| 1 | | Prior finding | Disposition at `c5393728` | |
| 2 | |---|---| |
| 3 | | R10-1 | **Resolved for the credential exposure.** All tenant roles hide `/etc/carlos`; §9 extends the audit to credential reads. The new probe setup has a separate defect below. | |
| 4 | | R5-2 | **Resolved.** Downgrade checks every row’s paths regardless of flags and requires completed reversal; unflagging nested rows is refused (§8.2). | |
| 5 | | R5-3 | **Resolved.** Directory, socket, unit and slice names consistently use bounded `InstanceID(host)` (§§3.1, 5.3). | |
| 6 | | R2-4 | **Resolved.** Blocking seed execution and `RemainAfterExit=yes` retain invocation identity and results through capture (§§4.2, 5.3). | |
| 7 | | R2-5 | **Resolved.** Completion requires terminal state and cgroup emptiness, including foreign invocations; uncertain stops retain the lease (§§6.3, 6.5). | |
| 8 | | R2-7 | **Resolved.** Recovery derives both endpoints from journal direction, completes that transaction, then converges to current intent (§8.2). | |
| 9 | | R2-9 | **Resolved.** Flat minting, explicit reversal, env asides and completed-reversal downgrade guards cover the reported failures (§§8.1–8.2). | |
| 10 | | R2-14 | **Resolved at spec level.** The IPv6 exception is explicit, bounded, rechecked and reported (§8.5). | |
| 11 | | R1-4 | **Resolved.** Log EOF does not establish termination; blocking observations remain outside the activator mutex (§§6.4–6.7). | |
| 12 | | R1-5 | **Resolved.** Seed preparation, execution budget, cancellation, result retention and termination-before-cleanup are specified (§§6.1–6.5). | |
| 13 | | R1-8 | **Resolved under the recorded decision.** Shared tier limits remain; per-service OOM families are an explicit difference (§4.3). | |
| 14 | | R1-12 | **Resolved.** Named consumer fences and bidirectional journal recovery cover interrupted migration (§8.2). | |
| 15 | | R1-13 | **Resolved.** Reverse recovery and completed-reversal downgrade guards address the reported defects (§8.2). | |
| 16 | | R1-15 | **Resolved for the reported PID/IMDS defects.** No unsafe fallback remains; the behavioural gate is specified (§8.5). | |
| 17 | | R1-18 | **Resolved under the recorded ruling.** Remote operations and reporting are specified; the `foreign` repair residual remains explicitly accepted (§§8.3–8.4). | |
| 18 | |
| 19 | **R11-1 — P2 — §§5.2, 8.5: The control service’s sandbox prevents creation of the new probe fixture.** |
| 20 | |
| 21 | Retain §5.4’s process-authenticated control service. |
| 22 | |
| 23 | [§8.5 requires the control service to stage `/etc/carlos/probe-secret`](/home/paulca/amadan.net/carlos/platform/.claude/worktrees/isolated-exec-spec/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-09-11-isolated-exec-design.md:1664) as `root:carlos 0640` before running the probe. But [the supplied control-service unit](/home/paulca/amadan.net/carlos/platform/.claude/worktrees/isolated-exec-spec/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-09-11-isolated-exec-design.md:857) sets `ProtectSystem=strict` without a writable exception for that path. This makes `/etc` read-only inside the service; ordinary file creation fails with `EROFS` despite running as root. [systemd execution semantics](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/systemd/systemd/v257/man/systemd.exec.xml). |
| 24 | |
| 25 | On a clean rollout, the mandatory fixture therefore cannot be prepared as specified. Honouring the setup failure prevents readiness; proceeding without the fixture makes its unreadability check vacuous. |
| 26 | |
| 27 | **Correction:** assign fixture creation to root bootstrap/tmpfiles, ordered before the probe. Have the control service verify that the fixture exists with the required ownership and mode before accepting the probe result. Keep `/etc/carlos` inaccessible in every tenant template. |
| 28 | |
| 29 | **Verdict: accept with corrections.** |
amadan