| 1 | package mail |
| 2 | |
| 3 | import ( |
| 4 | "encoding/json" |
| 5 | "testing" |
| 6 | ) |
| 7 | |
| 8 | type policyDoc struct { |
| 9 | Version string `json:"Version"` |
| 10 | Statement []struct { |
| 11 | Effect string `json:"Effect"` |
| 12 | Action []string `json:"Action"` |
| 13 | Resource []string `json:"Resource"` |
| 14 | Condition map[string]map[string][]string |
| 15 | } `json:"Statement"` |
| 16 | } |
| 17 | |
| 18 | func parsePolicy(t *testing.T, s string) policyDoc { |
| 19 | t.Helper() |
| 20 | var d policyDoc |
| 21 | if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(s), &d); err != nil { |
| 22 | t.Fatalf("policy is not valid JSON: %v\n%s", err, s) |
| 23 | } |
| 24 | return d |
| 25 | } |
| 26 | |
| 27 | // BOTH rails or neither. Resource alone authorises sending AS the identity, |
| 28 | // and a subdomain identity covers From addresses the app must not claim. |
| 29 | // The condition alone does not bind the identity used to sign. A change that |
| 30 | // drops either must fail a test, not a review (spec §4). |
| 31 | func TestPolicyCarriesBothIsolationRails(t *testing.T) { |
| 32 | got, err := SendPolicyJSON( |
| 33 | []string{"arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:1:identity/harbourmail.bag.oncarlos.com"}, |
| 34 | nil, |
| 35 | []string{"harbourmail.bag.oncarlos.com"}) |
| 36 | if err != nil { |
| 37 | t.Fatalf("SendPolicyJSON: %v", err) |
| 38 | } |
| 39 | d := parsePolicy(t, got) |
| 40 | if len(d.Statement) != 1 { |
| 41 | t.Fatalf("want exactly one statement, got %d", len(d.Statement)) |
| 42 | } |
| 43 | st := d.Statement[0] |
| 44 | if st.Effect != "Allow" { |
| 45 | t.Fatalf("Effect = %q, want Allow", st.Effect) |
| 46 | } |
| 47 | if len(st.Action) != 1 || st.Action[0] != "ses:SendRawEmail" { |
| 48 | t.Fatalf("Action = %v, want [ses:SendRawEmail] — the contract is SMTP-only", st.Action) |
| 49 | } |
| 50 | if len(st.Resource) != 1 || st.Resource[0] != "arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:1:identity/harbourmail.bag.oncarlos.com" { |
| 51 | t.Fatalf("Resource = %v — rail one is missing or wrong", st.Resource) |
| 52 | } |
| 53 | from := st.Condition["StringLike"]["ses:FromAddress"] |
| 54 | if len(from) != 1 || from[0] != "*@harbourmail.bag.oncarlos.com" { |
| 55 | t.Fatalf("ses:FromAddress = %v — rail two is missing or wrong", from) |
| 56 | } |
| 57 | } |
| 58 | |
| 59 | // Multi-region: one credential, one policy, an ARN per (domain, region). |
| 60 | func TestPolicyListsEveryVerifiedARN(t *testing.T) { |
| 61 | got, err := SendPolicyJSON([]string{ |
| 62 | "arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:1:identity/x.com", |
| 63 | "arn:aws:ses:us-east-1:1:identity/x.com", |
| 64 | }, nil, []string{"x.com"}) |
| 65 | if err != nil { |
| 66 | t.Fatalf("SendPolicyJSON: %v", err) |
| 67 | } |
| 68 | if n := len(parsePolicy(t, got).Statement[0].Resource); n != 2 { |
| 69 | t.Fatalf("Resource count = %d, want 2 — a credential spans regions", n) |
| 70 | } |
| 71 | } |
| 72 | |
| 73 | // Steady state is multiple domains per app. Untested single-domain case would |
| 74 | // allow an implementation that rendered only froms[0] to pass the suite. |
| 75 | func TestPolicyWithMultipleDomainsAndARNs(t *testing.T) { |
| 76 | got, err := SendPolicyJSON([]string{ |
| 77 | "arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:1:identity/platform.com", |
| 78 | "arn:aws:ses:us-east-1:1:identity/custom.app", |
| 79 | }, nil, []string{"platform.com", "custom.app"}) |
| 80 | if err != nil { |
| 81 | t.Fatalf("SendPolicyJSON: %v", err) |
| 82 | } |
| 83 | d := parsePolicy(t, got) |
| 84 | st := d.Statement[0] |
| 85 | |
| 86 | // Check resources |
| 87 | if len(st.Resource) != 2 { |
| 88 | t.Fatalf("Resource count = %d, want 2", len(st.Resource)) |
| 89 | } |
| 90 | resourceSet := make(map[string]bool) |
| 91 | for _, r := range st.Resource { |
| 92 | resourceSet[r] = true |
| 93 | } |
| 94 | if !resourceSet["arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:1:identity/platform.com"] { |
| 95 | t.Fatalf("Resource missing arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:1:identity/platform.com") |
| 96 | } |
| 97 | if !resourceSet["arn:aws:ses:us-east-1:1:identity/custom.app"] { |
| 98 | t.Fatalf("Resource missing arn:aws:ses:us-east-1:1:identity/custom.app") |
| 99 | } |
| 100 | |
| 101 | // Check from addresses |
| 102 | froms := st.Condition["StringLike"]["ses:FromAddress"] |
| 103 | if len(froms) != 2 { |
| 104 | t.Fatalf("ses:FromAddress count = %d, want 2", len(froms)) |
| 105 | } |
| 106 | fromSet := make(map[string]bool) |
| 107 | for _, f := range froms { |
| 108 | fromSet[f] = true |
| 109 | } |
| 110 | if !fromSet["*@platform.com"] { |
| 111 | t.Fatalf("ses:FromAddress missing *@platform.com") |
| 112 | } |
| 113 | if !fromSet["*@custom.app"] { |
| 114 | t.Fatalf("ses:FromAddress missing *@custom.app") |
| 115 | } |
| 116 | } |
| 117 | |
| 118 | // An empty grant must not render a policy that permits everything. Refusing |
| 119 | // is the only safe direction: a wildcard here would let one app send as any |
| 120 | // identity in the estate. |
| 121 | // TestPolicyGrantsTheConfigSetItSendsThrough is issue #271, and it is the |
| 122 | // difference between a primitive that can emit events and one that can send |
| 123 | // mail — before this, it could not do both. |
| 124 | // |
| 125 | // SES authorises a configuration set as a SEPARATE resource. The moment |
| 126 | // SetIdentityConfigSet binds one to an identity, every send through that |
| 127 | // identity needs ses:SendRawEmail on the config-set ARN too, and a policy |
| 128 | // naming only the identity is refused with a 554: |
| 129 | // |
| 130 | // Access denied: User '...' is not authorized to perform 'ses:SendRawEmail' |
| 131 | // on resource 'arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:...:configuration-set/carlos-bag' |
| 132 | // |
| 133 | // That is not hypothetical and it is not retrofit-specific: EnsureDomain |
| 134 | // binds a config set whenever SNSTopicARN is set, so on any deployment with |
| 135 | // event ingest configured a freshly enabled tenant could not send at all. |
| 136 | // Proven in production on 2026-08-23, at the cost of a short outage. |
| 137 | func TestPolicyGrantsTheConfigSetItSendsThrough(t *testing.T) { |
| 138 | doc, err := SendPolicyJSON( |
| 139 | []string{"arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:1234:identity/a.example.com"}, |
| 140 | []string{"arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:1234:configuration-set/carlos-bag"}, |
| 141 | []string{"a.example.com"}, |
| 142 | ) |
| 143 | if err != nil { |
| 144 | t.Fatalf("SendPolicyJSON: %v", err) |
| 145 | } |
| 146 | res := policyResources(t, doc) |
| 147 | if !res["arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:1234:identity/a.example.com"] { |
| 148 | t.Error("the identity ARN is missing from Resource") |
| 149 | } |
| 150 | if !res["arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:1234:configuration-set/carlos-bag"] { |
| 151 | t.Error("the configuration-set ARN is missing from Resource — every send through a bound identity 554s without it") |
| 152 | } |
| 153 | } |
| 154 | |
| 155 | // TestPolicyWithNoConfigSetIsUnchanged: a deployment with no SNS topic binds |
| 156 | // no configuration set, and its policy must stay exactly what it was. The |
| 157 | // fix must not make event ingest a precondition for sending. |
| 158 | func TestPolicyWithNoConfigSetIsUnchanged(t *testing.T) { |
| 159 | doc, err := SendPolicyJSON( |
| 160 | []string{"arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:1234:identity/a.example.com"}, |
| 161 | nil, |
| 162 | []string{"a.example.com"}, |
| 163 | ) |
| 164 | if err != nil { |
| 165 | t.Fatalf("SendPolicyJSON: %v", err) |
| 166 | } |
| 167 | res := policyResources(t, doc) |
| 168 | if len(res) != 1 || !res["arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:1234:identity/a.example.com"] { |
| 169 | t.Fatalf("Resource = %v, want the identity ARN alone", res) |
| 170 | } |
| 171 | } |
| 172 | |
| 173 | // TestPolicyRefusesABadConfigSetARN: the config-set ARN reaches IAM as a |
| 174 | // resource pattern exactly as the identity ARN does, so it gets the same |
| 175 | // scrutiny. A wildcard would widen the grant to every configuration set in |
| 176 | // the estate; a wrong resource type would be a silently ineffective grant. |
| 177 | func TestPolicyRefusesABadConfigSetARN(t *testing.T) { |
| 178 | for _, bad := range []string{ |
| 179 | "arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:1234:configuration-set/*", |
| 180 | "arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:1234:configuration-set/carlos-?ag", |
| 181 | "arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:1234:identity/a.example.com", |
| 182 | "arn:aws:sns:eu-west-1:1234:configuration-set/carlos-bag", |
| 183 | "arn:aws:ses::1234:configuration-set/carlos-bag", |
| 184 | "arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1::configuration-set/carlos-bag", |
| 185 | "not-an-arn", |
| 186 | } { |
| 187 | if _, err := SendPolicyJSON( |
| 188 | []string{"arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:1234:identity/a.example.com"}, |
| 189 | []string{bad}, |
| 190 | []string{"a.example.com"}, |
| 191 | ); err == nil { |
| 192 | t.Errorf("config-set ARN %q was accepted", bad) |
| 193 | } |
| 194 | } |
| 195 | } |
| 196 | |
| 197 | // TestVerifiedConfigSetARNsSkipsWhatItShould: only a VERIFIED region with a |
| 198 | // config set contributes one. A pending region, or a verified region that |
| 199 | // has no set bound, must contribute nothing — the first because its identity |
| 200 | // is not usable yet, the second because that is the ordinary no-SNS shape. |
| 201 | func TestVerifiedConfigSetARNsSkipsWhatItShould(t *testing.T) { |
| 202 | rec := &DomainRecord{Domain: "a.example.com", Regions: map[string]*RegionState{ |
| 203 | "eu-west-1": {IdentityARN: "arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:1234:identity/a.example.com", |
| 204 | ConfigSet: "carlos-bag", Status: StatusVerified}, |
| 205 | "us-east-1": {IdentityARN: "arn:aws:ses:us-east-1:1234:identity/a.example.com", |
| 206 | ConfigSet: "carlos-bag", Status: StatusPending}, |
| 207 | "eu-west-2": {IdentityARN: "arn:aws:ses:eu-west-2:1234:identity/a.example.com", |
| 208 | ConfigSet: "", Status: StatusVerified}, |
| 209 | }} |
| 210 | got := rec.VerifiedConfigSetARNs() |
| 211 | want := []string{"arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:1234:configuration-set/carlos-bag"} |
| 212 | if len(got) != len(want) || (len(got) == 1 && got[0] != want[0]) { |
| 213 | t.Fatalf("VerifiedConfigSetARNs = %v, want %v", got, want) |
| 214 | } |
| 215 | } |
| 216 | |
| 217 | // policyResources pulls the Resource list out of a rendered policy. |
| 218 | func policyResources(t *testing.T, doc string) map[string]bool { |
| 219 | t.Helper() |
| 220 | var parsed struct { |
| 221 | Statement []struct { |
| 222 | Resource []string `json:"Resource"` |
| 223 | } `json:"Statement"` |
| 224 | } |
| 225 | if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(doc), &parsed); err != nil { |
| 226 | t.Fatalf("policy is not JSON: %v", err) |
| 227 | } |
| 228 | if len(parsed.Statement) != 1 { |
| 229 | t.Fatalf("statements = %d, want 1", len(parsed.Statement)) |
| 230 | } |
| 231 | out := map[string]bool{} |
| 232 | for _, r := range parsed.Statement[0].Resource { |
| 233 | out[r] = true |
| 234 | } |
| 235 | return out |
| 236 | } |
| 237 | |
| 238 | func TestPolicyRefusesAnEmptyGrant(t *testing.T) { |
| 239 | if _, err := SendPolicyJSON(nil, nil, nil); err == nil { |
| 240 | t.Fatal("SendPolicyJSON with no ARNs and no domains returned a policy, want an error") |
| 241 | } |
| 242 | if _, err := SendPolicyJSON([]string{"arn:x"}, nil, nil); err == nil { |
| 243 | t.Fatal("SendPolicyJSON with no domains returned a policy, want an error") |
| 244 | } |
| 245 | if _, err := SendPolicyJSON(nil, nil, []string{"x.com"}); err == nil { |
| 246 | t.Fatal("SendPolicyJSON with no ARNs returned a policy, want an error") |
| 247 | } |
| 248 | } |
| 249 | |
| 250 | // A domain that reached this far unvalidated could inject a wildcard into |
| 251 | // the condition ("*" would match every address). Refuse rather than render. |
| 252 | func TestPolicyRefusesAnInvalidDomain(t *testing.T) { |
| 253 | if _, err := SendPolicyJSON([]string{"arn:x"}, nil, []string{"*"}); err == nil { |
| 254 | t.Fatal("SendPolicyJSON accepted a wildcard domain") |
| 255 | } |
| 256 | } |
| 257 | |
| 258 | // IAM expands * and ? as match patterns in ALL ARN segments, not just the |
| 259 | // identity name. Reject wildcards anywhere in the ARN, and validate the |
| 260 | // entire structure: exactly 6 colon-delimited parts, region and account-id |
| 261 | // non-empty, no trailing segments, no bypasses. |
| 262 | func TestPolicyRefusesARNWildcards(t *testing.T) { |
| 263 | tests := []struct { |
| 264 | name string |
| 265 | arn string |
| 266 | }{ |
| 267 | // Wildcards in different segments |
| 268 | {"wildcard in region", "arn:aws:ses:*:1:identity/example.com"}, |
| 269 | {"wildcard in account", "arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:*:identity/example.com"}, |
| 270 | {"wildcard in both", "arn:aws:ses:*:*:identity/example.com"}, |
| 271 | {"question mark in region", "arn:aws:ses:?:1:identity/example.com"}, |
| 272 | |
| 273 | // Malformed structure |
| 274 | {"trailing segment", "arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:1:identity/x.com:extra"}, |
| 275 | {"empty region", "arn:aws:ses::1:identity/example.com"}, |
| 276 | {"empty account", "arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1::identity/example.com"}, |
| 277 | } |
| 278 | |
| 279 | for _, tt := range tests { |
| 280 | t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { |
| 281 | _, err := SendPolicyJSON([]string{tt.arn}, nil, []string{"example.com"}) |
| 282 | if err == nil { |
| 283 | t.Fatalf("SendPolicyJSON accepted invalid ARN: %s", tt.arn) |
| 284 | } |
| 285 | }) |
| 286 | } |
| 287 | } |
| 288 | |
| 289 | // Legitimate production shape must pass: real 12-digit account ID, valid region. |
| 290 | func TestPolicyAcceptsLegitimateARN(t *testing.T) { |
| 291 | _, err := SendPolicyJSON( |
| 292 | []string{"arn:aws:ses:eu-west-1:123456789012:identity/harbourmail.bag.oncarlos.com"}, |
| 293 | nil, |
| 294 | []string{"harbourmail.bag.oncarlos.com"}) |
| 295 | if err != nil { |
| 296 | t.Fatalf("SendPolicyJSON rejected legitimate ARN: %v", err) |
| 297 | } |
| 298 | } |
| 299 | |
| 300 | func TestTenantNameIsPrefixed(t *testing.T) { |
| 301 | if got, want := TenantName("bag"), "carlos-bag"; got != want { |
| 302 | t.Fatalf("TenantName = %q, want %q", got, want) |
| 303 | } |
| 304 | } |
| 305 | |
| 306 | func TestUserNamesAreStableAndDistinct(t *testing.T) { |
| 307 | if got, want := UserName("bag", "harbourmail"), "carlos-mail-bag-harbourmail"; got != want { |
| 308 | t.Fatalf("UserName = %q, want %q", got, want) |
| 309 | } |
| 310 | // A standalone credential MUST NOT share the delivered user: IAM allows |
| 311 | // two access keys per user and both slots are spent on the delivered key |
| 312 | // plus the rotation overlap. |
| 313 | if StandaloneUserName("bag", "harbourmail", "laptop") == UserName("bag", "harbourmail") { |
| 314 | t.Fatal("standalone credential collided with the delivered user") |
| 315 | } |
| 316 | // App names allow hyphens, so ensure no collision with a different separator. |
| 317 | if StandaloneUserName("bag", "see", "laptop") == UserName("bag", "see-s-laptop") { |
| 318 | t.Fatal("standalone credential collided with a hyphenated app name") |
| 319 | } |
| 320 | } |
| 321 | |
amadan