| 1 | // The AWS provisioner: SESv2 + IAM behind the Provisioner seam. |
| 2 | // |
| 3 | // Every idempotence mapping here is load-bearing. The walks in walk.go are |
| 4 | // re-runnable after a half-failure ONLY because each verb below treats |
| 5 | // "already exists" and "already gone" as success rather than error. |
| 6 | // |
| 7 | // TENANT ATTRIBUTION: verified against the live SESv2 API reference and |
| 8 | // Developer Guide on 2026-08-19 (docs.aws.amazon.com/ses/latest/dg/tenants.html |
| 9 | // and docs.aws.amazon.com/ses/latest/APIReference-V2/API_CreateTenant.html). |
| 10 | // SESv2 DOES have tenant management: CreateTenant, CreateTenantResourceAssociation, |
| 11 | // GetTenant, DeleteTenant, ListTenants, ListTenantResources are all present in |
| 12 | // aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sesv2 v1.66.6, and CreateTenant's documented error set |
| 13 | // includes AlreadyExistsException, so it fits the same idempotence mapping as |
| 14 | // everything else here. SMTP sends ARE attributable to a tenant, via a plain |
| 15 | // header on the outgoing message: `X-SES-TENANT: <tenant-name>` (the guide |
| 16 | // gives that exact spelling, NOT the `X-SES-TENANT-NAME` this package's spec |
| 17 | // guessed at). That header, plus which config set and identity a send uses, |
| 18 | // is a concern of the code that composes an outgoing message, not of this |
| 19 | // provisioner. EnsureTenant below therefore does the one thing the Provisioner |
| 20 | // interface actually asks of it — create the account's named tenant container, |
| 21 | // idempotently — and stops there: it does not call |
| 22 | // CreateTenantResourceAssociation itself, because the interface gives |
| 23 | // EnsureTenant no identity or config-set to associate; that association is |
| 24 | // wired separately, by walk.go's EnsureDomain, once it has both (plan 2, |
| 25 | // task 7). Isolation is unaffected either way: the tenant buys REPUTATION |
| 26 | // isolation, and AUTHORITY isolation is the IAM policy in policy.go (spec |
| 27 | // §4). |
| 28 | package mail |
| 29 | |
| 30 | import ( |
| 31 | "context" |
| 32 | "errors" |
| 33 | "fmt" |
| 34 | "regexp" |
| 35 | |
| 36 | "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws" |
| 37 | awsconfig "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/config" |
| 38 | "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/iam" |
| 39 | iamtypes "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/iam/types" |
| 40 | "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sesv2" |
| 41 | sesv2types "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sesv2/types" |
| 42 | "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/sts" |
| 43 | "github.com/carlosframework/platform/internal/rootaws" |
| 44 | ) |
| 45 | |
| 46 | // mailFromBehaviour is REJECT_MESSAGE and must stay that way. |
| 47 | // |
| 48 | // The alternative, USE_DEFAULT_VALUE, silently falls back to amazonses.com |
| 49 | // when the custom MAIL FROM MX is absent: the tenant keeps sending, from an |
| 50 | // unaligned envelope domain, failing DMARC, with nothing to notice. Rejecting |
| 51 | // turns a DNS mistake into a visible error instead of a slow deliverability |
| 52 | // leak. |
| 53 | const mailFromBehaviour = sesv2types.BehaviorOnMxFailureRejectMessage |
| 54 | |
| 55 | // sesAPI is the subset of *sesv2.Client awsProvisioner calls, narrowed so a |
| 56 | // future test can stand a stub in for a live client without a network or |
| 57 | // credentials — exactly as internal/objstore/aws.go narrows s3API and iamAPI. |
| 58 | type sesAPI interface { |
| 59 | CreateTenant(context.Context, *sesv2.CreateTenantInput, ...func(*sesv2.Options)) (*sesv2.CreateTenantOutput, error) |
| 60 | CreateEmailIdentity(context.Context, *sesv2.CreateEmailIdentityInput, ...func(*sesv2.Options)) (*sesv2.CreateEmailIdentityOutput, error) |
| 61 | GetEmailIdentity(context.Context, *sesv2.GetEmailIdentityInput, ...func(*sesv2.Options)) (*sesv2.GetEmailIdentityOutput, error) |
| 62 | PutEmailIdentityMailFromAttributes(context.Context, *sesv2.PutEmailIdentityMailFromAttributesInput, ...func(*sesv2.Options)) (*sesv2.PutEmailIdentityMailFromAttributesOutput, error) |
| 63 | DeleteEmailIdentity(context.Context, *sesv2.DeleteEmailIdentityInput, ...func(*sesv2.Options)) (*sesv2.DeleteEmailIdentityOutput, error) |
| 64 | CreateConfigurationSet(context.Context, *sesv2.CreateConfigurationSetInput, ...func(*sesv2.Options)) (*sesv2.CreateConfigurationSetOutput, error) |
| 65 | CreateConfigurationSetEventDestination(context.Context, *sesv2.CreateConfigurationSetEventDestinationInput, ...func(*sesv2.Options)) (*sesv2.CreateConfigurationSetEventDestinationOutput, error) |
| 66 | PutEmailIdentityConfigurationSetAttributes(context.Context, *sesv2.PutEmailIdentityConfigurationSetAttributesInput, ...func(*sesv2.Options)) (*sesv2.PutEmailIdentityConfigurationSetAttributesOutput, error) |
| 67 | CreateTenantResourceAssociation(context.Context, *sesv2.CreateTenantResourceAssociationInput, ...func(*sesv2.Options)) (*sesv2.CreateTenantResourceAssociationOutput, error) |
| 68 | DeleteTenantResourceAssociation(context.Context, *sesv2.DeleteTenantResourceAssociationInput, ...func(*sesv2.Options)) (*sesv2.DeleteTenantResourceAssociationOutput, error) |
| 69 | } |
| 70 | |
| 71 | // iamAPI is the subset of *iam.Client awsProvisioner calls. |
| 72 | type iamAPI interface { |
| 73 | CreateUser(context.Context, *iam.CreateUserInput, ...func(*iam.Options)) (*iam.CreateUserOutput, error) |
| 74 | GetUser(context.Context, *iam.GetUserInput, ...func(*iam.Options)) (*iam.GetUserOutput, error) |
| 75 | PutUserPolicy(context.Context, *iam.PutUserPolicyInput, ...func(*iam.Options)) (*iam.PutUserPolicyOutput, error) |
| 76 | // PutUserPermissionsBoundary backfills the boundary onto a user that |
| 77 | // already exists without it (EnsureUser). Its inverse, |
| 78 | // DeleteUserPermissionsBoundary, is deliberately NOT on this interface: |
| 79 | // nothing in this package may ever take a ceiling off. |
| 80 | PutUserPermissionsBoundary(context.Context, *iam.PutUserPermissionsBoundaryInput, ...func(*iam.Options)) (*iam.PutUserPermissionsBoundaryOutput, error) |
| 81 | DeleteUserPolicy(context.Context, *iam.DeleteUserPolicyInput, ...func(*iam.Options)) (*iam.DeleteUserPolicyOutput, error) |
| 82 | CreateAccessKey(context.Context, *iam.CreateAccessKeyInput, ...func(*iam.Options)) (*iam.CreateAccessKeyOutput, error) |
| 83 | UpdateAccessKey(context.Context, *iam.UpdateAccessKeyInput, ...func(*iam.Options)) (*iam.UpdateAccessKeyOutput, error) |
| 84 | DeleteAccessKey(context.Context, *iam.DeleteAccessKeyInput, ...func(*iam.Options)) (*iam.DeleteAccessKeyOutput, error) |
| 85 | ListAccessKeys(context.Context, *iam.ListAccessKeysInput, ...func(*iam.Options)) (*iam.ListAccessKeysOutput, error) |
| 86 | // ListUsers is the boundary sweep's listing (SweepUserBoundaries), always |
| 87 | // with PathPrefix UserPath. |
| 88 | ListUsers(context.Context, *iam.ListUsersInput, ...func(*iam.Options)) (*iam.ListUsersOutput, error) |
| 89 | DeleteUser(context.Context, *iam.DeleteUserInput, ...func(*iam.Options)) (*iam.DeleteUserOutput, error) |
| 90 | } |
| 91 | |
| 92 | // stsAPI is the subset of *sts.Client awsProvisioner's constructor calls, |
| 93 | // narrowed the same way as sesAPI and iamAPI. |
| 94 | type stsAPI interface { |
| 95 | GetCallerIdentity(context.Context, *sts.GetCallerIdentityInput, ...func(*sts.Options)) (*sts.GetCallerIdentityOutput, error) |
| 96 | } |
| 97 | |
| 98 | type awsProvisioner struct { |
| 99 | ses sesAPI |
| 100 | iam iamAPI |
| 101 | region string |
| 102 | account string |
| 103 | // boundary is the permissions-boundary policy ARN every sending user |
| 104 | // carries. See EnsureUser for why it is not optional. |
| 105 | boundary string |
| 106 | } |
| 107 | |
| 108 | var _ Provisioner = (*awsProvisioner)(nil) |
| 109 | |
| 110 | // NewAWSProvisioner builds a Provisioner against SESv2 and IAM. |
| 111 | // |
| 112 | // The SES client is bound to region because SES is regional in every |
| 113 | // dimension that matters. IAM takes no region: users and keys are global, |
| 114 | // which is what lets one credential span regions (spec §8). |
| 115 | // |
| 116 | // The account id is resolved ONCE here via STS GetCallerIdentity and stored |
| 117 | // on the provisioner (controller ruling F3), rather than looked up per call: |
| 118 | // SESv2 does not return an identity ARN, so EnsureIdentity must compose one, |
| 119 | // and composing it needs the account id. Resolving it once at construction |
| 120 | // keeps every walk free of an extra round trip. |
| 121 | // |
| 122 | // boundary is the ARN of the IAM managed policy every sending user is created |
| 123 | // under (cmd/console reads it from CARLOS_MAIL_USER_BOUNDARY). It is required, |
| 124 | // and checked before any AWS call: a provisioner without one would create |
| 125 | // users with no ceiling at all (see EnsureUser). |
| 126 | func NewAWSProvisioner(ctx context.Context, region, boundary string) (Provisioner, error) { |
| 127 | if err := checkUserBoundary(boundary); err != nil { |
| 128 | return nil, err |
| 129 | } |
| 130 | cfg, err := rootaws.LoadDefaultConfig(ctx, awsconfig.WithRegion(region)) |
| 131 | if err != nil { |
| 132 | return nil, fmt.Errorf("mail: load aws config: %w", err) |
| 133 | } |
| 134 | var stsClient stsAPI = sts.NewFromConfig(cfg) |
| 135 | ident, err := stsClient.GetCallerIdentity(ctx, &sts.GetCallerIdentityInput{}) |
| 136 | if err != nil { |
| 137 | return nil, fmt.Errorf("mail: resolve caller identity: %w", err) |
| 138 | } |
| 139 | return &awsProvisioner{ |
| 140 | ses: sesv2.NewFromConfig(cfg), |
| 141 | iam: iam.NewFromConfig(cfg), |
| 142 | region: region, |
| 143 | account: aws.ToString(ident.Account), |
| 144 | boundary: boundary, |
| 145 | }, nil |
| 146 | } |
| 147 | |
| 148 | // ErrNoUserBoundary is what NewAWSProvisioner, EnsureUser and |
| 149 | // CheckUserBoundary wrap when the permissions boundary is missing or is not |
| 150 | // an IAM policy ARN. |
| 151 | var ErrNoUserBoundary = errors.New("mail: sending users need a permissions boundary") |
| 152 | |
| 153 | // CheckUserBoundary is checkUserBoundary for the console's startup check, |
| 154 | // so a bad CARLOS_MAIL_USER_BOUNDARY stops the console booting rather than |
| 155 | // only failing NewAWSProvisioner. |
| 156 | func CheckUserBoundary(boundary string) error { return checkUserBoundary(boundary) } |
| 157 | |
| 158 | // userBoundaryARN is the only shape a boundary may take: a customer managed |
| 159 | // policy, arn:<partition>:iam::<12-digit account>:policy/<path><name>. The |
| 160 | // path is IAM's /-separated segments and the name IAM's policy-name |
| 161 | // characters (letters, digits and + = , . @ _ -, at most 128). Anything else, |
| 162 | // including wildcards, spaces and control characters, is refused. An AWS |
| 163 | // managed policy (account "aws") is refused too: none of them is a sensible |
| 164 | // ceiling for a sending user. |
| 165 | var userBoundaryARN = regexp.MustCompile(`^arn:aws(-[a-z]+)*:iam::[0-9]{12}:policy/([A-Za-z0-9+=,.@_-]+/)*[A-Za-z0-9+=,.@_-]{1,128}$`) |
| 166 | |
| 167 | // checkUserBoundary refuses an empty boundary, and anything not shaped like |
| 168 | // userBoundaryARN. The shape check is there so a typo fails at boot, not at |
| 169 | // the first CreateUser against a live account. |
| 170 | func checkUserBoundary(boundary string) error { |
| 171 | if boundary == "" { |
| 172 | return fmt.Errorf("%w: none configured", ErrNoUserBoundary) |
| 173 | } |
| 174 | if len(boundary) > 2048 || !userBoundaryARN.MatchString(boundary) { |
| 175 | return fmt.Errorf("%w: %q is not an IAM customer managed policy ARN (arn:aws:iam::<12-digit account>:policy/<name>)", ErrNoUserBoundary, boundary) |
| 176 | } |
| 177 | return nil |
| 178 | } |
| 179 | |
| 180 | // checkRegion refuses a call naming a region other than the one this |
| 181 | // provisioner is bound to. The SES client here is bound once at |
| 182 | // construction (NewAWSProvisioner), but every SES-facing Provisioner method |
| 183 | // still takes a region parameter — because the spec's multi-region story is |
| 184 | // "capable, not deployed" and MemProvisioner genuinely models N regions. An |
| 185 | // awsProvisioner silently routing every region through its one client would |
| 186 | // let a walk test built against the fake pass while production quietly acts |
| 187 | // on the wrong region (or, for EnsureIdentity, composes an ARN naming the |
| 188 | // CALLER's region while the identity itself was created in a different |
| 189 | // one). An empty region is accepted as "caller doesn't care" and treated as |
| 190 | // this provisioner's own region. |
| 191 | // errRegionMismatch is the sentinel checkRegion wraps, so a test (or a |
| 192 | // future caller) can check errors.Is(err, errRegionMismatch) rather than |
| 193 | // matching against the formatted message. |
| 194 | var errRegionMismatch = errors.New("mail: region mismatch") |
| 195 | |
| 196 | func (p *awsProvisioner) checkRegion(region string) error { |
| 197 | if region != "" && region != p.region { |
| 198 | return fmt.Errorf("mail: provisioner is bound to region %s, cannot act on %s: %w", p.region, region, errRegionMismatch) |
| 199 | } |
| 200 | return nil |
| 201 | } |
| 202 | |
| 203 | // ---- error classification ------------------------------------------------- |
| 204 | |
| 205 | func isAlreadyExists(err error) bool { |
| 206 | var ses *sesv2types.AlreadyExistsException |
| 207 | var im *iamtypes.EntityAlreadyExistsException |
| 208 | return errors.As(err, &ses) || errors.As(err, &im) |
| 209 | } |
| 210 | |
| 211 | func isNotFound(err error) bool { |
| 212 | var ses *sesv2types.NotFoundException |
| 213 | var im *iamtypes.NoSuchEntityException |
| 214 | return errors.As(err, &ses) || errors.As(err, &im) |
| 215 | } |
| 216 | |
| 217 | // ---- SES ------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| 218 | |
| 219 | // EnsureTenant creates the account's SES tenant if absent. |
| 220 | // |
| 221 | // See the TENANT ATTRIBUTION note at the top of this file: CreateTenant is a |
| 222 | // real, present SESv2 API, verified against the live docs on 2026-08-19. This |
| 223 | // creates ONLY the named container — it does not call |
| 224 | // CreateTenantResourceAssociation, because EnsureTenant's signature carries |
| 225 | // no identity ARN or configuration-set name to associate. Isolation is |
| 226 | // unaffected by that gap: the tenant buys reputation isolation, and |
| 227 | // authority isolation is the IAM policy (spec §4), which this does not touch. |
| 228 | // |
| 229 | // PRECONDITION FOR SENDING, NOW MET BY EnsureDomain, NOT HERE: per |
| 230 | // docs.aws.amazon.com/ses/latest/dg/tenants.html, a tenant needs at least |
| 231 | // one verified identity AND one configuration set associated via |
| 232 | // CreateTenantResourceAssociation before SES will accept a send attributed |
| 233 | // to it — SES validates that association on every send. walk.go's |
| 234 | // EnsureDomain wires both associations now, after PutDomain, using |
| 235 | // AssociateTenantResource below (plan 2, task 7). This still does not make |
| 236 | // any send carry the `X-SES-TENANT: <name>` header: nothing in step 2 |
| 237 | // composes an outgoing message or writes a tenant-conditioned policy, so |
| 238 | // that header waits for step 3. The spike's answer (design §4.1, confirmed |
| 239 | // against the live API): an association is inert for the identity's owner |
| 240 | // in every respect except deletion, and `ses:TenantName` IS enforced over |
| 241 | // SMTP. |
| 242 | func (p *awsProvisioner) EnsureTenant(ctx context.Context, name string) error { |
| 243 | _, err := p.ses.CreateTenant(ctx, &sesv2.CreateTenantInput{ |
| 244 | TenantName: aws.String(name), |
| 245 | }) |
| 246 | if err != nil && !isAlreadyExists(err) { |
| 247 | return fmt.Errorf("mail: create tenant %q: %w", name, err) |
| 248 | } |
| 249 | return nil |
| 250 | } |
| 251 | |
| 252 | // AssociateTenantResource associates an identity or a configuration set with |
| 253 | // a tenant. This is the call the file header said nothing here made yet: SES |
| 254 | // validates the association on every tenant-attributed send, so it must exist |
| 255 | // before any send carries X-SES-TENANT. Associating changes nothing about the |
| 256 | // resource itself, so it is safe on an identity another product owns. |
| 257 | func (p *awsProvisioner) AssociateTenantResource(ctx context.Context, tenant, resourceARN string) error { |
| 258 | _, err := p.ses.CreateTenantResourceAssociation(ctx, &sesv2.CreateTenantResourceAssociationInput{ |
| 259 | TenantName: aws.String(tenant), |
| 260 | ResourceArn: aws.String(resourceARN), |
| 261 | }) |
| 262 | if err != nil && !isAlreadyExists(err) { |
| 263 | return fmt.Errorf("mail: associate %s with tenant %q: %w", resourceARN, tenant, err) |
| 264 | } |
| 265 | return nil |
| 266 | } |
| 267 | |
| 268 | // DisassociateTenantResource removes one association. It has to run before |
| 269 | // DeleteEmailIdentity: SES refuses to delete an identity while an |
| 270 | // association exists, which is also the cross-team contract for a borrowed |
| 271 | // identity (design §7) — while CARLOS's association stands, the owner cannot |
| 272 | // delete their own identity. |
| 273 | func (p *awsProvisioner) DisassociateTenantResource(ctx context.Context, tenant, resourceARN string) error { |
| 274 | _, err := p.ses.DeleteTenantResourceAssociation(ctx, &sesv2.DeleteTenantResourceAssociationInput{ |
| 275 | TenantName: aws.String(tenant), |
| 276 | ResourceArn: aws.String(resourceARN), |
| 277 | }) |
| 278 | if err != nil && !isNotFound(err) { |
| 279 | return fmt.Errorf("mail: disassociate %s from tenant %q: %w", resourceARN, tenant, err) |
| 280 | } |
| 281 | return nil |
| 282 | } |
| 283 | |
| 284 | func (p *awsProvisioner) EnsureConfigSet(ctx context.Context, region, name, snsTopicARN string) error { |
| 285 | if err := p.checkRegion(region); err != nil { |
| 286 | return err |
| 287 | } |
| 288 | _, err := p.ses.CreateConfigurationSet(ctx, &sesv2.CreateConfigurationSetInput{ |
| 289 | ConfigurationSetName: aws.String(name), |
| 290 | }) |
| 291 | if err != nil && !isAlreadyExists(err) { |
| 292 | return fmt.Errorf("mail: create configuration set %q: %w", name, err) |
| 293 | } |
| 294 | _, err = p.ses.CreateConfigurationSetEventDestination(ctx, &sesv2.CreateConfigurationSetEventDestinationInput{ |
| 295 | ConfigurationSetName: aws.String(name), |
| 296 | EventDestinationName: aws.String("carlos-events"), |
| 297 | EventDestination: &sesv2types.EventDestinationDefinition{ |
| 298 | Enabled: true, |
| 299 | // Send is here as well as the failure events because it is the |
| 300 | // only source of the per-tenant send count that enforces a cap |
| 301 | // (spec §9) — SES has no per-identity rate limit to read. |
| 302 | MatchingEventTypes: []sesv2types.EventType{ |
| 303 | sesv2types.EventTypeSend, |
| 304 | sesv2types.EventTypeBounce, |
| 305 | sesv2types.EventTypeComplaint, |
| 306 | sesv2types.EventTypeReject, |
| 307 | sesv2types.EventTypeDelivery, |
| 308 | }, |
| 309 | SnsDestination: &sesv2types.SnsDestination{TopicArn: aws.String(snsTopicARN)}, |
| 310 | }, |
| 311 | }) |
| 312 | if err != nil && !isAlreadyExists(err) { |
| 313 | return fmt.Errorf("mail: create event destination on %q: %w", name, err) |
| 314 | } |
| 315 | return nil |
| 316 | } |
| 317 | |
| 318 | // SetIdentityConfigSet binds domain's identity to configSet — see the |
| 319 | // Provisioner interface's doc comment on why this call, separate from |
| 320 | // EnsureConfigSet, is what actually makes SES emit an event for a send |
| 321 | // (C1, review follow-up). |
| 322 | func (p *awsProvisioner) SetIdentityConfigSet(ctx context.Context, region, domain, configSet string) error { |
| 323 | if err := p.checkRegion(region); err != nil { |
| 324 | return err |
| 325 | } |
| 326 | _, err := p.ses.PutEmailIdentityConfigurationSetAttributes(ctx, &sesv2.PutEmailIdentityConfigurationSetAttributesInput{ |
| 327 | EmailIdentity: aws.String(domain), |
| 328 | ConfigurationSetName: aws.String(configSet), |
| 329 | }) |
| 330 | if err != nil { |
| 331 | return fmt.Errorf("mail: set configuration set %q on identity %q: %w", configSet, domain, err) |
| 332 | } |
| 333 | return nil |
| 334 | } |
| 335 | |
| 336 | // EnsureIdentity creates the identity with Easy DKIM and sets the custom |
| 337 | // MAIL FROM, idempotently. |
| 338 | // |
| 339 | // On "already exists" it READS the identity back rather than failing, |
| 340 | // because the DKIM tokens it must return are the ones already published in |
| 341 | // DNS. Minting fresh tokens on a re-run would orphan every CNAME already |
| 342 | // out there — and for a custom domain, CNAMEs somebody published by hand. |
| 343 | // |
| 344 | // SESv2 does not return an identity ARN, so it is composed here from region, |
| 345 | // domain and p.account (resolved once at construction — controller ruling |
| 346 | // F3), in the exact shape SendPolicyJSON validates: |
| 347 | // arn:aws:ses:<region>:<account-id>:identity/<domain>. |
| 348 | // |
| 349 | // With adopt false, "already exists" is ErrIdentityExists, returned before |
| 350 | // the identity is read or its MAIL FROM touched: the identity may belong to |
| 351 | // another product in this AWS account (#216). |
| 352 | func (p *awsProvisioner) EnsureIdentity(ctx context.Context, region, domain, mailFrom string, adopt bool) (Identity, error) { |
| 353 | if err := p.checkRegion(region); err != nil { |
| 354 | return Identity{}, err |
| 355 | } |
| 356 | var tokens []string |
| 357 | created := false |
| 358 | out, err := p.ses.CreateEmailIdentity(ctx, &sesv2.CreateEmailIdentityInput{ |
| 359 | EmailIdentity: aws.String(domain), |
| 360 | }) |
| 361 | switch { |
| 362 | case err == nil: |
| 363 | created = true |
| 364 | if out.DkimAttributes != nil { |
| 365 | tokens = out.DkimAttributes.Tokens |
| 366 | } |
| 367 | case isAlreadyExists(err) && !adopt: |
| 368 | return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("mail: identity %q in %s: %w", domain, region, ErrIdentityExists) |
| 369 | case isAlreadyExists(err): |
| 370 | got, gerr := p.ses.GetEmailIdentity(ctx, &sesv2.GetEmailIdentityInput{ |
| 371 | EmailIdentity: aws.String(domain), |
| 372 | }) |
| 373 | if gerr != nil { |
| 374 | return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("mail: get existing identity %q: %w", domain, gerr) |
| 375 | } |
| 376 | if got.DkimAttributes != nil { |
| 377 | tokens = got.DkimAttributes.Tokens |
| 378 | } |
| 379 | default: |
| 380 | return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("mail: create identity %q in %s: %w", domain, region, err) |
| 381 | } |
| 382 | |
| 383 | // No tokens is not a partial success: with none to publish as CNAMEs, |
| 384 | // the domain can never converge to DKIM SUCCESS, and nothing else in |
| 385 | // the walk would ever surface why. This also catches an identity that |
| 386 | // exists but was created BYODKIM or as an email-address identity rather |
| 387 | // than Easy DKIM — GetEmailIdentity succeeds but has no Tokens either. |
| 388 | if len(tokens) == 0 { |
| 389 | return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("mail: identity %q in %s has no Easy DKIM tokens available", domain, region) |
| 390 | } |
| 391 | |
| 392 | if _, err := p.ses.PutEmailIdentityMailFromAttributes(ctx, &sesv2.PutEmailIdentityMailFromAttributesInput{ |
| 393 | EmailIdentity: aws.String(domain), |
| 394 | MailFromDomain: aws.String(mailFrom), |
| 395 | BehaviorOnMxFailure: mailFromBehaviour, |
| 396 | }); err != nil { |
| 397 | return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("mail: set MAIL FROM %q on %q: %w", mailFrom, domain, err) |
| 398 | } |
| 399 | |
| 400 | return Identity{ |
| 401 | ARN: fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:ses:%s:%s:identity/%s", region, p.account, domain), |
| 402 | DKIMTokens: tokens, |
| 403 | Created: created, |
| 404 | }, nil |
| 405 | } |
| 406 | |
| 407 | func (p *awsProvisioner) IdentityStatus(ctx context.Context, region, domain string) (Status, error) { |
| 408 | if err := p.checkRegion(region); err != nil { |
| 409 | return Status{}, err |
| 410 | } |
| 411 | got, err := p.ses.GetEmailIdentity(ctx, &sesv2.GetEmailIdentityInput{ |
| 412 | EmailIdentity: aws.String(domain), |
| 413 | }) |
| 414 | if err != nil { |
| 415 | if isNotFound(err) { |
| 416 | return Status{DKIM: "NOT_STARTED", MailFrom: "NOT_STARTED", Sending: "NOT_STARTED"}, nil |
| 417 | } |
| 418 | return Status{}, fmt.Errorf("mail: get identity %q: %w", domain, err) |
| 419 | } |
| 420 | st := Status{Sending: "PENDING"} |
| 421 | if got.VerifiedForSendingStatus { |
| 422 | st.Sending = "SUCCESS" |
| 423 | } |
| 424 | if got.DkimAttributes != nil { |
| 425 | st.DKIM = string(got.DkimAttributes.Status) |
| 426 | } |
| 427 | if got.MailFromAttributes != nil { |
| 428 | st.MailFrom = string(got.MailFromAttributes.MailFromDomainStatus) |
| 429 | } |
| 430 | st.ConfigSet = aws.ToString(got.ConfigurationSetName) |
| 431 | return st, nil |
| 432 | } |
| 433 | |
| 434 | func (p *awsProvisioner) DeleteIdentity(ctx context.Context, region, domain string) error { |
| 435 | if err := p.checkRegion(region); err != nil { |
| 436 | return err |
| 437 | } |
| 438 | _, err := p.ses.DeleteEmailIdentity(ctx, &sesv2.DeleteEmailIdentityInput{ |
| 439 | EmailIdentity: aws.String(domain), |
| 440 | }) |
| 441 | if err != nil && !isNotFound(err) { |
| 442 | return fmt.Errorf("mail: delete identity %q: %w", domain, err) |
| 443 | } |
| 444 | return nil |
| 445 | } |
| 446 | |
| 447 | // ---- IAM -------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 448 | |
| 449 | // EnsureUser creates the sending user at path if absent, under the |
| 450 | // permissions boundary, and writes its inline policy either way. |
| 451 | // |
| 452 | // THE BOUNDARY IS THE LOAD-BEARING HALF, not a hardening extra. The console's |
| 453 | // role may call CreateUser, PutUserPolicy and CreateAccessKey on the mail |
| 454 | // user path. Without a boundary, anyone acting as that role can create a |
| 455 | // user there, give it an administrator inline policy and mint it a key: the |
| 456 | // whole AWS account. The path says which user is made, never what it may do. |
| 457 | // The boundary is a ceiling that holds whatever inline policy is written, |
| 458 | // including a wrong one from this code. objstore's EnsureUser closed the |
| 459 | // same gap for store users. |
| 460 | // |
| 461 | // A user that already exists (a re-run after a crash, a policy refresh, or a |
| 462 | // user created before this boundary existed) is read back with GetUser. If |
| 463 | // it carries no boundary, or a different one, PutUserPermissionsBoundary sets |
| 464 | // the configured one BEFORE PutUserPolicy runs. That is how users created |
| 465 | // unbounded get fixed, and the order matters: once the operator conditions |
| 466 | // PutUserPolicy on iam:PermissionsBoundary, the policy write on a user still |
| 467 | // unbounded is refused. This never removes a boundary. |
| 468 | func (p *awsProvisioner) EnsureUser(ctx context.Context, name, path string, identityARNs, configSetARNs, domains []string) (string, error) { |
| 469 | // NewAWSProvisioner already refused an empty boundary. Checked again |
| 470 | // here because this is the call that would act without one. |
| 471 | if err := checkUserBoundary(p.boundary); err != nil { |
| 472 | return "", err |
| 473 | } |
| 474 | // Render the policy FIRST. SendPolicyJSON refuses an empty grant, and |
| 475 | // refusing before CreateUser is what stops a principal existing with no |
| 476 | // policy at all — an unscoped sending user, briefly, is still one. |
| 477 | doc, err := SendPolicyJSON(identityARNs, configSetARNs, domains) |
| 478 | if err != nil { |
| 479 | return "", err |
| 480 | } |
| 481 | var arn string |
| 482 | out, err := p.iam.CreateUser(ctx, &iam.CreateUserInput{ |
| 483 | UserName: aws.String(name), |
| 484 | Path: aws.String(path), |
| 485 | PermissionsBoundary: aws.String(p.boundary), |
| 486 | }) |
| 487 | if err != nil { |
| 488 | if !isAlreadyExists(err) { |
| 489 | return "", fmt.Errorf("mail: create user %q: %w", name, err) |
| 490 | } |
| 491 | got, gerr := p.iam.GetUser(ctx, &iam.GetUserInput{UserName: aws.String(name)}) |
| 492 | if gerr != nil { |
| 493 | return "", fmt.Errorf("mail: get existing user %q: %w", name, gerr) |
| 494 | } |
| 495 | if got.User == nil { |
| 496 | return "", fmt.Errorf("mail: get existing user %q: no user in the response", name) |
| 497 | } |
| 498 | if err := p.backfillBoundary(ctx, name, got.User); err != nil { |
| 499 | return "", err |
| 500 | } |
| 501 | arn = aws.ToString(got.User.Arn) |
| 502 | } else { |
| 503 | arn = aws.ToString(out.User.Arn) |
| 504 | } |
| 505 | if _, err := p.iam.PutUserPolicy(ctx, &iam.PutUserPolicyInput{ |
| 506 | UserName: aws.String(name), |
| 507 | PolicyName: aws.String(PolicyName), |
| 508 | PolicyDocument: aws.String(doc), |
| 509 | }); err != nil { |
| 510 | return "", fmt.Errorf("mail: put policy for user %q: %w", name, err) |
| 511 | } |
| 512 | return arn, nil |
| 513 | } |
| 514 | |
| 515 | // ensureUserBoundary reads user and backfills the boundary onto it. |
| 516 | func (p *awsProvisioner) ensureUserBoundary(ctx context.Context, user string) error { |
| 517 | if err := checkUserBoundary(p.boundary); err != nil { |
| 518 | return err |
| 519 | } |
| 520 | got, err := p.iam.GetUser(ctx, &iam.GetUserInput{UserName: aws.String(user)}) |
| 521 | if err != nil { |
| 522 | return fmt.Errorf("mail: get user %q: %w", user, err) |
| 523 | } |
| 524 | if got.User == nil { |
| 525 | return fmt.Errorf("mail: get user %q: no user in the response", user) |
| 526 | } |
| 527 | return p.backfillBoundary(ctx, user, got.User) |
| 528 | } |
| 529 | |
| 530 | // backfillBoundary sets p.boundary on an existing user that lacks it or |
| 531 | // carries another one. A user already carrying it costs no call. |
| 532 | func (p *awsProvisioner) backfillBoundary(ctx context.Context, name string, u *iamtypes.User) error { |
| 533 | if u.PermissionsBoundary != nil && aws.ToString(u.PermissionsBoundary.PermissionsBoundaryArn) == p.boundary { |
| 534 | return nil |
| 535 | } |
| 536 | if _, err := p.iam.PutUserPermissionsBoundary(ctx, &iam.PutUserPermissionsBoundaryInput{ |
| 537 | UserName: aws.String(name), |
| 538 | PermissionsBoundary: aws.String(p.boundary), |
| 539 | }); err != nil { |
| 540 | return fmt.Errorf("mail: set permissions boundary on existing user %q: %w", name, err) |
| 541 | } |
| 542 | return nil |
| 543 | } |
| 544 | |
| 545 | // MintKey creates a fresh access key for user, after making sure the user |
| 546 | // carries the boundary. Every walk that mints calls this, and rotation |
| 547 | // (Rotate) reaches it WITHOUT EnsureUser, so this is the check that no key |
| 548 | // is ever minted for an unbounded user: one GetUser, and a |
| 549 | // PutUserPermissionsBoundary only when the boundary is missing or different. |
| 550 | func (p *awsProvisioner) MintKey(ctx context.Context, user string) (string, string, error) { |
| 551 | if err := p.ensureUserBoundary(ctx, user); err != nil { |
| 552 | return "", "", err |
| 553 | } |
| 554 | out, err := p.iam.CreateAccessKey(ctx, &iam.CreateAccessKeyInput{UserName: aws.String(user)}) |
| 555 | if err != nil { |
| 556 | return "", "", fmt.Errorf("mail: create access key for %q: %w", user, err) |
| 557 | } |
| 558 | return aws.ToString(out.AccessKey.AccessKeyId), aws.ToString(out.AccessKey.SecretAccessKey), nil |
| 559 | } |
| 560 | |
| 561 | // SetKeyActive is the pause. Instant, reversible, and it rewrites no policy — |
| 562 | // which matters because a policy rewrite would have to be undone correctly to |
| 563 | // resume, and this cannot half-fail into a broken grant. |
| 564 | func (p *awsProvisioner) SetKeyActive(ctx context.Context, user, keyID string, active bool) error { |
| 565 | st := iamtypes.StatusTypeInactive |
| 566 | if active { |
| 567 | st = iamtypes.StatusTypeActive |
| 568 | } |
| 569 | _, err := p.iam.UpdateAccessKey(ctx, &iam.UpdateAccessKeyInput{ |
| 570 | UserName: aws.String(user), AccessKeyId: aws.String(keyID), Status: st, |
| 571 | }) |
| 572 | if err != nil && !isNotFound(err) { |
| 573 | return fmt.Errorf("mail: set key %s active=%v: %w", keyID, active, err) |
| 574 | } |
| 575 | return nil |
| 576 | } |
| 577 | |
| 578 | func (p *awsProvisioner) DeleteKey(ctx context.Context, user, keyID string) error { |
| 579 | _, err := p.iam.DeleteAccessKey(ctx, &iam.DeleteAccessKeyInput{ |
| 580 | UserName: aws.String(user), AccessKeyId: aws.String(keyID), |
| 581 | }) |
| 582 | if err != nil && !isNotFound(err) { |
| 583 | return fmt.Errorf("mail: delete key %s: %w", keyID, err) |
| 584 | } |
| 585 | return nil |
| 586 | } |
| 587 | |
| 588 | func (p *awsProvisioner) ReapKeys(ctx context.Context, user string, keep []string) error { |
| 589 | keepSet := make(map[string]bool, len(keep)) |
| 590 | for _, id := range keep { |
| 591 | keepSet[id] = true |
| 592 | } |
| 593 | var marker *string |
| 594 | for { |
| 595 | out, err := p.iam.ListAccessKeys(ctx, &iam.ListAccessKeysInput{ |
| 596 | UserName: aws.String(user), Marker: marker, |
| 597 | }) |
| 598 | if err != nil { |
| 599 | if isNotFound(err) { |
| 600 | return nil |
| 601 | } |
| 602 | return fmt.Errorf("mail: list access keys for %q: %w", user, err) |
| 603 | } |
| 604 | for _, k := range out.AccessKeyMetadata { |
| 605 | id := aws.ToString(k.AccessKeyId) |
| 606 | if keepSet[id] { |
| 607 | continue |
| 608 | } |
| 609 | if err := p.DeleteKey(ctx, user, id); err != nil { |
| 610 | return err |
| 611 | } |
| 612 | } |
| 613 | if !out.IsTruncated { |
| 614 | return nil |
| 615 | } |
| 616 | if out.Marker == nil { |
| 617 | // IsTruncated=true with no Marker to page from would otherwise |
| 618 | // spin forever re-issuing the same request. AWS is not observed |
| 619 | // to do this, but this loop runs inside a console door, and the |
| 620 | // guard is one line while the file is already open. |
| 621 | return nil |
| 622 | } |
| 623 | marker = out.Marker |
| 624 | } |
| 625 | } |
| 626 | |
| 627 | // DeleteUser removes keys and the inline policy first — IAM refuses to |
| 628 | // delete a user that still has either. |
| 629 | func (p *awsProvisioner) DeleteUser(ctx context.Context, user string) error { |
| 630 | if err := p.ReapKeys(ctx, user, nil); err != nil { |
| 631 | return err |
| 632 | } |
| 633 | if _, err := p.iam.DeleteUserPolicy(ctx, &iam.DeleteUserPolicyInput{ |
| 634 | UserName: aws.String(user), PolicyName: aws.String(PolicyName), |
| 635 | }); err != nil && !isNotFound(err) { |
| 636 | return fmt.Errorf("mail: delete policy for %q: %w", user, err) |
| 637 | } |
| 638 | if _, err := p.iam.DeleteUser(ctx, &iam.DeleteUserInput{UserName: aws.String(user)}); err != nil && !isNotFound(err) { |
| 639 | return fmt.Errorf("mail: delete user %q: %w", user, err) |
| 640 | } |
| 641 | return nil |
| 642 | } |
| 643 | |
amadan