| 1 | package console |
| 2 | |
| 3 | import ( |
| 4 | "context" |
| 5 | "crypto/aes" |
| 6 | "crypto/cipher" |
| 7 | "crypto/ecdh" |
| 8 | "crypto/ecdsa" |
| 9 | "crypto/elliptic" |
| 10 | "crypto/hkdf" |
| 11 | "crypto/rand" |
| 12 | "crypto/sha256" |
| 13 | "encoding/base64" |
| 14 | "encoding/json" |
| 15 | "errors" |
| 16 | "math/big" |
| 17 | "net/http" |
| 18 | "net/http/httptest" |
| 19 | "net/url" |
| 20 | "strings" |
| 21 | "sync" |
| 22 | "testing" |
| 23 | "time" |
| 24 | ) |
| 25 | |
| 26 | // ---- a fake keymail, faithful to oauth.go / appapi.go on the wires the |
| 27 | // console touches. Shared with server_test.go. |
| 28 | |
| 29 | type sentMessage struct { |
| 30 | ID, From, To, Subject, Body, Kind string |
| 31 | } |
| 32 | |
| 33 | type fakeKeymail struct { |
| 34 | t *testing.T |
| 35 | srv *httptest.Server |
| 36 | |
| 37 | mu sync.Mutex |
| 38 | address string // the user identity minted at exchange |
| 39 | expectCode string // the single code the fake will honor |
| 40 | challenge string // PKCE challenge captured from the authorize URL |
| 41 | token string // access token minted at exchange |
| 42 | signPub string // sign_pub pinned at exchange |
| 43 | origin string // client_id seen at exchange |
| 44 | boxPriv *ecdh.PrivateKey |
| 45 | send401 bool // simulate a revoked grant on /api/app/send |
| 46 | revoked []string |
| 47 | sends []sentMessage |
| 48 | exchanges int |
| 49 | |
| 50 | // Step-up (stepup.go). reauth mirrors /.well-known/keymail's advertised |
| 51 | // capability; authTime is what the next exchange reports (zero = "this |
| 52 | // deployment proved no gesture", the fail-closed case); stepUp records |
| 53 | // whether the last exchange replayed the step-up redirect_uri. |
| 54 | reauth bool |
| 55 | authTime time.Time |
| 56 | stepUp bool |
| 57 | |
| 58 | // Federation (federation.go / relay.go proxyAPI). fedSends is every |
| 59 | // envelope accepted over /api/federation/deliver (Kind "federation"). |
| 60 | // powBits is the price this mailbox charges a sender it doesn't know yet. |
| 61 | // noMailbox marks local parts with no claimed mailbox (404 at lookup). |
| 62 | // blocked marks senders this mailbox has blocked. senders is the |
| 63 | // registered-sender table: from -> the sign_pub it proved. registrations |
| 64 | // counts successful /api/federation/register calls. challenges is the |
| 65 | // outstanding challenge-token table (the real Keymail seals the token |
| 66 | // instead of keeping a map, but the wire is the same). |
| 67 | fedSends []sentMessage |
| 68 | powBits int |
| 69 | noMailbox map[string]bool |
| 70 | blocked map[string]bool |
| 71 | senders map[string]string |
| 72 | registrations int |
| 73 | challenges map[string]fakeChallenge |
| 74 | |
| 75 | // lookupStatus makes the lookup for one full address answer that HTTP |
| 76 | // status (400/404/409/500...) instead of its usual 200; lookupStall makes |
| 77 | // it hold the answer for that long (or until the caller gives up). |
| 78 | lookupStatus map[string]int |
| 79 | lookupStall map[string]time.Duration |
| 80 | // lookups counts every federation lookup the fake answered or was asked. |
| 81 | lookups int |
| 82 | // deliverStatus, when set, makes /api/federation/deliver answer that |
| 83 | // status (an ordinary post-lookup failure) before looking at the envelope. |
| 84 | deliverStatus int |
| 85 | } |
| 86 | |
| 87 | // sentBodies is every message body the fake has accepted — how a test proves |
| 88 | // a link was delivered into a Keymail inbox rather than emailed. |
| 89 | func (f *fakeKeymail) sentBodies() []string { |
| 90 | f.mu.Lock() |
| 91 | defer f.mu.Unlock() |
| 92 | out := make([]string, 0, len(f.sends)) |
| 93 | for _, s := range f.sends { |
| 94 | out = append(out, s.Body) |
| 95 | } |
| 96 | return out |
| 97 | } |
| 98 | |
| 99 | func newFakeKeymail(t *testing.T, address string) *fakeKeymail { |
| 100 | t.Helper() |
| 101 | boxPriv, err := ecdh.P256().GenerateKey(rand.Reader) |
| 102 | if err != nil { |
| 103 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 104 | } |
| 105 | // reauth defaults on: the deployments this console talks to are relays, and |
| 106 | // a test that wants the fail-closed path turns it off explicitly. |
| 107 | f := &fakeKeymail{ |
| 108 | t: t, address: address, boxPriv: boxPriv, reauth: true, |
| 109 | powBits: 8, |
| 110 | noMailbox: map[string]bool{}, |
| 111 | blocked: map[string]bool{}, |
| 112 | lookupStatus: map[string]int{}, |
| 113 | lookupStall: map[string]time.Duration{}, |
| 114 | senders: map[string]string{}, |
| 115 | } |
| 116 | mux := http.NewServeMux() |
| 117 | mux.HandleFunc("GET /.well-known/keymail", f.handleWellKnown) |
| 118 | mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/oauth/token", f.handleToken) |
| 119 | mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/oauth/revoke", f.handleRevoke) |
| 120 | mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/federation/lookup", f.handleLookup) |
| 121 | mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/app/send", f.handleSend) |
| 122 | mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/federation/challenge", f.handleChallenge) |
| 123 | mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/federation/register", f.handleRegister) |
| 124 | mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/federation/deliver", f.handleDeliver) |
| 125 | f.srv = httptest.NewServer(mux) |
| 126 | t.Cleanup(f.srv.Close) |
| 127 | return f |
| 128 | } |
| 129 | |
| 130 | func jsonErr(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, msg string) { |
| 131 | w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") |
| 132 | w.WriteHeader(status) |
| 133 | json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"error": msg}) |
| 134 | } |
| 135 | |
| 136 | func (f *fakeKeymail) handleToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { |
| 137 | f.mu.Lock() |
| 138 | defer f.mu.Unlock() |
| 139 | var req struct { |
| 140 | Code string `json:"code"` |
| 141 | CodeVerifier string `json:"code_verifier"` |
| 142 | ClientID string `json:"client_id"` |
| 143 | RedirectURI string `json:"redirect_uri"` |
| 144 | SignPub string `json:"sign_pub"` |
| 145 | } |
| 146 | if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil { |
| 147 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad json") |
| 148 | return |
| 149 | } |
| 150 | if f.expectCode == "" || req.Code != f.expectCode { |
| 151 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "code invalid, used, or expired") |
| 152 | return |
| 153 | } |
| 154 | f.expectCode = "" // single-use, burn-then-check manners |
| 155 | if f.challenge != "" && ChallengeS256(req.CodeVerifier) != f.challenge { |
| 156 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "PKCE verification failed") |
| 157 | return |
| 158 | } |
| 159 | switch req.RedirectURI { |
| 160 | case req.ClientID + "/auth/callback": |
| 161 | f.stepUp = false |
| 162 | case req.ClientID + "/auth/stepup/callback": |
| 163 | f.stepUp = true |
| 164 | default: |
| 165 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "client_id or redirect_uri does not match the authorization") |
| 166 | return |
| 167 | } |
| 168 | // Scope "identify send" requires the app's envelope-signing key: a |
| 169 | // base64 raw uncompressed P-256 point (keymail parseECDSAPub). |
| 170 | raw, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(req.SignPub) |
| 171 | if err != nil || len(raw) != 65 || raw[0] != 4 { |
| 172 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "sign_pub (the app's envelope-signing key) is required to send") |
| 173 | return |
| 174 | } |
| 175 | f.signPub = req.SignPub |
| 176 | f.origin = req.ClientID |
| 177 | f.token = "user.tok-" + f.address |
| 178 | f.exchanges++ |
| 179 | out := map[string]any{ |
| 180 | "access_token": f.token, |
| 181 | "token_type": "bearer", |
| 182 | "scope": "identify send", |
| 183 | "address": f.address, |
| 184 | } |
| 185 | // auth_time is OMITTED when no gesture was proved — keymail never invents |
| 186 | // one, and the console must treat its absence as a refusal. |
| 187 | if !f.authTime.IsZero() { |
| 188 | out["auth_time"] = f.authTime.Unix() |
| 189 | } |
| 190 | w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") |
| 191 | json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(out) |
| 192 | } |
| 193 | |
| 194 | // handleWellKnown is the capability probe the step-up gate makes before it |
| 195 | // sends anyone anywhere. |
| 196 | func (f *fakeKeymail) handleWellKnown(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { |
| 197 | f.mu.Lock() |
| 198 | defer f.mu.Unlock() |
| 199 | w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") |
| 200 | json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{ |
| 201 | "version": "keymail1", "host": "keymail.dev", "pow_bits": 8, "reauth": f.reauth, |
| 202 | }) |
| 203 | } |
| 204 | |
| 205 | func (f *fakeKeymail) handleRevoke(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { |
| 206 | f.mu.Lock() |
| 207 | defer f.mu.Unlock() |
| 208 | var req struct { |
| 209 | Token string `json:"token"` |
| 210 | } |
| 211 | json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req) |
| 212 | f.revoked = append(f.revoked, req.Token) |
| 213 | w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") |
| 214 | json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"status": "ok"}) |
| 215 | } |
| 216 | |
| 217 | // handleLookup routes like the relay (keymail/relay.go proxyAPI) and prices |
| 218 | // like the instance (keymail/federation.go handleLookup): a host other than |
| 219 | // keymail.dev never resolves (the relay only owns that one host), and an |
| 220 | // unclaimed local part 404s as "no such mailbox" one level up from "no such |
| 221 | // inbox" — the fake collapses the two hops into one handler. |
| 222 | func (f *fakeKeymail) handleLookup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { |
| 223 | addr := r.URL.Query().Get("addr") |
| 224 | f.mu.Lock() |
| 225 | f.lookups++ |
| 226 | stall, status := f.lookupStall[addr], f.lookupStatus[addr] |
| 227 | f.mu.Unlock() |
| 228 | if stall > 0 { |
| 229 | select { |
| 230 | case <-time.After(stall): |
| 231 | case <-r.Context().Done(): |
| 232 | return |
| 233 | } |
| 234 | } |
| 235 | if status != 0 && status != http.StatusOK { |
| 236 | jsonErr(w, status, http.StatusText(status)) |
| 237 | return |
| 238 | } |
| 239 | f.mu.Lock() |
| 240 | defer f.mu.Unlock() |
| 241 | // A forced 200 resolves whatever the host (a Keymail-served custom |
| 242 | // domain), so it skips the keymail.dev-only routing. |
| 243 | if status != http.StatusOK { |
| 244 | local, host, ok := strings.Cut(addr, "@") |
| 245 | if !ok || host != "keymail.dev" { |
| 246 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "could not determine target mailbox") |
| 247 | return |
| 248 | } |
| 249 | if f.noMailbox[local] { |
| 250 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusNotFound, "no such mailbox") |
| 251 | return |
| 252 | } |
| 253 | } |
| 254 | bits := f.powBits |
| 255 | if _, known := f.senders[r.URL.Query().Get("from")]; known { |
| 256 | bits = 0 // keymail prices a known sender at 0 whatever key it brings |
| 257 | } |
| 258 | w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") |
| 259 | json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{ |
| 260 | "addr": addr, |
| 261 | "sign_pub": "", |
| 262 | "box_pub": base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(f.boxPriv.PublicKey().Bytes()), |
| 263 | "pow_bits": bits, |
| 264 | }) |
| 265 | } |
| 266 | |
| 267 | // fakeChallenge is the outstanding-challenge record keyed by token. The real |
| 268 | // Keymail seals the challenge instead of keeping a map (federation.go |
| 269 | // sealChallenge/openChallenge), but the wire — and what register checks — is |
| 270 | // the same. |
| 271 | type fakeChallenge struct { |
| 272 | to, from, signPub string |
| 273 | bits int |
| 274 | } |
| 275 | |
| 276 | func (f *fakeKeymail) handleChallenge(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { |
| 277 | f.mu.Lock() |
| 278 | defer f.mu.Unlock() |
| 279 | var raw struct { |
| 280 | To string `json:"to"` |
| 281 | From string `json:"from"` |
| 282 | SignPub string `json:"sign_pub"` |
| 283 | } |
| 284 | if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&raw); err != nil { |
| 285 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad json") |
| 286 | return |
| 287 | } |
| 288 | if f.blocked[raw.From] { |
| 289 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "blocked") |
| 290 | return |
| 291 | } |
| 292 | bits := f.powBits |
| 293 | if f.senders[raw.From] == raw.SignPub { |
| 294 | bits = 0 |
| 295 | } |
| 296 | tok := make([]byte, 16) |
| 297 | rand.Read(tok) |
| 298 | token := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(tok) |
| 299 | if f.challenges == nil { |
| 300 | f.challenges = map[string]fakeChallenge{} |
| 301 | } |
| 302 | f.challenges[token] = fakeChallenge{to: raw.To, from: raw.From, signPub: raw.SignPub, bits: bits} |
| 303 | w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") |
| 304 | json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"challenge": token, "bits": bits, "expires_at": time.Now().Add(time.Minute).Unix()}) |
| 305 | } |
| 306 | |
| 307 | func (f *fakeKeymail) handleRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { |
| 308 | f.mu.Lock() |
| 309 | defer f.mu.Unlock() |
| 310 | var req struct { |
| 311 | To string `json:"to"` |
| 312 | Challenge string `json:"challenge"` |
| 313 | Counter uint64 `json:"counter"` |
| 314 | From string `json:"from"` |
| 315 | SignPub string `json:"sign_pub"` |
| 316 | BoxPub string `json:"box_pub"` |
| 317 | Attestation string `json:"attestation"` |
| 318 | } |
| 319 | if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil { |
| 320 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad json") |
| 321 | return |
| 322 | } |
| 323 | c, ok := f.challenges[req.Challenge] |
| 324 | if !ok { |
| 325 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad challenge") |
| 326 | return |
| 327 | } |
| 328 | delete(f.challenges, req.Challenge) |
| 329 | if c.from != req.From || c.signPub != req.SignPub { |
| 330 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "challenge does not match this sender") |
| 331 | return |
| 332 | } |
| 333 | nonce := sha256.Sum256([]byte(req.Challenge)) |
| 334 | signPubRaw, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(req.SignPub) |
| 335 | if refLeadingZeros(refHash(nonce[:], signPubRaw, req.Counter)) < c.bits { |
| 336 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "proof of work does not meet difficulty") |
| 337 | return |
| 338 | } |
| 339 | attest := []byte("keymail-attest-v1\n" + req.From + "\n" + req.SignPub + "\n" + req.BoxPub) |
| 340 | if !testVerify(req.SignPub, attest, req.Attestation) { |
| 341 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "bad key attestation") |
| 342 | return |
| 343 | } |
| 344 | f.senders[req.From] = req.SignPub |
| 345 | f.registrations++ |
| 346 | w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") |
| 347 | json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"status": "proven"}) |
| 348 | } |
| 349 | |
| 350 | func (f *fakeKeymail) handleDeliver(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { |
| 351 | f.mu.Lock() |
| 352 | defer f.mu.Unlock() |
| 353 | var req struct { |
| 354 | Envelope envelope `json:"envelope"` |
| 355 | } |
| 356 | if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil { |
| 357 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad json") |
| 358 | return |
| 359 | } |
| 360 | e := req.Envelope |
| 361 | if f.deliverStatus != 0 { |
| 362 | jsonErr(w, f.deliverStatus, http.StatusText(f.deliverStatus)) |
| 363 | return |
| 364 | } |
| 365 | if f.blocked[e.From] { |
| 366 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "blocked") |
| 367 | return |
| 368 | } |
| 369 | reg, known := f.senders[e.From] |
| 370 | if !known { |
| 371 | w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") |
| 372 | w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden) |
| 373 | json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"error": "unknown_sender", "pow_bits": f.powBits}) |
| 374 | return |
| 375 | } |
| 376 | if reg != e.SignPub { |
| 377 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "signing key does not match registered key") |
| 378 | return |
| 379 | } |
| 380 | if e.V != "keymail1" || e.ID == "" || e.Date == "" || |
| 381 | !testVerify(e.SignPub, envelopeMsg(e.ID, e.From, e.To, e.Date, e.Blob), e.Sig) { |
| 382 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad envelope signature") |
| 383 | return |
| 384 | } |
| 385 | plain, err := testOpen(f.boxPriv, e.Blob) |
| 386 | if err != nil { |
| 387 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "blob does not open") |
| 388 | return |
| 389 | } |
| 390 | var p struct{ Subject, Body string } |
| 391 | json.Unmarshal(plain, &p) |
| 392 | f.fedSends = append(f.fedSends, sentMessage{ID: e.ID, From: e.From, To: e.To, Subject: p.Subject, Body: p.Body, Kind: "federation"}) |
| 393 | w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") |
| 394 | json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"status": "delivered"}) |
| 395 | } |
| 396 | |
| 397 | // fedBodies is every message body the fake has accepted over federation — |
| 398 | // how a test proves an invite reached someone who never granted the |
| 399 | // console anything. |
| 400 | func (f *fakeKeymail) fedBodies() []string { |
| 401 | f.mu.Lock() |
| 402 | defer f.mu.Unlock() |
| 403 | out := make([]string, 0, len(f.fedSends)) |
| 404 | for _, s := range f.fedSends { |
| 405 | out = append(out, s.Body) |
| 406 | } |
| 407 | return out |
| 408 | } |
| 409 | |
| 410 | func (f *fakeKeymail) handleSend(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { |
| 411 | f.mu.Lock() |
| 412 | defer f.mu.Unlock() |
| 413 | if f.send401 || r.Header.Get("Authorization") != "Bearer "+f.token || f.token == "" { |
| 414 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "bad, expired or revoked app token") |
| 415 | return |
| 416 | } |
| 417 | var req struct { |
| 418 | Envelope envelope `json:"envelope"` |
| 419 | Kind string `json:"kind"` |
| 420 | } |
| 421 | if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil { |
| 422 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad json") |
| 423 | return |
| 424 | } |
| 425 | e := req.Envelope |
| 426 | if e.To == "" { |
| 427 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "envelope needs a recipient") |
| 428 | return |
| 429 | } |
| 430 | // The grant authorizes exactly one recipient: the user who approved it |
| 431 | // (keymail appapi.go handleAppSend). This fake used to accept anyone, |
| 432 | // which is how invites shipped broken. |
| 433 | grantUser := strings.TrimPrefix(f.token, "user.tok-") |
| 434 | if e.To != grantUser { |
| 435 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "envelope to must be "+grantUser) |
| 436 | return |
| 437 | } |
| 438 | if host := OriginHost(f.origin); !strings.HasSuffix(e.From, "@"+host) { |
| 439 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "envelope from must be an address on "+host) |
| 440 | return |
| 441 | } |
| 442 | if e.SignPub != f.signPub { |
| 443 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusForbidden, "signing key does not match this grant") |
| 444 | return |
| 445 | } |
| 446 | if e.V != "keymail1" || e.ID == "" || e.Date == "" || |
| 447 | !testVerify(e.SignPub, envelopeMsg(e.ID, e.From, e.To, e.Date, e.Blob), e.Sig) { |
| 448 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad envelope signature") |
| 449 | return |
| 450 | } |
| 451 | plain, err := testOpen(f.boxPriv, e.Blob) |
| 452 | if err != nil { |
| 453 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "blob does not open: "+err.Error()) |
| 454 | return |
| 455 | } |
| 456 | var payload struct{ Subject, Body string } |
| 457 | if err := json.Unmarshal(plain, &payload); err != nil { |
| 458 | jsonErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "payload is not subject/body json") |
| 459 | return |
| 460 | } |
| 461 | f.sends = append(f.sends, sentMessage{ |
| 462 | ID: e.ID, From: e.From, To: e.To, |
| 463 | Subject: payload.Subject, Body: payload.Body, Kind: req.Kind, |
| 464 | }) |
| 465 | w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") |
| 466 | json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"status": "delivered", "folder": "apps"}) |
| 467 | } |
| 468 | |
| 469 | // testVerify mirrors keymail crypto.go verifySig: raw r||s ECDSA P-256 over |
| 470 | // sha256(msg), key a base64 raw uncompressed point. |
| 471 | func testVerify(b64pub string, msg []byte, b64sig string) bool { |
| 472 | raw, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(b64pub) |
| 473 | if err != nil || len(raw) != 65 || raw[0] != 4 { |
| 474 | return false |
| 475 | } |
| 476 | pub := &ecdsa.PublicKey{ |
| 477 | Curve: elliptic.P256(), |
| 478 | X: new(big.Int).SetBytes(raw[1:33]), |
| 479 | Y: new(big.Int).SetBytes(raw[33:65]), |
| 480 | } |
| 481 | sig, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(b64sig) |
| 482 | if err != nil || len(sig) != 64 { |
| 483 | return false |
| 484 | } |
| 485 | h := sha256.Sum256(msg) |
| 486 | return ecdsa.Verify(pub, h[:], new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[:32]), new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[32:])) |
| 487 | } |
| 488 | |
| 489 | // testOpen mirrors keymail crypto.go open: the inverse of sealToBox. |
| 490 | func testOpen(boxPriv *ecdh.PrivateKey, blobB64 string) ([]byte, error) { |
| 491 | blob, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(blobB64) |
| 492 | if err != nil || len(blob) < 65+12+16 { |
| 493 | return nil, errors.New("bad blob") |
| 494 | } |
| 495 | ephPub, err := ecdh.P256().NewPublicKey(blob[:65]) |
| 496 | if err != nil { |
| 497 | return nil, err |
| 498 | } |
| 499 | shared, err := boxPriv.ECDH(ephPub) |
| 500 | if err != nil { |
| 501 | return nil, err |
| 502 | } |
| 503 | key, err := hkdf.Key(sha256.New, shared, nil, envelopeInfo, 32) |
| 504 | if err != nil { |
| 505 | return nil, err |
| 506 | } |
| 507 | block, err := aes.NewCipher(key) |
| 508 | if err != nil { |
| 509 | return nil, err |
| 510 | } |
| 511 | gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block) |
| 512 | if err != nil { |
| 513 | return nil, err |
| 514 | } |
| 515 | return gcm.Open(nil, blob[65:77], blob[77:], nil) |
| 516 | } |
| 517 | |
| 518 | func testSigningKey(t *testing.T) *ecdsa.PrivateKey { |
| 519 | t.Helper() |
| 520 | k, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) |
| 521 | if err != nil { |
| 522 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 523 | } |
| 524 | return k |
| 525 | } |
| 526 | |
| 527 | // ---- tests ------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| 528 | |
| 529 | func TestAuthorizeURL(t *testing.T) { |
| 530 | km := NewKeymail("https://keymail.dev/", "https://platform.carlosframework.com") |
| 531 | km.SetSigningKey(testSigningKey(t)) |
| 532 | u, err := url.Parse(km.AuthorizeURL("state123", "chal456")) |
| 533 | if err != nil { |
| 534 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 535 | } |
| 536 | if u.Scheme != "https" || u.Host != "keymail.dev" || u.Path != "/oauth/authorize" { |
| 537 | t.Fatalf("authorize URL = %v", u) |
| 538 | } |
| 539 | q := u.Query() |
| 540 | for k, want := range map[string]string{ |
| 541 | "client_id": "https://platform.carlosframework.com", |
| 542 | "redirect_uri": "https://platform.carlosframework.com/auth/callback", |
| 543 | "scope": "identify send", |
| 544 | "state": "state123", |
| 545 | "code_challenge": "chal456", |
| 546 | "code_challenge_method": "S256", |
| 547 | } { |
| 548 | if got := q.Get(k); got != want { |
| 549 | t.Errorf("%s = %q, want %q", k, got, want) |
| 550 | } |
| 551 | } |
| 552 | } |
| 553 | |
| 554 | func TestAuthorizeURLScopeWithoutKey(t *testing.T) { |
| 555 | km := NewKeymail("https://keymail.dev", "https://platform.carlosframework.com") |
| 556 | u, _ := url.Parse(km.AuthorizeURL("s", "c")) |
| 557 | if got := u.Query().Get("scope"); got != "identify" { |
| 558 | t.Fatalf("scope without signing key = %q, want identify", got) |
| 559 | } |
| 560 | } |
| 561 | |
| 562 | func TestExchangeRoundTrip(t *testing.T) { |
| 563 | fk := newFakeKeymail(t, "paul@keymail.dev") |
| 564 | km := NewKeymail(fk.srv.URL, "https://platform.carlosframework.com") |
| 565 | km.SetSigningKey(testSigningKey(t)) |
| 566 | |
| 567 | verifier, err := NewVerifier() |
| 568 | if err != nil { |
| 569 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 570 | } |
| 571 | if n := len(verifier); n < 43 || n > 128 { |
| 572 | t.Fatalf("verifier length %d outside RFC 7636 window", n) |
| 573 | } |
| 574 | fk.challenge = ChallengeS256(verifier) |
| 575 | fk.expectCode = "code-1" |
| 576 | addr, token, err := km.Exchange(context.Background(), "code-1", verifier) |
| 577 | if err != nil { |
| 578 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 579 | } |
| 580 | if addr != "paul@keymail.dev" { |
| 581 | t.Fatalf("address = %q", addr) |
| 582 | } |
| 583 | if token == "" || token != fk.token { |
| 584 | t.Fatalf("token = %q, fake minted %q", token, fk.token) |
| 585 | } |
| 586 | if fk.signPub != km.SignPub() { |
| 587 | t.Fatalf("fake pinned sign_pub %q, client's is %q", fk.signPub, km.SignPub()) |
| 588 | } |
| 589 | } |
| 590 | |
| 591 | func TestExchangePKCEMismatch(t *testing.T) { |
| 592 | fk := newFakeKeymail(t, "paul@keymail.dev") |
| 593 | km := NewKeymail(fk.srv.URL, "https://platform.carlosframework.com") |
| 594 | km.SetSigningKey(testSigningKey(t)) |
| 595 | fk.challenge = ChallengeS256("the-real-verifier") |
| 596 | fk.expectCode = "code-1" |
| 597 | _, _, err := km.Exchange(context.Background(), "code-1", "a-different-verifier") |
| 598 | if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "PKCE") { |
| 599 | t.Fatalf("err = %v, want PKCE failure surfaced", err) |
| 600 | } |
| 601 | } |
| 602 | |
| 603 | func TestExchangeBadCode(t *testing.T) { |
| 604 | fk := newFakeKeymail(t, "paul@keymail.dev") |
| 605 | km := NewKeymail(fk.srv.URL, "https://platform.carlosframework.com") |
| 606 | km.SetSigningKey(testSigningKey(t)) |
| 607 | fk.expectCode = "code-1" |
| 608 | _, _, err := km.Exchange(context.Background(), "guessed", "v") |
| 609 | if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "code invalid") { |
| 610 | t.Fatalf("err = %v, want code-invalid error", err) |
| 611 | } |
| 612 | } |
| 613 | |
| 614 | func TestRevoke(t *testing.T) { |
| 615 | fk := newFakeKeymail(t, "paul@keymail.dev") |
| 616 | km := NewKeymail(fk.srv.URL, "https://platform.carlosframework.com") |
| 617 | if err := km.Revoke(context.Background(), "user.tok"); err != nil { |
| 618 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 619 | } |
| 620 | if len(fk.revoked) != 1 || fk.revoked[0] != "user.tok" { |
| 621 | t.Fatalf("revoked = %v", fk.revoked) |
| 622 | } |
| 623 | } |
| 624 | |
| 625 | func TestSendAppSealedRoundTrip(t *testing.T) { |
| 626 | fk := newFakeKeymail(t, "paul@keymail.dev") |
| 627 | km := NewKeymail(fk.srv.URL, "http://127.0.0.1:8090") |
| 628 | km.SetSigningKey(testSigningKey(t)) |
| 629 | verifier, _ := NewVerifier() |
| 630 | fk.challenge = ChallengeS256(verifier) |
| 631 | fk.expectCode = "code-1" |
| 632 | _, token, err := km.Exchange(context.Background(), "code-1", verifier) |
| 633 | if err != nil { |
| 634 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 635 | } |
| 636 | id, err := km.SendApp(context.Background(), token, "paul@keymail.dev", |
| 637 | "Sign in", "click https://example.com/auth/confirm?token=abc") |
| 638 | if err != nil { |
| 639 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 640 | } |
| 641 | if id == "" { |
| 642 | t.Fatal("no envelope id") |
| 643 | } |
| 644 | if len(fk.sends) != 1 { |
| 645 | t.Fatalf("fake got %d sends", len(fk.sends)) |
| 646 | } |
| 647 | got := fk.sends[0] |
| 648 | if got.ID != id || got.To != "paul@keymail.dev" || got.From != "console@127.0.0.1:8090" { |
| 649 | t.Fatalf("send = %+v", got) |
| 650 | } |
| 651 | if got.Subject != "Sign in" || !strings.Contains(got.Body, "confirm?token=abc") { |
| 652 | t.Fatalf("sealed payload did not round-trip: %+v", got) |
| 653 | } |
| 654 | if got.Kind != "app" { |
| 655 | t.Fatalf("kind = %q, want app", got.Kind) |
| 656 | } |
| 657 | } |
| 658 | |
| 659 | func TestSendAppRevokedGrant(t *testing.T) { |
| 660 | fk := newFakeKeymail(t, "paul@keymail.dev") |
| 661 | km := NewKeymail(fk.srv.URL, "http://127.0.0.1:8090") |
| 662 | km.SetSigningKey(testSigningKey(t)) |
| 663 | verifier, _ := NewVerifier() |
| 664 | fk.challenge = ChallengeS256(verifier) |
| 665 | fk.expectCode = "code-1" |
| 666 | _, token, err := km.Exchange(context.Background(), "code-1", verifier) |
| 667 | if err != nil { |
| 668 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 669 | } |
| 670 | fk.send401 = true |
| 671 | if _, err := km.SendApp(context.Background(), token, "paul@keymail.dev", "s", "b"); !errors.Is(err, ErrGrantRevoked) { |
| 672 | t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrGrantRevoked", err) |
| 673 | } |
| 674 | } |
| 675 | |
| 676 | func TestSendAppWithoutKey(t *testing.T) { |
| 677 | km := NewKeymail("https://keymail.dev", "https://platform.carlosframework.com") |
| 678 | if _, err := km.SendApp(context.Background(), "tok", "paul@keymail.dev", "s", "b"); err == nil { |
| 679 | t.Fatal("SendApp without a signing key should refuse") |
| 680 | } |
| 681 | } |
| 682 | |
amadan