funds the work and the checking of the work. The |
| 277 | mission is locked where money can't reach it. |
| 278 | |