| 1 | package console |
| 2 | |
| 3 | import ( |
| 4 | "encoding/json" |
| 5 | "errors" |
| 6 | "net/http" |
| 7 | "strings" |
| 8 | "testing" |
| 9 | "time" |
| 10 | |
| 11 | "github.com/carlosframework/platform/internal/svcrole" |
| 12 | ) |
| 13 | |
| 14 | // mintBody is the create door's request body, spelled once so a test that |
| 15 | // varies one field says which field it is varying. |
| 16 | func mintBody(name, role, app string) map[string]string { |
| 17 | return map[string]string{"name": name, "role": role, "app": app} |
| 18 | } |
| 19 | |
| 20 | // jsonStrings pulls a []string out of a raw JSON response body. The doors |
| 21 | // list is the only array this file reads, and reading it through the raw |
| 22 | // bytes (rather than a decoded map handed down from postJSON) keeps every |
| 23 | // assertion in this file working from what actually went over the wire. |
| 24 | func jsonStrings(t *testing.T, body, key string) []string { |
| 25 | t.Helper() |
| 26 | var out map[string]any |
| 27 | if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(body), &out); err != nil { |
| 28 | t.Fatalf("decode %s: %v (body %s)", key, err, body) |
| 29 | } |
| 30 | raw, ok := out[key].([]any) |
| 31 | if !ok { |
| 32 | t.Fatalf("%s is not an array in %s", key, body) |
| 33 | } |
| 34 | got := make([]string, 0, len(raw)) |
| 35 | for _, v := range raw { |
| 36 | s, ok := v.(string) |
| 37 | if !ok { |
| 38 | t.Fatalf("%s carries a non-string element in %s", key, body) |
| 39 | } |
| 40 | got = append(got, s) |
| 41 | } |
| 42 | return got |
| 43 | } |
| 44 | |
| 45 | // jsonField pulls one string field out of a raw JSON response body. |
| 46 | func jsonField(t *testing.T, body, key string) string { |
| 47 | t.Helper() |
| 48 | var out map[string]any |
| 49 | if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(body), &out); err != nil { |
| 50 | t.Fatalf("decode %s: %v (body %s)", key, err, body) |
| 51 | } |
| 52 | s, _ := out[key].(string) |
| 53 | return s |
| 54 | } |
| 55 | |
| 56 | // jsonBool pulls one boolean field out of a raw JSON response body. |
| 57 | func jsonBool(t *testing.T, body, key string) bool { |
| 58 | t.Helper() |
| 59 | var out map[string]any |
| 60 | if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(body), &out); err != nil { |
| 61 | t.Fatalf("decode %s: %v (body %s)", key, err, body) |
| 62 | } |
| 63 | v, ok := out[key].(bool) |
| 64 | if !ok { |
| 65 | t.Fatalf("%s is not a boolean in %s", key, body) |
| 66 | } |
| 67 | return v |
| 68 | } |
| 69 | |
| 70 | // TestServiceMintIsOwnerOnly — minting is an authority grant that outlives |
| 71 | // its minter, so it needs the owner gate, not the ordinary member write |
| 72 | // door. The two refusals differ deliberately: a member who already proved |
| 73 | // they hold the account gets 403 (there is nothing left to conceal, and a |
| 74 | // 404 would send them hunting for a typo in a sqid they typed correctly), |
| 75 | // while a non-member gets the family's byte-identical 404, because a |
| 76 | // distinct answer would confirm the account exists. |
| 77 | func TestServiceMintIsOwnerOnly(t *testing.T) { |
| 78 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 79 | if err := fx.st.AddMember(OpsAccountID, "alice@keymail.dev", RoleMember, time.Now()); err != nil { |
| 80 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 81 | } |
| 82 | owner := cliToken(t, fx, "paul@keymail.dev", "code-svc-mint-owner") |
| 83 | member := cliToken(t, fx, "alice@keymail.dev", "code-svc-mint-member") |
| 84 | stranger := cliToken(t, fx, "eve@keymail.dev", "code-svc-mint-stranger") |
| 85 | |
| 86 | u := fx.ts.URL + "/api/cli/services/" + fx.sqid |
| 87 | if code, body := postRaw(t, u, mintBody("hub", "publish", ""), owner); code != http.StatusCreated { |
| 88 | t.Errorf("owner mint = %d %s; want 201", code, body) |
| 89 | } |
| 90 | if code, body := postRaw(t, u, mintBody("other", "publish", ""), member); code != http.StatusForbidden { |
| 91 | t.Errorf("member mint = %d %s; want 403", code, body) |
| 92 | } |
| 93 | strangerCode, strangerBody := postRaw(t, u, mintBody("x", "publish", ""), stranger) |
| 94 | if strangerCode != http.StatusNotFound { |
| 95 | t.Errorf("non-member mint = %d %s; want 404", strangerCode, strangerBody) |
| 96 | } |
| 97 | // The same bytes an account that does not exist at all answers with. |
| 98 | unknownCode, unknownBody := postRaw(t, fx.ts.URL+"/api/cli/services/zzzz", mintBody("x", "publish", ""), owner) |
| 99 | if unknownCode != http.StatusNotFound || unknownBody != strangerBody { |
| 100 | t.Errorf("unknown-account mint = %d %q, non-member = %d %q — the 404 is not byte-identical", |
| 101 | unknownCode, unknownBody, strangerCode, strangerBody) |
| 102 | } |
| 103 | } |
| 104 | |
| 105 | // TestServiceListRotateRevokeAreOwnerOnly: the owner gate belongs on all |
| 106 | // four doors, not only on the one that hands out a secret. A member who |
| 107 | // could revoke could take a production path down; a member who could list |
| 108 | // learns the whole credential inventory. |
| 109 | func TestServiceListRotateRevokeAreOwnerOnly(t *testing.T) { |
| 110 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 111 | if err := fx.st.AddMember(OpsAccountID, "alice@keymail.dev", RoleMember, time.Now()); err != nil { |
| 112 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 113 | } |
| 114 | serviceToken(t, fx.st, OpsAccountID, "hub", "", svcrole.Publish) |
| 115 | member := cliToken(t, fx, "alice@keymail.dev", "code-svc-doors-member") |
| 116 | stranger := cliToken(t, fx, "eve@keymail.dev", "code-svc-doors-stranger") |
| 117 | |
| 118 | base := fx.ts.URL + "/api/cli/services/" + fx.sqid |
| 119 | if code, body := getRaw(t, base, member); code != http.StatusForbidden { |
| 120 | t.Errorf("member list = %d %s; want 403", code, body) |
| 121 | } |
| 122 | if code, body := getRaw(t, base, stranger); code != http.StatusNotFound { |
| 123 | t.Errorf("non-member list = %d %s; want 404", code, body) |
| 124 | } |
| 125 | for _, verb := range []string{"rotate", "revoke"} { |
| 126 | if code, body := postRaw(t, base+"/hub/"+verb, map[string]string{}, member); code != http.StatusForbidden { |
| 127 | t.Errorf("member %s = %d %s; want 403", verb, code, body) |
| 128 | } |
| 129 | if code, body := postRaw(t, base+"/hub/"+verb, map[string]string{}, stranger); code != http.StatusNotFound { |
| 130 | t.Errorf("non-member %s = %d %s; want 404", verb, code, body) |
| 131 | } |
| 132 | } |
| 133 | // And the member's refusal must be the same at every door — a 403 that |
| 134 | // varied by verb would tell a member which of the four they are nearest |
| 135 | // to reaching. |
| 136 | _, one := postRaw(t, base+"/hub/rotate", map[string]string{}, member) |
| 137 | _, two := postRaw(t, base+"/hub/revoke", map[string]string{}, member) |
| 138 | if one != two { |
| 139 | t.Errorf("member refusal varies by door:\nrotate: %s\nrevoke: %s", one, two) |
| 140 | } |
| 141 | } |
| 142 | |
| 143 | // TestAServiceCannotMintAService is the escalation cut, tested from the wire |
| 144 | // rather than from the role table: a publish credential and an ADMIN one must |
| 145 | // both meet the 403 the role gate gives a zero Set. |
| 146 | func TestAServiceCannotMintAService(t *testing.T) { |
| 147 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 148 | for _, role := range []svcrole.Role{svcrole.Publish, svcrole.Admin} { |
| 149 | tok := serviceToken(t, fx.st, OpsAccountID, "svc-"+string(role), "", role) |
| 150 | for _, path := range []string{ |
| 151 | "/api/cli/services/" + fx.sqid, |
| 152 | "/api/cli/services/" + fx.sqid + "/other/rotate", |
| 153 | "/api/cli/services/" + fx.sqid + "/other/revoke", |
| 154 | "/api/cli/apps/" + fx.sqid + "/kass/instance-token", |
| 155 | } { |
| 156 | code, _, body := rawReq(t, http.MethodPost, fx.ts.URL+path, tok, `{}`) |
| 157 | if code != http.StatusForbidden { |
| 158 | t.Errorf("role %q at POST %s = %d %s; want 403", role, path, code, body) |
| 159 | } |
| 160 | } |
| 161 | // The listing is a door too: an inventory of every credential in |
| 162 | // the account is exactly what a compromised one must not enumerate. |
| 163 | if code, body := getRaw(t, fx.ts.URL+"/api/cli/services/"+fx.sqid, tok); code != http.StatusForbidden { |
| 164 | t.Errorf("role %q at GET services = %d %s; want 403", role, code, body) |
| 165 | } |
| 166 | } |
| 167 | } |
| 168 | |
| 169 | // TestMintReturnsTheSecretExactlyOnce — only the hash is stored, so there is |
| 170 | // no second copy to hand out. The listing must never carry a secret. |
| 171 | func TestMintReturnsTheSecretExactlyOnce(t *testing.T) { |
| 172 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 173 | owner := cliToken(t, fx, "paul@keymail.dev", "code-svc-once") |
| 174 | u := fx.ts.URL + "/api/cli/services/" + fx.sqid |
| 175 | code, body := postRaw(t, u, mintBody("hub", "publish", ""), owner) |
| 176 | if code != http.StatusCreated { |
| 177 | t.Fatalf("mint = %d %s; want 201", code, body) |
| 178 | } |
| 179 | secret := jsonField(t, body, "token") |
| 180 | if secret == "" { |
| 181 | t.Fatal("mint returned no token") |
| 182 | } |
| 183 | // The secret works, which is what makes its absence from the listing |
| 184 | // meaningful rather than merely a string not appearing. |
| 185 | if status, out := getRaw(t, fx.ts.URL+"/api/cli/apps", secret); status != http.StatusOK { |
| 186 | t.Fatalf("minted credential at GET apps = %d %s; want 200", status, out) |
| 187 | } |
| 188 | _, list := getRaw(t, u, owner) |
| 189 | if strings.Contains(list, secret) { |
| 190 | t.Error("the listing carries the secret") |
| 191 | } |
| 192 | // The listing DOES carry the sha256, as the listing id (C36). That is |
| 193 | // not the secret and cannot be turned back into it: only the preimage |
| 194 | // authenticates. It is here because it is the handle revoke accepts, and |
| 195 | // the only handle a nameless legacy row has. |
| 196 | if !strings.Contains(list, hashToken(secret)) { |
| 197 | t.Errorf("the listing does not carry the credential's listing id: %s", list) |
| 198 | } |
| 199 | } |
| 200 | |
| 201 | // TestMintRefusesAnUnknownRole keeps the catalogue closed at the door, not |
| 202 | // just in the type. |
| 203 | func TestMintRefusesAnUnknownRole(t *testing.T) { |
| 204 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 205 | owner := cliToken(t, fx, "paul@keymail.dev", "code-svc-role") |
| 206 | u := fx.ts.URL + "/api/cli/services/" + fx.sqid |
| 207 | for _, bad := range []string{"", "root", "owner", "Publish", "*"} { |
| 208 | if code, body := postRaw(t, u, mintBody("hub", bad, ""), owner); code != http.StatusBadRequest { |
| 209 | t.Errorf("role %q = %d %s; want 400", bad, code, body) |
| 210 | } |
| 211 | } |
| 212 | } |
| 213 | |
| 214 | // TestMintRefusesAnUnusableName: the name is the handle rotate and revoke |
| 215 | // address the credential by and the string an operator types on a command |
| 216 | // line, so it takes the same grammar a fleet label does. A name with a path |
| 217 | // separator or a leading hyphen in it is refused here rather than becoming a |
| 218 | // row nobody can address cleanly later. |
| 219 | func TestMintRefusesAnUnusableName(t *testing.T) { |
| 220 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 221 | owner := cliToken(t, fx, "paul@keymail.dev", "code-svc-name") |
| 222 | u := fx.ts.URL + "/api/cli/services/" + fx.sqid |
| 223 | for _, bad := range []string{"", " ", "Hub", "a/b", "a b", "a.b", strings.Repeat("a", 33)} { |
| 224 | if code, body := postRaw(t, u, mintBody(bad, "publish", ""), owner); code != http.StatusBadRequest { |
| 225 | t.Errorf("name %q = %d %s; want 400", bad, code, body) |
| 226 | } |
| 227 | } |
| 228 | // A name is trimmed before it is judged, the same as a fleet's. |
| 229 | if code, body := postRaw(t, u, mintBody(" hub ", "publish", ""), owner); code != http.StatusCreated { |
| 230 | t.Errorf("padded name = %d %s; want 201", code, body) |
| 231 | } |
| 232 | } |
| 233 | |
| 234 | // TestMintRefusesAnAppThatIsNotThere: an app-scoped credential minted |
| 235 | // against a name that is not in the account is authority pointed at |
| 236 | // nothing — and if that app is later created by someone else in the |
| 237 | // account, authority pointed at something its minter never chose. |
| 238 | func TestMintRefusesAnAppThatIsNotThere(t *testing.T) { |
| 239 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 240 | owner := cliToken(t, fx, "paul@keymail.dev", "code-svc-app") |
| 241 | u := fx.ts.URL + "/api/cli/services/" + fx.sqid |
| 242 | if code, body := postRaw(t, u, mintBody("router", "instance", "no-such-app"), owner); code != http.StatusNotFound { |
| 243 | t.Errorf("mint against a missing app = %d %s; want 404", code, body) |
| 244 | } |
| 245 | if code, body := postRaw(t, u, mintBody("router", "instance", "kass"), owner); code != http.StatusCreated { |
| 246 | t.Errorf("mint against a real app = %d %s; want 201", code, body) |
| 247 | } |
| 248 | } |
| 249 | |
| 250 | // TestMintRefusesADuplicateName: within an account a name is the handle, so |
| 251 | // two live credentials cannot share one. The 409 must come from the |
| 252 | // sentinel, not from a string match on a driver error, which is what tells |
| 253 | // it apart from a store that is simply broken. |
| 254 | func TestMintRefusesADuplicateName(t *testing.T) { |
| 255 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 256 | owner := cliToken(t, fx, "paul@keymail.dev", "code-svc-dup") |
| 257 | u := fx.ts.URL + "/api/cli/services/" + fx.sqid |
| 258 | if code, body := postRaw(t, u, mintBody("hub", "publish", ""), owner); code != http.StatusCreated { |
| 259 | t.Fatalf("first mint = %d %s; want 201", code, body) |
| 260 | } |
| 261 | if code, body := postRaw(t, u, mintBody("hub", "operate", ""), owner); code != http.StatusConflict { |
| 262 | t.Errorf("duplicate mint = %d %s; want 409", code, body) |
| 263 | } |
| 264 | } |
| 265 | |
| 266 | // TestCreateAnswersWithTheDoorsItGranted — an operator must be able to see |
| 267 | // what they gave away without reading a spec (AGENTS.md's no-infra rule |
| 268 | // applied to comprehension, not just access). The list is derived from the |
| 269 | // same map the gate reads, so it cannot drift from what the gate allows. |
| 270 | func TestCreateAnswersWithTheDoorsItGranted(t *testing.T) { |
| 271 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 272 | owner := cliToken(t, fx, "paul@keymail.dev", "code-svc-doors") |
| 273 | _, body := postRaw(t, fx.ts.URL+"/api/cli/services/"+fx.sqid, mintBody("hub", "publish", ""), owner) |
| 274 | doors := jsonStrings(t, body, "doors") |
| 275 | if len(doors) == 0 { |
| 276 | t.Fatal("create returned no door list") |
| 277 | } |
| 278 | for _, d := range doors { |
| 279 | if strings.Contains(d, "instance-token") || strings.Contains(d, "/fleets/") || strings.Contains(d, "/api/cli/services/") { |
| 280 | t.Errorf("door list names a closed door: %s", d) |
| 281 | } |
| 282 | } |
| 283 | // It is the gate's own answer, not a hand-written list: every pattern it |
| 284 | // names must be a door this server actually admits `publish` to, and |
| 285 | // every such door must be named. |
| 286 | want := map[string]bool{} |
| 287 | for pattern, set := range fx.srv.cliRoles { |
| 288 | if set.Permits(svcrole.Publish) { |
| 289 | want[pattern] = true |
| 290 | } |
| 291 | } |
| 292 | if len(doors) != len(want) { |
| 293 | t.Errorf("door list has %d entries, the gate admits publish to %d", len(doors), len(want)) |
| 294 | } |
| 295 | for _, d := range doors { |
| 296 | if !want[d] { |
| 297 | t.Errorf("door list names %s, which the gate does not admit publish to", d) |
| 298 | } |
| 299 | } |
| 300 | if !sortedStrings(doors) { |
| 301 | t.Errorf("door list is not sorted: %v", doors) |
| 302 | } |
| 303 | } |
| 304 | |
| 305 | // sortedStrings reports whether a slice is in ascending order — the door |
| 306 | // list is sorted so two mints of the same role answer identically, rather |
| 307 | // than in whatever order a map range happened to produce. |
| 308 | func sortedStrings(s []string) bool { |
| 309 | for i := 1; i < len(s); i++ { |
| 310 | if s[i-1] > s[i] { |
| 311 | return false |
| 312 | } |
| 313 | } |
| 314 | return true |
| 315 | } |
| 316 | |
| 317 | // TestLegacyAppTokensAppearInTheAccountListing — absorbing them must not hide |
| 318 | // them. A credential nobody can see is one nobody rotates. |
| 319 | func TestLegacyAppTokensAppearInTheAccountListing(t *testing.T) { |
| 320 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 321 | owner := cliToken(t, fx, "paul@keymail.dev", "code-svc-legacy") |
| 322 | if _, err := fx.st.NewAppToken(OpsAccountID, "titogo", "paul@keymail.dev", "router", time.Now()); err != nil { |
| 323 | t.Fatalf("NewAppToken: %v", err) |
| 324 | } |
| 325 | code, body := getRaw(t, fx.ts.URL+"/api/cli/services/"+fx.sqid, owner) |
| 326 | if code != http.StatusOK { |
| 327 | t.Fatalf("list = %d %s; want 200", code, body) |
| 328 | } |
| 329 | if !strings.Contains(body, `"instance"`) || !strings.Contains(body, "titogo") { |
| 330 | t.Errorf("legacy app token missing from the account listing: %s", body) |
| 331 | } |
| 332 | // The label is the ONLY thing telling two nameless credentials bound to |
| 333 | // the same app apart, so an owner deciding which to revoke needs it |
| 334 | // (C39) — and the listing id is the only handle either of them has. |
| 335 | if !strings.Contains(body, `"router"`) { |
| 336 | t.Errorf("legacy app token listed without its label: %s", body) |
| 337 | } |
| 338 | rows, err := fx.st.ServicePrincipals(OpsAccountID) |
| 339 | if err != nil || len(rows) != 1 { |
| 340 | t.Fatalf("ServicePrincipals = %d rows, %v", len(rows), err) |
| 341 | } |
| 342 | if !strings.Contains(body, rows[0].ID) { |
| 343 | t.Errorf("legacy app token listed without its listing id: %s", body) |
| 344 | } |
| 345 | } |
| 346 | |
| 347 | // TestServiceListRendersTheRotationFacts: the listing exists so an owner can |
| 348 | // decide what to rotate and what to kill, which takes the scope, the age of |
| 349 | // the grant, the age of the current secret, when it was last used and who |
| 350 | // minted it. Asserted as a shape rather than as bytes so the wire may gain |
| 351 | // fields without this failing. |
| 352 | func TestServiceListRendersTheRotationFacts(t *testing.T) { |
| 353 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 354 | owner := cliToken(t, fx, "paul@keymail.dev", "code-svc-list-shape") |
| 355 | tok := serviceToken(t, fx.st, OpsAccountID, "hub", "kass", svcrole.Operate) |
| 356 | code, body := getRaw(t, fx.ts.URL+"/api/cli/services/"+fx.sqid, owner) |
| 357 | if code != http.StatusOK { |
| 358 | t.Fatalf("list = %d %s; want 200", code, body) |
| 359 | } |
| 360 | var out struct { |
| 361 | Services []struct { |
| 362 | ID string `json:"id"` |
| 363 | Name string `json:"name"` |
| 364 | Label string `json:"label"` |
| 365 | Role string `json:"role"` |
| 366 | App string `json:"app"` |
| 367 | Created string `json:"created"` |
| 368 | Rotated string `json:"rotated"` |
| 369 | LastUsed string `json:"last_used"` |
| 370 | MintedBy string `json:"minted_by"` |
| 371 | } `json:"services"` |
| 372 | } |
| 373 | if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(body), &out); err != nil { |
| 374 | t.Fatalf("decode listing: %v (%s)", err, body) |
| 375 | } |
| 376 | if len(out.Services) != 1 { |
| 377 | t.Fatalf("listing = %d rows, want 1: %s", len(out.Services), body) |
| 378 | } |
| 379 | got := out.Services[0] |
| 380 | if got.Name != "hub" || got.Role != "operate" || got.App != "kass" { |
| 381 | t.Errorf("row = %+v; want hub/operate/kass", got) |
| 382 | } |
| 383 | // The listing id is the credential's sha256 — the handle revoke takes, |
| 384 | // and the only one a nameless row will ever have (C36). |
| 385 | if got.ID != hashToken(tok) { |
| 386 | t.Errorf("id = %q; want the credential's sha256 %q", got.ID, hashToken(tok)) |
| 387 | } |
| 388 | if got.Label != "" { |
| 389 | t.Errorf("label = %q; a named credential has a name to be known by", got.Label) |
| 390 | } |
| 391 | if got.Created == "" || got.Rotated == "" { |
| 392 | t.Errorf("row = %+v; created and rotated must both be rendered", got) |
| 393 | } |
| 394 | if got.MintedBy != "paul@example.test" { |
| 395 | t.Errorf("minted_by = %q; want the minter serviceToken recorded", got.MintedBy) |
| 396 | } |
| 397 | // Never used yet, and an empty string says so rather than the epoch |
| 398 | // reading as a real timestamp from 1970. |
| 399 | if got.LastUsed != "" { |
| 400 | t.Errorf("last_used = %q; want empty for a credential never used", got.LastUsed) |
| 401 | } |
| 402 | } |
| 403 | |
| 404 | // TestRotateReplacesTheSecret: rotation is not revocation of the identity — |
| 405 | // same name, same role, same scope — but the OLD secret must stop working |
| 406 | // the moment the new one is handed out, or a rotation done because a secret |
| 407 | // leaked would have changed nothing. |
| 408 | func TestRotateReplacesTheSecret(t *testing.T) { |
| 409 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 410 | owner := cliToken(t, fx, "paul@keymail.dev", "code-svc-rotate") |
| 411 | old := serviceToken(t, fx.st, OpsAccountID, "hub", "", svcrole.Publish) |
| 412 | if status, body := getRaw(t, fx.ts.URL+"/api/cli/apps", old); status != http.StatusOK { |
| 413 | t.Fatalf("the credential does not work before rotation: %d %s", status, body) |
| 414 | } |
| 415 | code, body := postRaw(t, fx.ts.URL+"/api/cli/services/"+fx.sqid+"/hub/rotate", map[string]string{}, owner) |
| 416 | if code != http.StatusOK { |
| 417 | t.Fatalf("rotate = %d %s; want 200", code, body) |
| 418 | } |
| 419 | fresh := jsonField(t, body, "token") |
| 420 | if fresh == "" || fresh == old { |
| 421 | t.Fatalf("rotate returned %q; want a secret that is not the old one", fresh) |
| 422 | } |
| 423 | if status, out := getRaw(t, fx.ts.URL+"/api/cli/apps", old); status != http.StatusUnauthorized { |
| 424 | t.Errorf("the OLD secret still works after rotation: %d %s", status, out) |
| 425 | } |
| 426 | if status, out := getRaw(t, fx.ts.URL+"/api/cli/apps", fresh); status != http.StatusOK { |
| 427 | t.Errorf("the fresh secret does not work: %d %s", status, out) |
| 428 | } |
| 429 | // The identity survives: one row, same name and role. |
| 430 | _, list := getRaw(t, fx.ts.URL+"/api/cli/services/"+fx.sqid, owner) |
| 431 | if !strings.Contains(list, `"hub"`) || !strings.Contains(list, `"publish"`) { |
| 432 | t.Errorf("after rotation the listing = %s; want the same name and role", list) |
| 433 | } |
| 434 | } |
| 435 | |
| 436 | // TestRotateAnUnknownNameIs404: within an account the caller already owns, an |
| 437 | // unknown name is an ordinary not-found — not a cross-tenant probe, exactly |
| 438 | // as findFleetBox reasons about a bad box label inside an owned fleet. |
| 439 | func TestRotateAnUnknownNameIs404(t *testing.T) { |
| 440 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 441 | owner := cliToken(t, fx, "paul@keymail.dev", "code-svc-rotate-404") |
| 442 | if code, body := postRaw(t, fx.ts.URL+"/api/cli/services/"+fx.sqid+"/nope/rotate", |
| 443 | map[string]string{}, owner); code != http.StatusNotFound { |
| 444 | t.Errorf("rotate an unknown name = %d %s; want 404", code, body) |
| 445 | } |
| 446 | // A legacy app token has no name, so an empty-ish name must not reach |
| 447 | // it: rotating "the nameless row" would hand out one secret while |
| 448 | // invalidating several credentials. |
| 449 | if _, err := fx.st.NewAppToken(OpsAccountID, "titogo", "paul@keymail.dev", "router", time.Now()); err != nil { |
| 450 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 451 | } |
| 452 | if code, body := postRaw(t, fx.ts.URL+"/api/cli/services/"+fx.sqid+"/%20/rotate", |
| 453 | map[string]string{}, owner); code != http.StatusNotFound { |
| 454 | t.Errorf("rotate a blank name = %d %s; want 404", code, body) |
| 455 | } |
| 456 | } |
| 457 | |
| 458 | // TestRevokeIsIdempotent: revocation must answer the same 200 whether it |
| 459 | // landed the first time, the second time, or against a name that never |
| 460 | // existed. The person reaching for it is racing a compromise and must not |
| 461 | // have to work out whether their first attempt took. |
| 462 | func TestRevokeIsIdempotent(t *testing.T) { |
| 463 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 464 | owner := cliToken(t, fx, "paul@keymail.dev", "code-svc-revoke") |
| 465 | tok := serviceToken(t, fx.st, OpsAccountID, "hub", "", svcrole.Publish) |
| 466 | base := fx.ts.URL + "/api/cli/services/" + fx.sqid |
| 467 | |
| 468 | first, firstBody := postRaw(t, base+"/hub/revoke", map[string]string{}, owner) |
| 469 | if first != http.StatusOK { |
| 470 | t.Fatalf("revoke = %d %s; want 200", first, firstBody) |
| 471 | } |
| 472 | if jsonField(t, firstBody, "result") != "revoked" || !jsonBool(t, firstBody, "matched") { |
| 473 | t.Errorf("revoking a live credential = %s; want result revoked and matched true", firstBody) |
| 474 | } |
| 475 | if status, out := getRaw(t, fx.ts.URL+"/api/cli/apps", tok); status != http.StatusUnauthorized { |
| 476 | t.Errorf("a revoked credential still works: %d %s", status, out) |
| 477 | } |
| 478 | second, secondBody := postRaw(t, base+"/hub/revoke", map[string]string{}, owner) |
| 479 | unknown, unknownBody := postRaw(t, base+"/never-existed/revoke", map[string]string{}, owner) |
| 480 | // A name that could never have been minted is the same answer again — |
| 481 | // refused before it can reach the audit trail, and indistinguishable |
| 482 | // from every other revoke from outside. |
| 483 | junk, junkBody := postRaw(t, base+"/A%20Name%20Nobody%20Minted/revoke", map[string]string{}, owner) |
| 484 | if second != http.StatusOK || unknown != http.StatusOK || junk != http.StatusOK { |
| 485 | t.Errorf("re-revoke = %d, unknown revoke = %d, unmintable revoke = %d; want 200 from all three", |
| 486 | second, unknown, junk) |
| 487 | } |
| 488 | // Idempotence is the STATUS and the result: every one of these leaves |
| 489 | // the caller with the same fact, that nothing of that handle is live. |
| 490 | for what, body := range map[string]string{"second": secondBody, "unknown": unknownBody, "junk": junkBody} { |
| 491 | if jsonField(t, body, "result") != "revoked" { |
| 492 | t.Errorf("%s revoke = %s; want result revoked", what, body) |
| 493 | } |
| 494 | // ...and `matched` is the non-authoritative half that says which it |
| 495 | // was, so a typo'd name is not a false all-clear (C41). |
| 496 | if jsonBool(t, body, "matched") { |
| 497 | t.Errorf("%s revoke reports matched true, but nothing was live: %s", what, body) |
| 498 | } |
| 499 | } |
| 500 | // And the row leaves the listing rather than lingering as a tombstone |
| 501 | // somebody has to interpret. |
| 502 | _, list := getRaw(t, base, owner) |
| 503 | if strings.Contains(list, `"hub"`) { |
| 504 | t.Errorf("a revoked credential is still listed: %s", list) |
| 505 | } |
| 506 | } |
| 507 | |
| 508 | // TestServiceDoorsAuditAgainstTheApp: every mutation writes an audit row |
| 509 | // naming the human who did it — the credential outlives the session that |
| 510 | // created it, and "who granted this" is the first question asked of a |
| 511 | // credential nobody recognises. An APP-SCOPED credential's rows are filed |
| 512 | // against that app, because the app's activity feed is the one place its |
| 513 | // owner looks; filing them under the credential's name would hide authority |
| 514 | // handed out over someone's app from that app's own page (C38). |
| 515 | func TestServiceDoorsAuditAgainstTheApp(t *testing.T) { |
| 516 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 517 | owner := cliToken(t, fx, "paul@keymail.dev", "code-svc-audit") |
| 518 | base := fx.ts.URL + "/api/cli/services/" + fx.sqid |
| 519 | if code, body := postRaw(t, base, mintBody("hub", "publish", "kass"), owner); code != http.StatusCreated { |
| 520 | t.Fatalf("mint = %d %s", code, body) |
| 521 | } |
| 522 | if code, body := postRaw(t, base+"/hub/rotate", map[string]string{}, owner); code != http.StatusOK { |
| 523 | t.Fatalf("rotate = %d %s", code, body) |
| 524 | } |
| 525 | if code, body := postRaw(t, base+"/hub/revoke", map[string]string{}, owner); code != http.StatusOK { |
| 526 | t.Fatalf("revoke = %d %s", code, body) |
| 527 | } |
| 528 | events, err := fx.st.Events(OpsAccountID, "kass", 50) |
| 529 | if err != nil { |
| 530 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 531 | } |
| 532 | want := map[string]bool{"service-create": false, "service-rotate": false, "service-revoke": false} |
| 533 | for _, e := range events { |
| 534 | if _, ok := want[e.Action]; !ok { |
| 535 | continue |
| 536 | } |
| 537 | want[e.Action] = true |
| 538 | if e.Address != "paul@keymail.dev" { |
| 539 | t.Errorf("%s audited as %q; want the human who pressed it", e.Action, e.Address) |
| 540 | } |
| 541 | if !strings.Contains(e.Detail, "hub") { |
| 542 | t.Errorf("%s detail = %q; it must name the credential", e.Action, e.Detail) |
| 543 | } |
| 544 | } |
| 545 | for action, seen := range want { |
| 546 | if !seen { |
| 547 | t.Errorf("no %s audit row in the app's activity", action) |
| 548 | } |
| 549 | } |
| 550 | // And nowhere else: a row filed under the credential's name would be |
| 551 | // invisible on the page that matters. |
| 552 | stray, err := fx.st.Events(OpsAccountID, "hub", 50) |
| 553 | if err != nil { |
| 554 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 555 | } |
| 556 | if len(stray) != 0 { |
| 557 | t.Errorf("app-scoped credential filed %d rows under its own name: %+v", len(stray), stray) |
| 558 | } |
| 559 | } |
| 560 | |
| 561 | // TestAccountScopedCredentialAuditsUnderItsName: with no app to file |
| 562 | // against, the subject IS the credential, so it keeps the shape fleets uses. |
| 563 | // It exercises all three verbs and checks the actor and the detail, the same |
| 564 | // as its app-scoped sibling — rotate especially, because |
| 565 | // serviceAuditKey(name, "") on the rotate path is pinned nowhere else. |
| 566 | func TestAccountScopedCredentialAuditsUnderItsName(t *testing.T) { |
| 567 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 568 | owner := cliToken(t, fx, "paul@keymail.dev", "code-svc-audit-acct") |
| 569 | base := fx.ts.URL + "/api/cli/services/" + fx.sqid |
| 570 | if code, body := postRaw(t, base, mintBody("root", "admin", ""), owner); code != http.StatusCreated { |
| 571 | t.Fatalf("mint = %d %s", code, body) |
| 572 | } |
| 573 | if code, body := postRaw(t, base+"/root/rotate", map[string]string{}, owner); code != http.StatusOK { |
| 574 | t.Fatalf("rotate = %d %s", code, body) |
| 575 | } |
| 576 | if code, body := postRaw(t, base+"/root/revoke", map[string]string{}, owner); code != http.StatusOK { |
| 577 | t.Fatalf("revoke = %d %s", code, body) |
| 578 | } |
| 579 | events, err := fx.st.Events(OpsAccountID, "root", 50) |
| 580 | if err != nil { |
| 581 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 582 | } |
| 583 | want := map[string]bool{"service-create": false, "service-rotate": false, "service-revoke": false} |
| 584 | for _, e := range events { |
| 585 | if _, ok := want[e.Action]; !ok { |
| 586 | continue |
| 587 | } |
| 588 | want[e.Action] = true |
| 589 | if e.Address != "paul@keymail.dev" { |
| 590 | t.Errorf("%s audited as %q; want the human who pressed it", e.Action, e.Address) |
| 591 | } |
| 592 | if !strings.Contains(e.Detail, "root") { |
| 593 | t.Errorf("%s detail = %q; it must name the credential", e.Action, e.Detail) |
| 594 | } |
| 595 | } |
| 596 | for action, seen := range want { |
| 597 | if !seen { |
| 598 | t.Errorf("no %s audit row under the credential's name", action) |
| 599 | } |
| 600 | } |
| 601 | } |
| 602 | |
| 603 | // TestRevokeAcceptsAnUppercaseListingID (C40) is the one that fires when it |
| 604 | // matters most. hashToken writes lowercase, but an owner racing a compromise |
| 605 | // as often has the id from PowerShell's Get-FileHash, certutil or a pasted |
| 606 | // audit extract — all uppercase. Case-strict, that paste matched neither arm |
| 607 | // and the door answered exactly like a successful revoke, leaving a live |
| 608 | // admin credential behind a false all-clear. |
| 609 | func TestRevokeAcceptsAnUppercaseListingID(t *testing.T) { |
| 610 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 611 | owner := cliToken(t, fx, "paul@keymail.dev", "code-svc-revoke-upper") |
| 612 | tok := serviceToken(t, fx.st, OpsAccountID, "hub", "", svcrole.Admin) |
| 613 | base := fx.ts.URL + "/api/cli/services/" + fx.sqid |
| 614 | |
| 615 | upper := strings.ToUpper(hashToken(tok)) |
| 616 | code, body := postRaw(t, base+"/"+upper+"/revoke", map[string]string{}, owner) |
| 617 | if code != http.StatusOK { |
| 618 | t.Fatalf("revoke by uppercase id = %d %s; want 200", code, body) |
| 619 | } |
| 620 | if !jsonBool(t, body, "matched") { |
| 621 | t.Errorf("revoke by uppercase id = %s; want matched true — the credential was live", body) |
| 622 | } |
| 623 | if status, out := getRaw(t, fx.ts.URL+"/api/cli/apps", tok); status != http.StatusUnauthorized { |
| 624 | t.Errorf("the credential still works after an uppercase-id revoke: %d %s", status, out) |
| 625 | } |
| 626 | } |
| 627 | |
| 628 | // TestRevokeDoesNotFoldACredentialName is the other half of C40, and the |
| 629 | // reason the folding lives in the id arm alone: a 64-character segment |
| 630 | // cannot be a name, so folding there can misroute nothing — but folding a |
| 631 | // NAME would make the segment HUB revoke the credential hub, which is a |
| 632 | // different credential from the one the caller typed, killed silently. |
| 633 | func TestRevokeDoesNotFoldACredentialName(t *testing.T) { |
| 634 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 635 | owner := cliToken(t, fx, "paul@keymail.dev", "code-svc-revoke-case") |
| 636 | tok := serviceToken(t, fx.st, OpsAccountID, "hub", "", svcrole.Publish) |
| 637 | base := fx.ts.URL + "/api/cli/services/" + fx.sqid |
| 638 | |
| 639 | code, body := postRaw(t, base+"/HUB/revoke", map[string]string{}, owner) |
| 640 | if code != http.StatusOK { |
| 641 | t.Fatalf("revoke HUB = %d %s; want 200", code, body) |
| 642 | } |
| 643 | if jsonBool(t, body, "matched") { |
| 644 | t.Errorf("revoke HUB reports matched true — it must not reach hub: %s", body) |
| 645 | } |
| 646 | if status, out := getRaw(t, fx.ts.URL+"/api/cli/apps", tok); status != http.StatusOK { |
| 647 | t.Errorf("hub was revoked by a request naming HUB: %d %s", status, out) |
| 648 | } |
| 649 | } |
| 650 | |
| 651 | // TestUnusableRevokeHandleIsAudited (C42): an attempted revoke that could |
| 652 | // not have worked is exactly the event an operator goes looking for |
| 653 | // afterwards. The early return used to leave no row at all, which |
| 654 | // contradicted the principle stated at the other audit call in the same |
| 655 | // handler. Filed under a subject that cannot be an app. |
| 656 | func TestUnusableRevokeHandleIsAudited(t *testing.T) { |
| 657 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 658 | owner := cliToken(t, fx, "paul@keymail.dev", "code-svc-revoke-audit") |
| 659 | base := fx.ts.URL + "/api/cli/services/" + fx.sqid |
| 660 | if code, body := postRaw(t, base+"/Not%20A%20Handle/revoke", map[string]string{}, owner); code != http.StatusOK { |
| 661 | t.Fatalf("revoke with an unusable handle = %d %s; want 200", code, body) |
| 662 | } |
| 663 | events, err := fx.st.Events(OpsAccountID, serviceAuditSubject, 50) |
| 664 | if err != nil { |
| 665 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 666 | } |
| 667 | if len(events) != 1 { |
| 668 | t.Fatalf("audit rows under %q = %d, want 1: %+v", serviceAuditSubject, len(events), events) |
| 669 | } |
| 670 | e := events[0] |
| 671 | if e.Action != "service-revoke" || e.Address != "paul@keymail.dev" { |
| 672 | t.Errorf("row = %+v; want a service-revoke by the human who pressed it", e) |
| 673 | } |
| 674 | if !strings.Contains(e.Detail, "neither a credential name nor a listing id") { |
| 675 | t.Errorf("detail = %q; it must say the handle was unusable", e.Detail) |
| 676 | } |
| 677 | // The handle itself is unbounded caller-controlled text and must not be |
| 678 | // echoed into the trail — the same reason it never reaches the store. |
| 679 | if strings.Contains(e.Detail, "Not A Handle") { |
| 680 | t.Errorf("detail echoes the caller's handle: %q", e.Detail) |
| 681 | } |
| 682 | } |
| 683 | |
| 684 | // TestRevokeAddressesARowByItsListingID (C36): a legacy kind='app' row |
| 685 | // carries no name — every one of them carries the empty string — so the |
| 686 | // listing id is the only handle it will ever have. An owner who can see a |
| 687 | // credential in the listing must be able to kill it from the same door. |
| 688 | func TestRevokeAddressesARowByItsListingID(t *testing.T) { |
| 689 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 690 | owner := cliToken(t, fx, "paul@keymail.dev", "code-svc-revoke-id") |
| 691 | legacy, err := fx.st.NewAppToken(OpsAccountID, "titogo", "paul@keymail.dev", "router", time.Now()) |
| 692 | if err != nil { |
| 693 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 694 | } |
| 695 | named := serviceToken(t, fx.st, OpsAccountID, "hub", "", svcrole.Publish) |
| 696 | base := fx.ts.URL + "/api/cli/services/" + fx.sqid |
| 697 | |
| 698 | // The id comes off the listing, which is the whole point of carrying it |
| 699 | // there: no caller has to compute a hash to use this door. |
| 700 | _, list := getRaw(t, base, owner) |
| 701 | var out struct { |
| 702 | Services []struct { |
| 703 | ID string `json:"id"` |
| 704 | Name string `json:"name"` |
| 705 | App string `json:"app"` |
| 706 | } `json:"services"` |
| 707 | } |
| 708 | if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(list), &out); err != nil { |
| 709 | t.Fatalf("decode listing: %v (%s)", err, list) |
| 710 | } |
| 711 | ids := map[string]string{} |
| 712 | for _, r := range out.Services { |
| 713 | key := r.Name |
| 714 | if key == "" { |
| 715 | key = r.App |
| 716 | } |
| 717 | ids[key] = r.ID |
| 718 | } |
| 719 | if ids["titogo"] == "" || ids["hub"] == "" { |
| 720 | t.Fatalf("listing did not carry both ids: %s", list) |
| 721 | } |
| 722 | |
| 723 | if code, body := postRaw(t, base+"/"+ids["titogo"]+"/revoke", map[string]string{}, owner); code != http.StatusOK { |
| 724 | t.Fatalf("revoke a legacy row by id = %d %s; want 200", code, body) |
| 725 | } |
| 726 | if status, body := getRaw(t, fx.ts.URL+"/api/cli/apps", legacy); status != http.StatusUnauthorized { |
| 727 | t.Errorf("the legacy credential still works after a revoke by id: %d %s", status, body) |
| 728 | } |
| 729 | // A NAMED row is addressable both ways, so the ergonomic handle and the |
| 730 | // universal one cannot disagree about what they reach. |
| 731 | if code, body := postRaw(t, base+"/"+ids["hub"]+"/revoke", map[string]string{}, owner); code != http.StatusOK { |
| 732 | t.Fatalf("revoke a named row by id = %d %s; want 200", code, body) |
| 733 | } |
| 734 | if status, body := getRaw(t, fx.ts.URL+"/api/cli/apps", named); status != http.StatusUnauthorized { |
| 735 | t.Errorf("the named credential still works after a revoke by id: %d %s", status, body) |
| 736 | } |
| 737 | if _, after := getRaw(t, base, owner); strings.Contains(after, "titogo") || strings.Contains(after, `"hub"`) { |
| 738 | t.Errorf("revoked credentials still listed: %s", after) |
| 739 | } |
| 740 | // The revoke-by-id answer is the same bytes as every other revoke. |
| 741 | _, byID := postRaw(t, base+"/"+ids["hub"]+"/revoke", map[string]string{}, owner) |
| 742 | _, byName := postRaw(t, base+"/hub/revoke", map[string]string{}, owner) |
| 743 | if byID != byName { |
| 744 | t.Errorf("revoke answers differ by handle:\nid: %s\nname: %s", byID, byName) |
| 745 | } |
| 746 | } |
| 747 | |
| 748 | // TestRevokeIgnoresAnIdFromAnotherAccount: the listing id is a handle, not |
| 749 | // an authority. Both store calls are account-scoped, so an id belonging to |
| 750 | // somebody else's account matches nothing here — and, being idempotent, says |
| 751 | // nothing about whether it exists. |
| 752 | func TestRevokeIgnoresAnIdFromAnotherAccount(t *testing.T) { |
| 753 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 754 | owner := cliToken(t, fx, "paul@keymail.dev", "code-svc-revoke-foreign") |
| 755 | if err := fx.st.CreateAccount(2, "bac", "widgets", "bob@keymail.dev", time.Now()); err != nil { |
| 756 | t.Fatal(err) |
| 757 | } |
| 758 | theirs := serviceToken(t, fx.st, 2, "theirs", "", svcrole.Publish) |
| 759 | rows, err := fx.st.ServicePrincipals(2) |
| 760 | if err != nil || len(rows) != 1 { |
| 761 | t.Fatalf("ServicePrincipals(2) = %d rows, %v", len(rows), err) |
| 762 | } |
| 763 | |
| 764 | base := fx.ts.URL + "/api/cli/services/" + fx.sqid |
| 765 | mine, mineBody := postRaw(t, base+"/never-existed/revoke", map[string]string{}, owner) |
| 766 | foreign, foreignBody := postRaw(t, base+"/"+rows[0].ID+"/revoke", map[string]string{}, owner) |
| 767 | if mine != http.StatusOK || foreign != http.StatusOK { |
| 768 | t.Fatalf("unknown = %d, foreign id = %d; want 200 from both", mine, foreign) |
| 769 | } |
| 770 | if foreignBody != mineBody { |
| 771 | t.Errorf("a foreign id is distinguishable from an unknown name:\nunknown: %s\nforeign: %s", |
| 772 | mineBody, foreignBody) |
| 773 | } |
| 774 | // And it says so: a foreign id must never report a match, or the |
| 775 | // non-authoritative signal would be telling the caller they killed |
| 776 | // something in an account they do not hold. |
| 777 | if jsonBool(t, foreignBody, "matched") { |
| 778 | t.Errorf("a foreign id reports matched true: %s", foreignBody) |
| 779 | } |
| 780 | if status, body := getRaw(t, fx.ts.URL+"/api/cli/apps", theirs); status != http.StatusOK { |
| 781 | t.Errorf("the other account's credential was revoked through this door: %d %s", status, body) |
| 782 | } |
| 783 | } |
| 784 | |
| 785 | // TestDoorsForReadsTheGate: doorsFor is derived from cliRoles, so the answer |
| 786 | // an operator is given is the answer the gate will give. A closed door |
| 787 | // appears for no role, and admin sees strictly more than publish. |
| 788 | func TestDoorsForReadsTheGate(t *testing.T) { |
| 789 | s := newConsoleFixture(t).srv |
| 790 | publish := s.doorsFor(svcrole.Publish) |
| 791 | admin := s.doorsFor(svcrole.Admin) |
| 792 | if len(publish) == 0 || len(admin) == 0 { |
| 793 | t.Fatalf("doorsFor: publish=%d admin=%d, want both non-empty", len(publish), len(admin)) |
| 794 | } |
| 795 | if len(admin) <= len(publish) { |
| 796 | t.Errorf("admin reaches %d doors, publish %d; admin is the union of the catalogue", len(admin), len(publish)) |
| 797 | } |
| 798 | inAdmin := map[string]bool{} |
| 799 | for _, d := range admin { |
| 800 | inAdmin[d] = true |
| 801 | } |
| 802 | for _, d := range publish { |
| 803 | if !inAdmin[d] { |
| 804 | t.Errorf("%s is open to publish but not to admin", d) |
| 805 | } |
| 806 | } |
| 807 | for _, closed := range closedDoors { |
| 808 | for _, r := range svcrole.All() { |
| 809 | for _, d := range s.doorsFor(r) { |
| 810 | if d == closed { |
| 811 | t.Errorf("doorsFor(%q) names the closed door %s", r, closed) |
| 812 | } |
| 813 | } |
| 814 | } |
| 815 | } |
| 816 | } |
| 817 | |
| 818 | // A Service credential must name one app. |
| 819 | // |
| 820 | // apiAccountAppBy binds a principal to its app only when p.App != "", so an |
| 821 | // account-scoped credential reaches every app in the account. That is |
| 822 | // tolerable for a role a person mints for their own tooling; it is not for one |
| 823 | // an APP holds at runtime to spend the deployment's CPU on its own data. |
| 824 | // |
| 825 | // The refusal lives in NewServicePrincipal rather than a handler because there |
| 826 | // are two mint doors — this one and the browser form, which explicitly offers |
| 827 | // an account-wide credential — and a handler check would leave one open. This |
| 828 | // test drives the store directly for that reason. |
| 829 | func TestServiceCredentialCannotBeAccountScoped(t *testing.T) { |
| 830 | fx := newConsoleFixture(t) |
| 831 | now := time.Now() |
| 832 | |
| 833 | _, err := fx.st.NewServicePrincipal(OpsAccountID, "svc-wide", "", svcrole.Service, "op@keymail.dev", now) |
| 834 | if !errors.Is(err, ErrAccountScopedService) { |
| 835 | t.Fatalf("account-scoped Service credential = %v, want ErrAccountScopedService", err) |
| 836 | } |
| 837 | |
| 838 | // Bound to an app, it mints. |
| 839 | if _, err := fx.st.NewServicePrincipal(OpsAccountID, "svc-app", "kass", svcrole.Service, "op@keymail.dev", now); err != nil { |
| 840 | t.Fatalf("app-scoped Service credential: %v", err) |
| 841 | } |
| 842 | |
| 843 | // Every other role still mints account-wide — this refusal is about |
| 844 | // Service alone, not a new rule for the whole vocabulary. |
| 845 | for _, r := range []svcrole.Role{svcrole.Publish, svcrole.Instance, svcrole.Operate, svcrole.Admin} { |
| 846 | if _, err := fx.st.NewServicePrincipal(OpsAccountID, "svc-"+string(r), "", r, "op@keymail.dev", now); err != nil { |
| 847 | t.Fatalf("account-scoped %s credential: %v", r, err) |
| 848 | } |
| 849 | } |
| 850 | } |
| 851 | |
amadan